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Most lending institutions with ofﬁces in metropolitan
statistical areas are required by the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act of 1975 (HMDA) to disclose informa-
tion to the public about applications for home loans
and the home loans that they originate or purchase
during each calendar year. The law’s requirements
arose from concerns that, in some cases, lenders were
contributing to the decline of certain neighborhoods
by failing to provide adequate home ﬁnancing to
qualiﬁed applicants on reasonable terms and condi-
tions. The disclosure of lending activity is intended to
help determine whether lenders are adequately serv-
ing their communities’ housing ﬁnance needs, to
facilitate enforcement of the nation’s fair lending
laws, and to guide investment activities in both the
public and the private sectors. HMDA is imple-
mented by the Federal Reserve Board’s Regula-
tion C.
Underlying HMDA’s disclosure requirements is a
presumption that more publicly available information
will improve market performance and help prevent
market failures. The data reported under HMDA are
certainly extensive: Taken together, the 8,853 lenders
covered by the law as of the end of 2004 are esti-
mated to have accounted for about 80 percent of
home loans extended that year.
The Congress has amended HMDA on several
occasions to extend the reach of the law to more
lenders and to expand the types of information that
must be disclosed. Amendments passed in 1989 have
been the most sweeping to date. They require that
lenders disclose the disposition of each application
they process for home loans and the income, race,
ethnicity, and sex of the individuals applying for the
loans. As this new information became available, it
revealed wide differences in rates of approval of loan
applications across racial and ethnic lines and thereby
heightened concerns about whether lending decisions
complied with the nation’s fair lending laws. The
disclosures triggered a continuing debate about the
proper interpretation of the data and the signiﬁcance
of the differences in lending decisions. Many lending
institutions have responded to the concerns raised in
the debate by adopting new loan-underwriting proce-
dures to help ensure fair treatment of all applicants
and by initiating a wide variety of community out-
reach and affordable lending programs intended to
beneﬁt minority borrowers and lower-income indi-
viduals and neighborhoods.
In 2002, in its most recent review of Regulation C,
the Federal Reserve Board made a number of impor-
tant changes to the disclosure requirements that sub-
stantially increase the types and amount of informa-
tion made available through HMDA.1 The revisions
are intended to better advance the purposes of the law
by keeping the regulation in step with recent develop-
ments in home-loan markets and by incorporating the
revised standards of classiﬁcation for the collection
of information on race and ethnicity as established by
the Ofﬁce of Management and Budget (OMB).
Most of the recent changes in the information that
is required to be reported under HMDA apply to data
relating to loans extended in 2004. Individual lenders
covered by HMDA were required to make their 2004
data available to the public beginning on March 31,
2005. However, only the September 2005 release of
the data will have been comprehensively checked by
the supervisory agencies for the errors and omissions
that are detectable from a review of the data.
Perhaps the most important change to Regula-
tion C is the requirement that lenders now disclose
pricing (interest rates and fees) for loans with prices
Note: Gregory Elliehausen, of the Credit Research Center of
Georgetown University, prepared a special analysis for this article.
1. See Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (12 U.S.C. 2801), Regula-
tion C (12 C.F.R. pt. 203), and the staff commentary accompanying
Regulation C (12 C.F.R. pt. 203, Supp. I). The Board’s revisions to
Regulation C that are the focus of this article were issued in 2002.
See the following issues of Federal Register (2002), vol. 67: Febru-
ary 15, p. 7222; May 8, p. 30771; and June 27, p. 43218; and Federal
Register (2003), vol. 68 (May 28), p. 31589.
344above designated thresholds. Loans with prices above
the thresholds are referred to here as ‘‘higher-priced
loans.’’ Other important new information being
reported under the revised regulation is whether
the loan is a ﬁrst lien, a junior lien, or unsecured
(characteristics referred to here as a loan’s lien sta-
tus), whether it is secured by a manufactured home,
and whether it is subject to the protections of the
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994
(HOEPA). These new pieces of information allow for
a better understanding of lending activity in the
higher-priced segment of the home-loan market, a
segment that was virtually nonexistent a decade or so
ago and is now a substantial part of the market. The
growth of this market segment, while affording some
consumers greater access to credit, has been accom-
panied by concerns about abusive lending practices,
often referred to as ‘‘predatory lending.’’2 These con-
cerns lend importance to a better understanding of
the higher-priced segment of the market and a greater
ability to monitor the activities of the individual
lenders involved in it.
This article presents a ﬁrst look at the greatly
expanded 2004 HMDA data and considers some of
their implications for the continuing concerns about
fair lending.3 The analysis highlights some key rela-
tionships revealed in an initial review of the types of
data that are new for 2004. Some parts of the analysis
focus on nationwide statistics, and others examine
patterns across groups of lenders, loan products, and
various groupings of applicants, borrowers, and
neighborhoods. The authors explore, in particular and
in some depth, the strengths and limitations of the
information on loan pricing.
We also describe how the Federal Reserve uses the
HMDA data as part of a screening tool to facilitate
the enforcement of the fair lending laws. In this
regard, we discuss the way the expanded HMDA
data, particularly the information on loan pricing,
enhance the utility of the screening tool. At the same
time, we emphasize that, although these data present
valuable new opportunities for researchers and others
to learn more about the home-loan market and for the
regulatory agencies to improve the enforcement of
fair lending laws, the data are not sufﬁcient by them-
selves for drawing conclusions about the fairness of
the lending process or the activities of any individual
lender. For example, credit history scores and other
factors not included in the HMDA data can be criti-
cal in determining loan prices. With regard to this
issue, we collaborated with researchers at the Credit
Research Center of Georgetown University, which
has data on credit history scores and other loan-level
factors relevant to loan pricing. The loan-level data
were supplied to the Credit Research Center by a
small group of lenders that are covered by HMDA
and are active originators of loans in the higher-
priced segment of the home-loan market.
Our examination of the 2004 data also focuses on
the newly reported information about loans on manu-
factured homes. The disposition of applications for
loans to buy, reﬁnance, or improve such units has
an important inﬂuence on the pattern of denial rates
of all loans reported under HMDA. We also discuss
the new information on HOEPA-related lending and
certain requests for pre-approvals of home-purchase
loans and assess their overall signiﬁcance in the
market. Finally, in the article’s summary and conclu-
sions, we review our key ﬁndings and emphasize that
users of the data should exercise particular caution
in drawing conclusions about lending patterns from
HMDA data alone.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF REGULATION C
The Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation C, which
implements HMDA, applies to most depository insti-
tutions (commercial banks, savings institutions, and
credit unions—hereafter, ‘‘banks’’) with a home or
branch ofﬁce in a metropolitan area. Banks that are
exempt from Regulation C are small (currently those
with assets of less than $34 million), or are not in
the home-lending business, or have ofﬁces exclu-
sively in rural (nonmetropolitan) areas.4 Regula-
2. The Federal Reserve has adopted no speciﬁc deﬁnition of preda-
tory lending, but the term is often considered to encompass a variety
of lending practices involving fraud, deception, or unfairness. Some
predatory lending practices are illegal; others, although legal, are still
considered abusive in certain circumstances. Some of the practices
considered questionable or in some cases illegal include (1) making
loans that are based on the asset value of the collateral but are
unaffordable given the consumer’s ability to pay the obligation;
(2) inducing repeated reﬁnancing accompanied by high fees that
provide no material beneﬁt to the consumer (sometimes referred to as
‘‘loan ﬂipping’’); (3) inducing the consumer, through deception or
fraud, to accept loan add-ons, such as single-premium credit insur-
ance; (4) ‘‘steering’’ borrowers qualiﬁed for lower-rate loans into
higher-priced loans; and (5) purposely overestimating the value of the
collateral to overstate available equity or induce a consumer to pay an
inﬂated price for a home.
3. For additional information, see Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System, Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, National Credit Union
Administration, Ofﬁce of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Ofﬁce
of Thrift Supervision (2005), ‘‘Agencies Announce Answers to Fre-
quently Asked Questions about New HMDA Data,’’ press release,
March 31, www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/all/2005/.
4. Although coverage of ﬁnancial institutions under HMDA is
limited to those with ofﬁces in metropolitan statistical areas, covered
institutions must report on all their home-lending activities whether
the properties involved in the loan are located in a metropolitan or
nonmetropolitan area.
345tion C also extends to mortgage and consumer ﬁnance
companies—hereafter, ‘‘mortgage companies’’—
whether such companies are independent or are sub-
sidiaries of banks or afﬁliates of bank holding com-
panies. Coverage of mortgage companies applies
mainly to those that are active in the home-loan
market—that is, those that extend 100 or more home-
purchase or home-reﬁnancing loans per year and
operate in at least one metropolitan area.5
The HMDA data include information about appli-
cants and borrowers, the home-loan products they
seek, the disposition of their requests for credit, and
details about the location of the property that relate to
the application. For information about the channels
through which the HMDA data are released and for a
description of the data that were required of lenders
before the 2002 revisions, see box ‘‘Distribution of
HMDA Data and Pre-2004 Requirements of Regula-
tion C.’’
The New Reporting Requirements
The 2002 revisions to Regulation C are intended to
improve the quality, consistency, and utility of the
data reported under HMDA; they are also intended
to ease regulatory burden, primarily by clarifying
and simplifying parts of the regulation. The new
requirements
• expand coverage to more nondepository lenders
• streamline the deﬁnitions of reﬁnancing and home-
improvement loan
• revise the deﬁnition of application to include cer-
tain requests for pre-approvals (however, in this
article, applications are deﬁned as being for a loan
on a speciﬁc property; they are thus distinct in our
analyses from requests for pre-approval, which are
unrelated to a speciﬁc property)
• mandate for the ﬁrst time the collection of lien
status; property code (to distinguish between one-
to four-family dwellings that are site-built and
those that are manufactured homes); loan pricing;
and HOEPA status
• incorporate changes to the rules on collecting and
reporting information on race and ethnicity to con-
form to guidance issued by the OMB
• require lenders to request the race, ethnicity, and
sex of prospective borrowers who apply by mail,
Internet, or telephone
• revise the categories that identify the type of insti-
tution to which loans are sold
The disclosure of additional data and the revised
deﬁnitions for some currently reported items serve
several purposes. For example, the revised deﬁnition
of reﬁnancing is intended to reduce inconsistency in
the data and to simplify reporting.6 Some of the new
data items—such as lien status and identiﬁcation of
loans for manufactured homes—allow more-precise
differentiation among loan products and consequently
reduce the possible analytical biases that arise when
dissimilar loan products are grouped together. To
ensure that nondepository institutions that are active
home lenders are subject to the same reporting regime
as are other lenders, coverage rules were changed by
adding an annual dollar-volume threshold of $25 mil-
lion of home-loan originations to the current criterion
of 10 percent of total loan originations measured in
dollars.
Pricing information increases the scope of analysis
of HMDA data in support of fair lending enforcement
and makes possible an assessment of pricing patterns
in the higher-priced segment of the home-loan mar-
ket. In addition, designation of HOEPA status can
be used to identify lenders involved in that type of
lending, to measure its incidence in the market, and
to aid in fair lending evaluations and HOEPA com-
pliance. Finally, the new information on requests
for pre-approvals provides more data on consumers’
experiences in the early stages of shopping for a loan
to buy a home, a phase of the loan process that has
heretofore gone largely unreported, and thus should
also facilitate fair lending enforcement.
Transition Rules
To minimize reporting burden and to help ensure
the quality and usefulness of the expanded data,
the Federal Reserve established transition rules for
HMDA compliance that generally did not require
lenders to collect some of the new information for
requests for pre-approval and applications submitted
before January 1, 2004. Among the new information
5. For the details of the coverage rules and for additional informa-
tion about the data collection and reporting requirements, see A Guide
to HMDA Reporting: Getting It Right! published annually by the
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (www.fﬁec.gov/
hmda/guide.htm).
6. Reporting institutions had been allowed to choose from four
scenarios in deciding which reﬁnancings to report. The new rules
deﬁne a reﬁnancing simply as a secured home loan that satisﬁes and
replaces another secured home loan by the same borrower. The
reporting of home equity lines of credit (extended for any purpose) is
voluntary.
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on pricing; the information on whether an application
or loan involved a request for pre-approval and on
whether the dwelling involved was a manufactured
home; and the classiﬁcations of race and ethnicity.
Of all applications involving one- to four-family
units in the 2004 HMDA data, about 2 million, or
7 percent, were ﬁled before 2004, and thus the data
reported on those applications (pertaining to about
1 million loans) might not reﬂect the new reporting
rules. Users of the 2004 data should be aware of this
limitation.
To help users of the HMDA data better distinguish
loans subject to the transition rules, the Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC)
has added a data item to the 2004 CD-ROM that
contains a copy of the HMDA/LAR for each institu-
tion that indicates whether or not an application was
Distribution of HMDA Data and Pre-2004 Requirements of Regulation C
Under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), lend-
ers use a ‘‘loan/application register’’ (HMDA/LAR) to
report information annually to their federal supervisory
agencies for each application and loan acted on during the
calendar year. Lenders must make their HMDA/LARs avail-
able to the public by March 31 following the year to which
the data relate, and they must remove the two date-related
ﬁelds to help preserve applicants’ privacy.1
The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
(FFIEC), acting on behalf of the federal supervisory agen-
cies, compiles the reported information and prepares an
individual disclosure statement for each institution—one for
each metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and metropolitan
division (MD) in which it has ofﬁces—as well as aggregate
reports for all covered lenders in each MSA and other
reports.2 The disclosure and aggregate reports are detailed
tables of data on individual loans and applications.
The disclosure statements and reports are available to the
public at the FFIEC website for HMDA (www.fﬁec.gov/
hmda), from the covered lenders themselves, and from
depositories (such as public libraries and other government
ofﬁces) in each MSA.3 In addition, a copy of the HMDA/
LAR for each institution is available to the public on
CD-ROM for a nominal charge. The FFIEC also makes
available a copy of the ﬁle of population characteristics of
each census tract covered by the tables on individual institu-
tions and by the aggregate tables. The 2004 census tract ﬁle
is derived from the 2000 decennial census. MSA and MD
identiﬁers included on that ﬁle are based on the designa-
tions of MSAs issued by the Ofﬁce of Management and
Budget.4
1. Lenders must make their date-modiﬁed register available to the public
for a period of three years.
2. MSAs that have a single core with a population of 2.5 million or more
and meet certain other requirements contain MDs. Of the 370 MSAs in the
United States, 11 have a population of at least 2.5 million and have a total of
29 MDs. Starting with the release of the 2004 HMDA data, disclosure reports
will follow the guidance provided by the Ofﬁce of Management and Budget
(OMB) regarding the appropriate use of statistical-area deﬁnitions; see Ofﬁce
of Management and Budget (2003), OMB Bulletin, no. 03-04 (June),
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/bulletins/b03-04.html. In conformance with OMB
guidance, the FFIEC will prepare disclosure reports for each MSA and MD.
3. The FFIEC maintains the most recent three years of HMDA data. Data
for earlier years can be obtained from the National Technical Information
Center, Springﬁeld, Virginia, www.ntis.gov.
4. See Ofﬁce of Management and Budget, OMB Bulletin.
Before the most recent revisions, in 2002, the Federal
Reserve Board’s Regulation C required lenders to report the
following information on home-purchase and home-
improvement loans and on the reﬁnancing of such loans:
For each application or loan
• application date and the date an action was taken on the
application
• action taken on the application
— approved and originated
— approved but not accepted by the applicant
— denied (with the reasons for denial—voluntary for
some lenders)
— withdrawn by the applicant
— ﬁle closed for incompleteness
• loan amount
• income relied on in loan underwriting
• loan type
— conventional
— insured by the Federal Housing Administration
— guaranteed by the Veterans Administration






• type of purchaser (if the lender subsequently sold the
loan)
For each applicant or co-applicant
• race or ethnicity
• sex
For each property
• location, by state, county, and census tract
• type (one- to four-family dwelling or dwelling with ﬁve
or more units)
• occupancy status (owner-occupied or nonowner-
occupied)
Information is also reported on home loans purchased by an
institution during a calendar year. Under the 2002 revisions
to Regulation C, additional items became required begin-
ning in 2004.
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of HMDA Data and Pre-2004 Requirements of
Regulation C’’). Users of the 2004 data can make
assumptions or restrict their analysis in various ways
to address problems created by the transition rules.
For example, in preparing the institution and aggre-
gate MSA disclosure reports for 2004, the FFIEC
excluded applications ﬁled before January 1, 2004,
from all tables reporting pricing (but not other)
information.
The transition rules should have little effect on the
data in future HMDA ﬁlings. However, because some
applications have application ﬁling dates that precede
a decision on the application by more than a year, a
few applications subject to the transition rules may be
included when the 2005 HMDA data are reported in
2006.
Lien Status
Information on lien status differentiates home loans
secured by a ﬁrst lien, those secured by a junior
(second or third) lien, and those not secured. (The last
category arises only among home-improvement
loans, for which a security interest in a property may
or may not be taken.) Knowledge of lien status is
basic to credit underwriting because loans secured by
ﬁrst liens have a lower incidence of default than loans
secured by junior liens or unsecured loans; conse-
quently, loans secured by a ﬁrst lien are generally
offered at the lowest rates of interest.
The information on lien status serves a number
of public policy interests. First, the information
improves the measurement of the overall size of the
home-loan market and particular segments within
that market, such as home-purchase lending.
Although HMDA data have always included informa-
tion about the purpose of a loan, recent market devel-
opments have made that information less useful for
measuring lending. Today, many home purchases
involve both ﬁrst- and junior-lien loans. The junior-
lien loan in such transactions is often used to avoid
requirements to purchase private mortgage insurance
(PMI) or to avoid exceeding the loan-size limits used
by some secondary-market purchasers, especially
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (see the appendix for
more information about PMI and the availability of
data on loans backed by PMI). In the past, a loan
backed by a junior lien could not be distinguished
directly in the home-purchase loan data from one
backed by a ﬁrst lien and was therefore often assumed
to represent a separate home-purchase loan rather
than to be one of two used to purchase a single
property.7 The expanded HMDA data allow such
distinctions to be made and consequently help avoid
the double counting of loans in the home-purchase
market.
Second, lien status is essential for interpreting
loan-pricing information and in conducting fair lend-
ing investigations. Regarding fair lending reviews,
the historical lack of information on lien status in
the HMDA data has hampered analyses focusing
on potential differences in the pattern of the dispo-
sition of applications because distinguishing prop-
erly among loan products using only HMDA data
has been difﬁcult or impossible.8 Because the use of
various loan products and patterns of application
disposition can vary across racial and ethnic groups,
an inability to distinguish products can lead to spuri-
ous correlations and potentially inappropriate conclu-
sions about the fairness of the application of credit-
underwriting policies.
Manufactured-Home Status
Available evidence indicates that the credit proﬁles of
individuals seeking loans backed by manufactured
homes differ from those of individuals borrowing for
site-built homes.9 On the whole, loans to purchase
manufactured homes involve relatively high credit
risk, in part because the buyers of such homes tend to
have weaker ﬁnancial proﬁles than do those purchas-
ing other single-family properties. This evidence has
important implications for denial rates and pricing.
Analysis of past HMDA data implied that lenders
denied about 60 percent of all applications for con-
ventional home-purchase loans for manufactured
homes, whereas they denied only about 12 percent of
7. One technique used to identify loans backed by junior liens was
to assume that all loans below a given amount were junior-lien loans.
This approach is ﬂawed because some homes, including many manu-
factured homes, have low prices and purchasers of these properties
often need only a small loan. Similarly, some borrowers make substan-
tial down payments when they buy a home, and in such circum-
stances, the amount of the ﬁrst-lien loan may be small.
8. During some fair lending reviews, lenders have provided exam-
iners with information that has allowed the separation of ﬁrst and
junior liens.
9. A manufactured home is a single-family house constructed
under a federal building code administered by the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The Federal Manufactured
Home Construction and Safety Standards (commonly known as the
HUD code) took effect on June 15, 1976. The result of federal
regulation was to more clearly deﬁne mobile homes as buildings
rather than vehicles—although the HUD code imposes standards to
make sure the units can be transported by truck to the placement site.
The Housing Act of 1980 ofﬁcially adopted this change, mandating
that, for homes built under the HUD code, the term manufactured
housing (factory-built homes) replace the term mobile homes in all
federal law and literature.
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loans.10 Until now, the general inability to accurately
distinguish manufactured-home loans from loans
related to site-built homes complicated the determina-
tion of whether differences in denial rates across
groups of applicants arose from differences in under-
writing practices across the groups or simply from
different mixes of loan products sought by the groups.
Identiﬁcation of applications and loans involving
manufactured homes in the expanded HMDA data
allows for more-reﬁned analysis of the sources of
different denial rate patterns and for greater under-
standing of ﬁnancing activities in this important mar-
ket segment.
Loan Pricing
The home-loan market has evolved in a number of
important respects over the past decade or so. Tradi-
tionally, lenders offered consumers a relatively lim-
ited array of products at prices that varied according
to the characteristics of the loan and property but not
according to the creditworthiness of the borrower.
Effectively, borrowers either did or did not meet the
underwriting criteria for a particular product, and
those who met the criteria paid about the same price.
This market characterization may explain why the
congressional revisions to HMDA in 1989 focused
on the disclosure of data on the disposition of applica-
tions rather than on loan prices.
Since then, improvements in information process-
ing and the maturation of a robust secondary market
for loans have spurred changes in the home-loan
market. Prominent among these changes has been
an evolution toward an explicitly risk-based pricing
of credit. Now the creditworthiness of individual
borrowers can lead to different prices for the same
product. Less-creditworthy applicants, or those either
unwilling or unable to document their creditworthi-
ness or income, are increasingly less likely to be
turned down for a loan; rather, they are offered credit
at higher prices.
Borrowers in the higher-priced market generally
fall into one of two market segments, ‘‘near prime’’
and ‘‘subprime,’’ with individuals in the latter cate-
gory paying the highest prices because they pose the
greatest risk of default. In practice, the dividing line
between these two ‘‘nonprime’’ markets is becoming
increasingly amorphous, as is the line between the
prime (lower-price) and nonprime markets.
Estimates of the annual volume of subprime lend-
ing vary, but all sources agree that this market has
grown substantially in recent years.11 One industry
source estimates that over the period 1994–2004,
the annual dollar volume of subprime home loans
increased from about $35 billion to more than
$530 billion. Consequently, subprime lending is no
longer a minor segment of the market. Subprime
loans are estimated to have accounted for about
19 percent of all home-loan originations in 2004, up
from less than 5 percent in 1994.12
As signiﬁcant pricing variability has emerged in
the market, so have concerns about the fairness of
creditor decisions in this regard. Little information
has been available to assess the merits of these con-
cerns, and only a few fair lending investigations
focusing on pricing issues have been pursued by the
federal banking agencies or the Department of Jus-
tice. In its review of Regulation C that led to the 2002
revisions, the Federal Reserve Board averred the
importance of gathering information to facilitate
assessments of the fairness of loan-pricing decisions,
particularly for nondepository institutions, which
are less likely to be subject to periodic fair lending
examinations. Recognizing the costs incurred by
lenders to comply with such a reporting and disclo-
sure requirement, the Board limited the scope of the
regulation to the disclosure of pricing on loan origina-
tions (not loans purchased from other entities or
applications that did not result in a loan origination)
in the higher-priced segment of the loan market and
to focus within that segment only on dwelling-
secured loans subject to Regulation Z (which does
not cover ‘‘business purpose’’ loans—including some
loans to individuals who do not intend to occupy the
dwelling being ﬁnanced).13
Speciﬁcally, the 2002 revisions to Regulation C
require the reporting of the spread between the annual
percentage rate (APR) on a loan and the rate on
10. In the past, loans on manufactured homes were identiﬁed using
information about the lender’s main line of business. This proxy is
helpful only for lenders focused mainly on manufactured-home lend-
ing. A large number of other lenders also extend such credit, but
because manufactured-home lending does not constitute their main
line of business, determining which of their loans involve manufac-
tured homes has been impossible. See www.huduser.org/datasets/
manu.html.
11. One method of estimating the annual volume of subprime loans
is based on a list of subprime lenders that was developed by HUD and
has been released each year since 1993. The number of loans in the
HMDA data originated by lenders on the HUD list has been used as
an estimate of subprime lending volume. The list has also been used
to support other analyses of subprime lending activity. Of the 224
lenders on the list for 2003, 191 appear under the same name and
identiﬁcation number as reported in the HMDA ﬁlings for 2004.
12. Estimates pertain to home loans backed by one- to four-family
homes; see Inside Mortgage Finance Publications (2005), Mortgage
Market Statistical Annual 2005, 2 vols. (Bethesda, Md.: IMFP).
13. Regulation Z, 226.3(a). The Federal Reserve Board’s Regula-
tion Z (12 C.F.R. pt. 226) implements the Truth in Lending Act.
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with spreads above designated thresholds. The APR
was selected as the measure of the loan’s pricing
because it was regarded as the best single measure of
the ‘‘true’’ cost of a loan. The thresholds for reporting
differ by lien status: 3 percentage points for ﬁrst liens
and 5 percentage points for junior liens. To calculate
the rate spread, the lender uses the yield on Treasury
securities as of the ﬁfteenth day of a given month
depending on when the interest rate was set on the
loan.14
In establishing this disclosure rule, the Federal
Reserve sought to select thresholds that would
exclude the vast majority of prime rate loans and
include the vast majority of subprime loans. The
selection of speciﬁc thresholds was based on loan-
price data from several sources.15 The analysis
revealed that roughly 98 percent of prime ﬁrst-lien
loans have APRs that would likely fall below the
threshold of 3 percentage points for reporting ﬁrst
liens.16 The analysis also indicated that this threshold
would require reporting for about 98 percent of the
subprime loans backed by ﬁrst liens and that the
5 percentage point threshold would capture about
95 percent of the subprime loans backed by junior
liens. Overall, data from the Annual Housing Survey
covering prime, near-prime, and subprime loans sug-
gested that, in a typical year, the thresholds would fall
somewhere in the near-prime range and would
require the reporting of about 10 percent of all home
loans backed by ﬁrst liens and about 22 percent of all
loans backed by junior liens.
In a given year, various factors may inﬂuence the
proportion of loans that have prices placing them
above or below the pricing thresholds. A change in
interest rates can inﬂuence the volume and types of
loans that exceed the pricing thresholds. With gen-
erally rising interest rates, for example, reﬁnancing
activity will be reduced, and consequently a larger
proportion of loans reported above the thresholds will
involve home purchases. Moreover, borrowers who
reﬁnance during a period of rising interest rates are
likely to differ from those who borrow when rates
are falling. When rates are rising, borrowers seeking
to reﬁnance their outstanding loans are likely to have
more-urgent needs for additional funds that can be
raised by a cash-out reﬁnancing or are seeking to
lower their total monthly payment obligations by
lengthening the terms of their outstanding debt.
Changing interest rates also may affect the propor-
tion of adjustable-rate versus ﬁxed-rate loans origi-
nated over the course of a year and thus the mix
of loans reported with rates above the threshold. To
compensate borrowers for bearing the additional
interest rate risk associated with adjustable-rate loans,
such loans typically have lower initial APRs than do
ﬁxed-rate loans with the same term to maturity. If
market participants expect interest rates to rise, these
expectations tend to be built into the term structure
of interest rates (the ‘‘yield curve’’) and to widen
the difference between the initial rates on adjustable-
rate and ﬁxed-rate loans. This widening can increase
the proportion of ﬁxed-rate loans with APRs above
the threshold because the APRs for longer-term
adjustable-rate loans will not rise as much in such a
market as will those for ﬁxed-rate longer-term loans.
HOEPA Status
Long-standing concerns about predatory lending led
the Congress to enact the Home Ownership and
Equity Protection Act of 1994, the ﬁrst federal statute
to explicitly target such lending practices. HOEPA,
which amends the Truth in Lending Act, applies to
closed-end home loans (excluding home-purchase
loans) bearing an APR or dollar-amount fees above
speciﬁed thresholds.17 The act imposes restrictions
on certain loan features, including balloon payments
and prepayment penalties, and requires improved
disclosures for consumers. HOEPA, like most other
federal consumer protection statutes, overrides
weaker state laws but permits states to enact stricter
rules.
14. For such calculation, the rule directs creditors to use the ﬁf-
teenth day of a given month for any loan on which the interest rate
was set on or after that day through the fourteenth day of the next
month. The relevant date is when the interest rate on the loan was
determined, which is often, but not always, set pursuant to a lock-in
agreement between the borrower and the lender. The APR used in
the calculations is the one determined and disclosed to the consumer
under section 226.6 or section 226.18 of Regulation Z. To ease
reporting burdens and to help ensure high-quality data, the FFIEC
makes available a ‘‘Rate Spread Calculator’’ that lenders can use to
determine whether they must report the spread on a given loan and, if
so, what the spread is; see www.fﬁec.gov/ratespread/default.aspx.
15. See the U.S. Census Bureau’s 1998 and 1999 Annual Housing
Surveys, the Federal Reserve Board’s 2001 Survey of Consumer
Finances, the Federal Housing Finance Board’s 1999 Mortgage Inter-
est Rate Survey, and data on subprime lending from the Credit
Research Center of Georgetown University.
16. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2002),
‘‘Regulatory Analysis of Proposed Amendments to Regulation C,’’
staff memorandum, Division of Research and Statistics, January 15.
17. Unlike lines of credit, closed-end loans are amortizing—they
require ﬁxed monthly payments against both principal and interest—
and are thus scheduled to close at the end of a given term to maturity,
when the balance will reach zero. A balloon payment might be
involved if the amortization schedule leaves a relatively large balance
owed at the end of the loan’s term. In contrast, a home equity line of
credit (HELOC) is a revolving account that permits borrowing from
time to time at the account holder’s discretion, up to the amount of the
credit line. Under a HELOC, a consumer may repeatedly pay the
balance down to zero and then redraw against the line.
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modify some of the requirements of HOEPA (imple-
mented by the Board’s Regulation Z), made such a
modiﬁcation in 2001. The 2001 revisions to the reg-
ulation lowered the APR trigger for coverage of
ﬁrst-lien loans from 10 percentage points above the
comparable-maturity Treasury security to 8 percent-
age points (the threshold for junior liens was left
at 10 percentage points), adjusted the calculation of
the dollar-amount trigger for fees to include amounts
paid at closing for optional credit insurance products,
prohibited or restricted certain practices, and required
improved disclosures.18 Although these amendments
addressed some concerns, predatory lending contin-
ues to some degree. Since 1999, about thirty states
and numerous local governments have enacted laws
regarding predatory lending to address certain prac-
tices and contract terms. The Congress has also con-
sidered amendments to HOEPA to broaden its scope
and to preempt state laws, but to date, no ﬁnal action
has been taken.
In its 2002 amendments to Regulation C (the
HMDA regulation), the Board required lenders to
report whether a loan is subject to HOEPA. In so
doing, the Board recognized that obtaining informa-
tion on the volume and pattern of lending covered
under HOEPA would be useful for a better under-
standing of the size of the HOEPA-related segment
of the market and would allow regulators to focus
examinations on the loans and creditors posing the
greatest concern. The HOEPA status of loans at banks
could always be obtained through on-site examina-
tions; but nondepository lenders are not subject to
regular examinations, and thus the extent of their
HOEPA-related lending has been largely unknown.
Moreover, although banks are examined regularly,
the collection of data on HOEPA status on the
HMDA/LAR is a much more efﬁcient way for the
enforce-
ment agencies to obtain the data and allows for some
types of analysis to precede an on-site compliance
examination.
Requests for Pre-Approvals
Prospective homebuyers are often asked by sellers to
demonstrate that they are likely to qualify for ﬁnanc-
ing. In recent years, many lending institutions have
developed pre-approval programs to respond to that
request. Such programs typically provide qualiﬁed
prospective homebuyers with a binding written com-
mitment to ﬁnance their purchase, subject to certain
conditions related primarily to the property to be
purchased and any changes in their ﬁnancial cir-
cumstances. The request for a pre-approval does
not generally identify a speciﬁc property so that, if
granted, it can be used by the prospective buyer with
more than one prospective seller. In the past, the
HMDA records did not include data on requests for
pre-approvals unless they ultimately resulted in an
application related to a speciﬁc property. Under the
expanded reporting requirements, lenders must also
report requests for pre-approval that were denied.
Disclosure of denials of pre-approval requests is
intended to provide more-complete information on
the availability of home ﬁnancing and to facilitate
fair lending enforcement. Lenders have the option
of reporting pre-approvals that were granted but not
acted on by the consumer.19
Changes in the Collection of Data Regarding
Race and Ethnicity
The 2004 HMDA data incorporate the revised stan-
dards of classiﬁcation for government collection of
information on race and ethnicity as established by
the OMB.20 Perhaps the most important OMB revi-
sion allows individuals to select multiple racial and
ethnic identiﬁcations, and HMDA reporting rules
were modiﬁed to conform to these changes. For
HMDA data collected before 2004, applicants for
credit had no opportunity to designate both race and
ethnicity but had to categorize themselves as being
of Hispanic origin or as being in one of ﬁve racial
categories (American Indian or Alaskan Native,
Asian or Paciﬁc Islander, black, white, or other). As
of 2004, applicants may designate more than one
racial category (American Indian or Alaska Native,
Asian, black or African American, Native Hawaiian
or other Paciﬁc Islander, or white) and may designate
one of two ethnicities (either ‘‘Hispanic or Latino’’ or
18. For further details, see section 226.32 of Regulation Z.
19. The only pre-approval programs covered by HMDA are those
in which the decision to grant or deny the request is based on a
comprehensive credit underwriting process in which a lender collects
and reviews the information it typically considers in making credit
decisions in a traditional application (that is, an application for a
speciﬁc property). For a pre-approval program to be covered, the
lender must issue binding written commitments (subject only to very
limited conditions) for consumers whose requests were granted.
Because requests for pre-approval typically do not identify a speciﬁc
home for purchase, the HMDA data do not show the property location
for pre-approvals that do not ultimately result in an application for
credit related to a speciﬁc property.
20. See Ofﬁce of Management and Budget (1997), ‘‘Revisions to
the Standards for the Classiﬁcation of Federal Data on Race and
Ethnicity,’’ Federal Register, vol. 62 (October 30), pp. 58782–90.
New Information Reported under HMDA and Its Application in Fair Lending Enforcement 351‘‘not Hispanic or Latino’’). (Hereafter, for concision,
we refer to the category ‘‘black or African Ameri-
can’’ as black and to the category ‘‘Hispanic or
Latino’’ as Hispanic.)
The changes regarding race and ethnicity will make
it difﬁcult to align the HMDA data for 2004 with
those for earlier years. Most important, applicants
who in 2003 were classiﬁed as Hispanic were not
also classiﬁed by their race. Consequently, a compari-
son of lending activity by race between 2004 and
earlier years might lead some to conclude that lend-
ing to certain racial groups may have changed when,
in fact, the only change was in the classiﬁcation
system.
Changes in the Data-Collection Requirements for
Sales in the Secondary Market
The secondary market for home loans is the arena in
which loans already originated are bought and sold.
HMDA requires that, for a given year, covered insti-
tutions report the sales of loans that they originated in
that year as well the sales of loans that they pur-
chased in that year. For each sale, the institution must
also report the type of purchaser.
HMDA data have long been one of the few sources
of loan-level information describing secondary-
market activities. The 2004 data are reported using
codes that represent revised categories for identifying
the secondary-market purchasers. For the ﬁrst time,
the HMDA data identify loans placed in private secu-
ritizations, which represent a growing segment of the
secondary market. The revisions in the reporting
categories are intended to improve the utility of the
data.
SUMMARY OF RESULTS FROM
THE 2004 HMDA DATA
For 2004, the FFIEC prepared disclosure statements
for 8,853 HMDA-reporting lenders—3,946 commer-
cial banks, 1,017 savings institutions, 2,030 credit
unions, and 1,860 mortgage companies. Of the mort-
gage companies, most (1,464) were independent
entities—that is, institutions that were neither subsid-
iaries of banks nor afﬁliates of bank holding compa-
nies (table 1). The disclosure statements consisted
of 72,246 distinct reports, each covering the lending
activity of a particular institution in each metropoli-
tan statistical area (MSA) in which it had a home
or branch ofﬁce (table 2). The number of reporting
institutions was up 9 percent from 2003, in part
because OMB’s revision of MSA boundaries added,
on net, 242 previously rural counties to MSAs.21
The number of lenders covered by HMDA is large;
however, most of these institutions, whether mea-
sured by number of reported applications or loans
or by asset size, are small. For 2004, 60 percent of
reporting institutions provided information on fewer
than 250 loans or applications, accounting for 1.7 per-
cent of the reported data (table 3). Sixty-three per-
cent of the reporting banks had assets of less than
$250 million, and they accounted for only 2.2 percent
of the applications and loans in the 2004 HMDA
data.22
At the other end of the spectrum, the twenty-ﬁve
lenders reporting the largest number of applications
accounted for about 42 percent of all the applications
reported in the 2004 data (data not shown in table). If
HMDA reporters are further aggregated to their high-
est level of corporate organization (such as a bank
holding company), lending is even more concen-
trated. The twenty-ﬁve largest organizations report-
ing the largest number of applications accounted for
55 percent of the applications in the 2004 data (data
not shown in table).
Volume of Applications and Loans
For 2004, lenders covered by HMDA reported
on roughly 28.1 million home-loan applications
(table 2)—9.8 million for purchasing one- to four-
family homes, 16.1 million for reﬁnancing existing
21. The OMB changed MSA boundaries to encompass 288 previ-
ously rural counties and to exclude 46 counties previously in MSAs.
22. Because of the reporting rules, asset size is generally a mean-
ingful measure of size only for depository institutions. Assets are
measured as of December 31, 2004.
1. Distribution of home lenders covered by HMDA,
by type of institution, 2004
Type Number Percent
Depository institution
Commercial bank ........... 3,946 44.6
Savings institution .......... 1,017 11.5
Creditunion ................ 2,030 22.9
All ......................... 6,993 79.0
Mortgage company
Independent ................ 1,464 16.5
Afﬁliated1 .................. 396 4.5
All ......................... 1,860 21.0
All institutions ............... 8,853 100
1. Subsidiary of a depository institution or an afﬁliate of a bank holding
company.
Source: In this and subsequent tables except as noted, Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council, data reported under the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act (www.fﬁec.gov/hmda).
352 Federal Reserve Bulletin Summer 2005home loans, 2.2 million for improving one- to four-
family dwellings, and 62,000 related to multifamily
dwellings (structures for ﬁve or more families). Lend-
ers also reported on about 5.1 million loans they
purchased from other institutions. In addition, lend-
ers reported on roughly 330,000 requests for pre-
approvals of home-purchase loans that were either
turned down by the lender at the time the pre-
approval was sought or granted but not acted on by
the applicant (data not shown in table). In either case,
those 330,000 requests for pre-approval did not reach
the stage of an application for a loan for a speciﬁc
property.23 The 2004 volume of applications for reﬁ-
nancing fell about one-third from 2003, primarily
because of a rise in interest rates.
Conventional and Government-Backed Loans
Among the reported applications for loans to pur-
chase owner-occupied one- to four-family homes
(both site-built and manufactured), about 90 per-
cent were for conventional loans—that is, loans not
involving a government backing for the lender—
most of which involve ﬁrst liens; the remainder were
for government-backed forms of credit, mostly
involving the Federal Housing Administration (FHA)
(table 4). An even higher share of applications for
reﬁnancings (and home-improvement loans) were for
conventional loans, an indication that borrowers with
government-backed loans either tend to reﬁnance into
a conventional loan or tend not to reﬁnance.
The share of HMDA-reported loans backed by the
FHA has been declining over the past several years,
from about 16 percent in 2000 to about 8 percent in
2004 (data not shown in tables). New, more ﬂexibly
underwritten conventional loan products are likely
attracting borrowers that would otherwise seek FHA
backing. Among these products are interest-only
loans, adjustable-rate products that offer ﬂexible pay-
ment options, and products that allow smaller down
payments, a wider range of credit histories, and
reduced documentation of incomes.
Lien Status
The 2004 data, which include for the ﬁrst time infor-
mation on the lien status of a loan, indicate that a
signiﬁcant minority of reported loans involve junior
liens, particularly loans for home purchases. Among
the loans to purchase owner-occupied homes, 13 per-
cent involved junior (subordinate) liens (data not
shown in tables).24 23. Among the loan originations in the 2004 data, about 470,000
were reported as being initiated through a pre-approval program. This
ﬁgure likely understates the number of originations that began in
pre-approval programs because the transition rules did not require the
reporting of this item on applications taken before January 1, 2004.
24. The HMDA data do not include a code indicating whether
the junior-lien home-purchase loan reported in the data is associated
2. Home loan and reporting activity of home lenders covered under HMDA, 1990–2004
Number
Year









1990 ............ 3.27 1.07 1.16 5.51 1.15 6.66 9,332 24,041
1991 ............ 3.26 2.11 1.18 6.55 1.36 7.91 9,358 25,934
1992 ............ 3.54 5.24 1.23 10.01 1.98 12.00 9,073 28,782
1993 ............ 4.52 7.72 1.40 13.64 1.80 15.44 9,650 35,976
1994 ............ 5.20 3.80 1.69 10.69 1.48 12.17 9,858 38,750
1995 ............ 5.51 2.70 1.75 9.96 1.28 11.24 9,539 36,611
1996 ............ 6.33 4.54 2.14 13.01 1.82 14.83 9,328 42,946
1997 ............ 6.75 5.39 2.16 14.30 2.08 16.38 7,925 47,416
1998 ............ 7.96 11.42 2.04 21.43 3.23 24.65 7,836 57,294
1999 ............ 8.43 9.37 2.05 19.85 3.01 22.86 7,832 56,966
2000 ............ 8.28 6.54 1.99 16.81 2.40 19.21 7,713 52,776
2001 ............ 7.69 14.29 1.85 23.83 3.77 27.59 7,631 53,066
2002 ............ 7.40 17.48 1.53 26.41 4.83 31.24 7,771 56,506
2003 ............ 8.15 24.60 1.51 34.26 7.23 41.49 8,121 65,808
2004 ............ 9.79 16.10 2.20 28.13 5.14 33.27 8,853 72,246
Note: Here and in all subsequent tables except tables 3 and 8, applications
exclude requests for pre-approval that were denied by the lender or were
accepted by the lender but not acted upon by the borrower.
In this article, applications are deﬁned as being for a loan on a speciﬁc
property; they are thus distinct from requests for pre-approval, which are not
related to a speciﬁc property.
1. Applications for multifamily homes are included only in the ‘‘total’’
column; for 2004 these applications numbered about 62,000.
2. A report covers the mortgage lending activity of a lender in a single
metropolitan statistical area in which it had an ofﬁce during the year.
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subordinate loans when they purchase their homes.
Some are seeking to raise funds to cover the down
payments and closing costs of the ﬁrst-lien loans used
to buy their homes. In some cases, funds raised
through the subordinate liens allow homebuyers to
avoid the requirement to purchase PMI for ﬁrst-lien
loans with high loan-to-value ratios. In other cases,
borrowers take out junior-lien loans to keep the
amounts borrowed on their ﬁrst-lien loans within the
loan-size limits used by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
(discussed below).
Owner Occupancy
Some commentators have attributed part of the
strength in housing markets for the past several years
to a growing number and share of home sales to
investors or individuals purchasing second homes as
distinct from those who intend to reside in the units
being purchased. HMDA reports help document the
role of investors in the housing market because the
data indicate whether the property to which an appli-
cation or loan relates is intended as the borrower’s
principal dwelling (that is, as an owner-occupied
unit).25 The HMDA data indicate that the share of
reported lending for nonowner-occupied purposes
remained steady from 1990 through 1995, primarily
in the 4.5 percent to 5.5 percent range (whether
measured in number of loans or dollar amount of
loans), and then began rising. In 2004, the nonowner-
occupied share of the home-purchase market in terms
of number of loans was about 15 percent and in terms
of dollar amount was roughly 13 percent (data not
shown in tables).
with any particular ﬁrst-lien loan. The junior-lien loan may be in the
reported data, but the ﬁrst-lien loan may not be. This distinction can
arise if, for example, the lender extending the ﬁrst-lien loan is not
covered by HMDA. We estimate that about 62 percent of the junior-
lien home loans used to purchase owner-occupied homes in the
reported data are likely associated with a reported ﬁrst-lien home loan
of the same lender—these ‘‘paired loans’’ were extended by the same
lender in the same census tract to borrowers of the same sex, race, and
ethnicity, and the actions taken on each loan in the loan pair were
within a couple of days of each other.
25. An investment property is a nonowner-occupied dwelling that
is intended to be continuously rented. Some nonowner-occupied
units—vacation homes and second homes—are for the primary use of
the owner and would thus not be considered investment properties.
The HMDA data do not, however, distinguish between these two
types of nonowner-occupied dwellings.
3. Distribution of home lenders covered by HMDA, by type of lender and the number of applications they receive, 2004
Type of lender,
and subcategory


















Less than 250 .......................... 80.2 56.7 71.4 31.6 31.3 11.0
250–999 ............................... 16.4 24.5 25.9 24.2 57.2 42.4
1,000ormore .......................... 3.4 13.4 2.7 6.6 11.5 22.6
All..................................... 100 42.8 100 26.8 100 21.2
Savings institution
Less than 250 .......................... 85.1 40.9 71.2 35.7 30.6 20.4
250–999 ............................... 10.7 7.2 25.3 17.8 60.8 57.1
1,000ormore .......................... 4.1 6.5 3.6 5.8 8.6 18.8
All..................................... 100 23.8 100 24.9 100 33.1
Credit union
Less than 250 .......................... 96.9 62.9 84.7 27.5 35.9 9.3
250–999 ............................... 3.0 7.6 14.7 18.4 58.0 58.3
1,000ormore .......................... .1 1.0 .6 3.0 6.0 24.0
All..................................... 100 49.1 100 24.5 100 19.6
All depository institutions
Less than 250 .......................... 86.3 57.1 75.1 30.6 32.3 11.5
250–999 ............................... 11.4 17.7 22.7 21.8 58.2 48.5
1,000ormore .......................... 2.3 10.0 2.2 5.9 9.5 22.0
All..................................... 100 41.9 100 25.9 100 22.5
Mortgage company
Independent .............................. 78.9 21.5 75.0 10.7 83.3 26.2
Af ﬁliated ................................. 21.1 21.2 13.1 13.1 16.7 19.4
All ....................................... 100 21.4 88.1 11.2 100 24.8
All lenders .................................. . . . 37.6 . . . 22.8 . . . 23.0
Memo
All applications, by number reported
by lender ............................... . . . .5 . . . 1.2 . . . 3.6
Note: See table 1, note 1, and general note to table 2.
1. Distribution sums vertically.
2. Distribution sums horizontally.
. . . Not applicable.
354 Federal Reserve Bulletin Summer 2005Lender Specialization
Different types of lending institutions tend to special-
ize in different types of home loans. Mortgage com-
panies, which extended 54 percent of all the home
loans reported in 2004, accounted for roughly 67 per-
cent of government-backed originations. Depository
institutions extended 71 percent of reported home-
improvement loans and about 89 percent of multifam-
ily loans. Commercial banks and mortgage compa-
nies together accounted for about 90 percent of loans
on manufactured homes in 2004.
Secondary-Market Activity
HMDA data document the importance of the second-
ary market for home loans. Of the 20.2 million home
loans originated or purchased in 2004 by lenders
covered by HMDA, 14.1 million, or roughly 70 per-
cent, were sold in 2004 (data not shown in tables).26
Prominent in the secondary market are
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)—in par-
ticular, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.27 For the most
part, the purchases of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
in 2004 consisted of conventional loans originated to
purchase homes or to reﬁnance existing loans. These
two institutions accounted for nearly 35 percent of
the loans purchased by secondary-market institutions.
Other types of purchasing institutions active in the
secondary market include banks (8 percent of loans
sold), private securitization pools (5 percent), and
mortgage and insurance companies (9 percent). In
some cases, the purchasing institution is afﬁliated
with the originating lender—directly, as a subsidiary,
or indirectly, as an afﬁliate of the holding company
that owns the lender. Afﬁliated institutions accounted
for 11 percent of loans sold in the secondary market.
Loans for Manufactured Homes
In the past, users of HMDA data had no certain way
to identify which applications and loans involved
26. The HMDA data tend to undercount the volume of secondary-
market sales somewhat. One reason is that, for example, some loans
originated in 2004 will be sold to a secondary-market institution in
2005 or later and thus will never be reported as a sale. Another is that,
as with other HMDA data, about 20 percent of home loans originated
in 2004 were extended by lenders not covered by HMDA.
27. GSEs are privately owned institutions that blend the character-
istics of public and private institutions. They receive certain beneﬁts
from government sponsorship in exchange for their advancement of
certain public policy goals such as homeownership among lower-
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Less than 250 .......................... 6.3 .7 1.1 .0 60.6 100 2,391 1.1
250–999 ............................... 35.7 8.6 4.4 .4 28.7 100 1,131 1.8
1,000ormore .......................... 58.1 37.3 94.4 20.1 10.8 100 424 19.6
All..................................... 100 6.9 100 2.3 100 100 3,946 22.5
Savings institution
Less than 250 .......................... 11.0 2.8 1.7 .2 49.6 100 504 .4
250–999 ............................... 48.0 17.0 5.2 .8 35.3 100 359 .9
1,000ormore .......................... 40.9 33.8 93.1 35.1 15.1 100 154 11.9
All..................................... 100 12.5 100 5.7 100 100 1,017 13.2
Credit union
Less than 250 .......................... 3.1 .3 .0 .0 75.6 100 1,534 .6
250–999 ............................... 47.7 15.4 10.0 .3 19.5 100 396 .9
1,000ormore .......................... 49.2 63.0 90.0 9.0 4.9 100 100 1.1
All..................................... 100 6.3 100 .5 100 100 2,030 2.5
All depository institutions
Less than 250 .......................... 6.6 .8 1.3 .1 63.3 100 4,429 2.2
250–999 ............................... 41.6 11.6 5.1 .4 27.0 100 1,886 3.5
1,000ormore .......................... 51.8 40.3 93.7 21.8 9.7 100 678 32.6
All..................................... 100 7.5 100 2.3 100 100 6,993 38.3
Mortgage company
Independent .............................. 81.8 27.3 69.2 14.4 78.7 100 1,464 44.2
Af ﬁliated ................................. 18.2 22.5 30.8 23.7 21.3 100 396 17.6
All ....................................... 100 26.2 100 16.4 100 100 1,860 61.7
All lenders .................................. . . . 11.5 . . . 5.2 . . . 100 8,853 100
Memo
All applications, by number reported
by lender ............................... . . . 7.6 . . . 87.1 . . . 100 . . . 100
New Information Reported under HMDA and Its Application in Fair Lending Enforcement 3554. Distribution of home loan applications and home loans, by purpose, lien status, and type of loan
and by type and occupancy status of home, 2004
Loan category
















































FHA ................... 8.3 94.2 .1 8.6 5.8 .1 8.3 100 .1 .5
V A..................... 2.3 97.8 * .9 2.2 * 2.2 100 **
FSA/RHS .............. .4 98.9 * .1 1.2 * .4 100 **
Conventional ............. 89.0 94.3 99.9 90.5 5.7 99.9 89.1 100 99.9 99.5
T otal ..................... 100 94.4 100 100 5.6 100 100 100 100 100
Memo: Number ............. 6,899,878 1,156,788 411,500 26,640 7,311,378 1,183,428 28,345
Junior lien
Government backed
FHA ................... .1 96.1 * 1.5 3.9 .2 .1 100 * .1
V A..................... * 99.4 ** .6 ** 100 **
FSA/RHS .............. * 100 ** * * * 100 **
Conventional ............. 99.8 99.6 100 98.5 .4 99.8 99.8 100 100 99.9
T otal ..................... 100 99.6 100 100 .4 100 100 100 100 100




FHA ................... 2.5 97.2 .6 3.7 2.8 .3 2.6 100 .6 .8
V A..................... 1.0 98.8 .6 .6 1.2 .3 1.0 100 .6 *
FSA/RHS .............. * 96.4 ** 3.6 ** 100 **
Conventional ............. 96.5 98.1 98.8 95.7 1.9 99.4 96.4 100 98.8 99.2
T otal ..................... 100 98.1 100 100 1.9 100 100 100 100 100
Memo: Number ............. 13,695,847 975,583 266,184 10,020 13,962,031 985,603 27,558
Junior lien
Government backed
FHA ................... .1 98.2 .1 .2 1.9 1.1 .1 100 .1 .2
V A..................... * 100 ** * * * 100 **
FSA/RHS .............. * 100 ** * * * 100 **
Conventional ............. 99.9 99.1 99.9 99.9 .9 98.9 99.9 100 99.9 99.8
T otal ..................... 100 99.1 100 100 .9 100 100 100 100 100




FHA ................... .5 95.2 .1 1.0 4.9 .4 .6 100 .1 *
V A..................... .1 97.8 * .1 2.2 * .1 100 **
FSA/RHS .............. * 100 ** * * * 100 **
Conventional ............. 99.4 97.4 99.9 98.9 2.6 99.6 99.4 100 99.9 100
T otal ..................... 100 97.4 100 100 2.7 100 100 100 100 100
Memo: Number ............. 727,677 58,664 19,784 1,275 747,461 59,939 2,751
Junior lien
Government backed
FHA ................... .6 99.7 .9 .1 .3 1.1 .6 100 .9 .1
V A..................... * 100 ** * * * 100 **
FSA/RHS .............. * 100 ** * * * 100 **
Conventional ............. 99.4 98.7 99.1 99.9 1.3 99.0 99.4 100 99.1 99.9
T otal ..................... 100 98.7 100 100 1.3 100 100 100 100 100
Memo: Number ............. 950,082 17,049 12,702 191 962,784 17,240 1,070
Unsecured
Government backed
FHA ................... .4 96.0 .1 .6 4.0 .3 .4 100 .1 *
V A..................... * 100 ** * * * 100 **
FSA/RHS .............. * 100 ** * * * 100 **
Conventional ............. 99.6 97.2 99.9 99.5 2.8 99.7 99.6 100 99.9 100
T otal ..................... 100 97.2 100 100 2.8 100 100 100 100 100
Memo: Number ............. 372,385 21,780 10,785 713 383,170 22,493 489
Memo: Total number ........ 24,783,925 2,338,481 733,784 39,556 25,517,709 2,378,037 61,895
Note: For one- to four-family homes, excludes applications for which occupancy status was missing.
FHA Federal Housing Administration VA Veterans Administration FSA/RHS Farm Service Agency and Rural Housing Service
1. Distribution sums verticaly.
2. Distribution sums horizontally.
* Less than 0.05 percent.
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Loan category
















































FHA ................... 8.8 95.1 .1 16.4 4.9 .1 9.0 100 .1 .5
V A..................... 2.6 97.9 * 2.0 2.1 * 2.5 100 **
FSA/RHS .............. .5 99.0 * .2 1.0 * .4 100 **
Conventional ............. 88.2 97.5 99.9 81.5 2.5 99.9 88.0 100 99.9 99.5
T otal ..................... 100 97.3 100 100 2.7 100 100 100 100 100
Memo: Number ............. 4,654,243 811,816 129,150 15,272 4,783,393 827,088 22,247
Junior lien
Government backed
FHA ................... .1 96.8 * 1.4 3.2 * 0.2 100 * .2
V A..................... * 99.1 ** .9 ** 100 **
FSA/RHS .............. * 100 ** * * * 100 **
Conventional ............. 99.8 99.7 100 98.6 .3 100 99.8 100 100 99.8
T otal ..................... 100 99.7 100 100 .3 100 100 100 100 100




FHA ................... 3.2 97.3 .5 6.7 2.7 .2 3.2 100 .5 .8
V A..................... 1.5 98.7 .7 1.5 1.3 .4 1.5 100 .7 *
FSA/RHS .............. * 96.8 ** 3.2 ** 100 **
Conventional ............. 95.4 98.8 98.8 91.8 1.2 99.5 95.3 100 98.8 99.2
T otal ..................... 100 98.7 100 100 1.3 100 100 100 100 100
Memo: Number ............. 6,405,770 578,753 83,946 5,980 6,489,716 584,733 21,703
Junior lien
Government backed
FHA ................... * 98.0 * .1 2.0 .7 * 100 * .3
V A..................... * 100 ** * * * 100 **
FSA/RHS .............. * 100 ** * * * 100 **
Conventional ............. 99.9 99.4 100 99.9 .6 99.3 99.9 100 99.9 99.7
T otal ..................... 100 99.4 100 100 .6 100 100 100 100 100




FHA ................... .7 96.4 .1 1.1 3.6 .4 .7 100 .1 *
V A..................... .1 98.5 * .1 1.5 * .1 100 **
FSA/RHS .............. * 100 ** * * * 100 **
Conventional ............. 99.3 97.7 99.9 98.9 2.3 99.6 99.3 100 99.9 100
T otal ..................... 100 97.7 100 100 2.3 100 100 100 100 100
Memo: Number ............. 352,066 35,835 8,249 787 360,315 36,622 2,058
Junior lien
Government backed
FHA ................... .6 99.6 .6 .2 .4 2.7 .6 100 .7 .2
V A..................... * 100 ** * * * 100 **
FSA/RHS .............. * 100 ** * * * 100 **
Conventional ............. 99.4 98.8 99.3 99.8 1.2 97.3 99.4 100 99.3 99.9
T otal ..................... 100 98.8 100 100 1.2 100 100 100 100 100
Memo: Number ............. 393,226 7,058 4,599 75 397,825 7,133 653
Unsecured
Government backed
FHA ................... .4 95.4 .1 .6 4.6 * .4 100 .1 *
V A..................... * 100 ** * * * 100 **
FSA/RHS .............. * 100 ** * * * 100 **
Conventional ............. 99.6 97.1 99.9 99.4 2.9 100 99.6 100 99.9 100
T otal ..................... 100 97.1 100 100 2.9 100 100 100 100 100
Memo: Number ............. 147,510 6,302 4,399 267 151,909 6,569 284
Memo: Total number ........ 13,149,825 1,501,556 235,667 22,804 13,385,492 1,524,360 48,150
New Information Reported under HMDA and Its Application in Fair Lending Enforcement 357manufactured homes. To help overcome this limita-
tion, the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) produced annually a list of reporting
institutions (typically about twenty) that it believed
were primarily in the business of extending such
credit.28 Users of the HMDA data often relied on the
HUD list to identify, albeit imperfectly, loans and
applications related to manufactured homes. This
practice had its own limitations—it could not be used
to identify applications and loans related to manufac-
tured homes reported by lenders not on the HUD list,
and users often assumed that all loans by the lenders
on the list were for manufactured homes when some
were not. The expanded HMDA data resolve this
problem by explicitly including a code to identify
applications and loans for manufactured homes. For
background information on manufactured homes, see
box ‘‘Manufactured Homes in the U.S. Housing
Market.’’
Loans for manufactured homes entail more credit
risk than do most other forms of credit extended to
consumers.29 For example, the proportion of loans
for manufactured homes that are thirty days or more
past due is far higher than for most other consumer
credit products and is about twice the rate for conven-
tional loans secured by one- to four-family homes.30
In part, the elevated credit risk arises from more
uncertainty about whether the collateral backing the
loan will retain its original value. Much of the credit
risk arises from the poorer credit history proﬁles of
the typical borrowers in the manufactured-home loan
market compared with those in the site-built home-
loan market.
An individual’s credit history score (a statistical
characterization of an individual’s creditworthiness
based exclusively on information in a credit record
maintained by a credit-reporting agency) is a com-
mon metric of credit risk.31 Among individuals who
have manufactured-home loans (whether home loans
or, as is the case for most manufactured homes,
personal-property loans), the average credit history
score as of June 30, 2003, was 666, a score nearly
70 points lower than the average among individuals
with loans secured by one- to four-family site-built
homes. Moreover, nearly 25 percent of the individ-
uals with loans secured by manufactured homes
had credit history scores below 600, a threshold that
is often associated with high-risk lending, compared
with only about 5 percent of the individuals with
loans backed by site-built units.
Lenders recognize the elevated risks related to
loans backed by manufactured homes and factor these
risks into the interest rates they charge borrowers.32
Lender caution is also reﬂected in the very high
denial rates on applications for loans backed by
manufactured homes.
28. See www.huduser.org/datasets/manu.html.
29. Unless otherwise indicated, information in this section is
derived from the following sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census (for
HUD), American Housing Survey (formerly the Annual Housing
Survey) and the Residential Finance Survey www.huduser.org/
datasets/pdrdatas.html; Manufactured Housing Institute 2004,
www.manufacturedhousing.org; and U.S. Census Bureau 2000 cen-
sus, www.census.gov/main/www/cen2000.html. Information on the
default experience regarding loans secured by manufactured homes
and on the credit history scores of individuals were derived from the
June 30, 2003, credit records of a nationally representative sample of
approximately 300,000 individuals (with all personal identifying infor-
mation removed); the sample was obtained by the Federal Reserve
Board from one of the three national credit-reporting agencies. See
Robert B. Avery, Paul S. Calem, and Glenn B. Canner (2004), ‘‘Credit
Report Accuracy and Access to Credit,’’ Federal Reserve Bulletin,
vol. 90 (Summer), pp. 297–322.
30. See American Bankers Association, Consumer Credit Delin-
quency Bulletin, www.aba.com.
31. To facilitate this discussion, we have adjusted the credit history
scores assigned to the individuals in the Federal Reserve sample of
300,000 credit records (see text note 30) to match the distribution
of the more-familiar FICO credit history scores developed by Fair
Isaac Corporation, for which information is publicly available. See
www.myﬁco.com/myﬁco/CreditCentral/ScoringWorks.asp.
32. In recent years, the manufactured-home lending industry has
been adversely affected by the excessive production of units in the late
1990s and the reliance on the relaxed credit underwriting that accom-
panied the sales of these units. See Neil J. Morse (2004), ‘‘Manufac-
turing the Dream,’’ Mortgage Banking (August), pp. 50–56.
Manufactured Homes in
the U.S. Housing Market
More than 23 million individuals, or roughly 8 percent of
the U.S. population, live in manufactured housing. Typi-
cally, about 10 percent to 20 percent of all construction
starts for single-family housing each year are for manu-
factured homes. Most manufactured homes are assembled
in factories, shipped to a home site, and never moved
once installed. Nearly 80 percent of all the manufactured
homes are owner occupied, a rate more than 10 percent-
age points higher than that for site-built homes.
Manufactured housing is a signiﬁcant source of afford-
able housing. The average new unit cost about $55,000
in 2003, although prices varied, averaging about $32,000
for single-section homes and nearly $60,000 for multi-
section (‘‘double wide’’) units (excluding land costs).
Because the price of a manufactured home is generally
lower per square foot than that of a site-built home, the
manufactured home is particularly attractive to house-
holds with lower incomes. The average annual income of
households owning manufactured homes is less than half
that of those owning site-built homes and about the same
as that of households that rent their homes.
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The 2004 HMDA data indicate that, on the basis
of applications that lenders received after January 1,
2004, nearly 4,400 lenders extended more than
242,000 manufactured-home loans.33 About 57 per-
cent of these loans were for home purchases; most
of the rest were for reﬁnancing an earlier loan (data
derived from table 5). Commercial banks, the largest
source of loans on manufactured homes, extended
46 percent of the total number; mortgage companies
extended 44 percent.
The data indicate further that manufactured-home
lending is a relatively concentrated business. The
ten lenders that extended the largest number of
manufactured-home loans in 2004 accounted for one-
third of all such loans that year, and the top twenty
such lenders accounted for 42 percent (data not
shown in tables). Likewise, 60 percent of the lenders
that extended manufactured-home loans in 2004
extended ten or fewer such loans. The 2004 data
indicate that thirty-ﬁve lenders could reasonably be
considered to have specialized in manufactured-home
lending that year (see box ‘‘The HUD List of Special-
ists in Manufactured-Home Lending and the 2004
HMDA Data’’).
For a number of the largest lenders that extended
manufactured-home loans (measured by the number
of such loans), that business segment was only a very
small portion of their lending activity, according to
the 2004 data. In fact, among the twenty-ﬁve ﬁrms
that extended the largest number of manufactured-
home loans, only three could be characterized as
focused primarily on that business segment. For
virtually all the rest, manufactured-home lending
amounted to 5 percent or less of their total lending
activity.
Of those obtaining loans to purchase manufactured
homes, 41 percent were of lower income, whereas of
those borrowing to purchase site-built homes, about
24 percent had lower incomes (table 6).34 On aver-
age, minority borrowers have lower incomes than do
non-Hispanic white borrowers, but only about 18 per-
cent of manufactured-home purchasers were mem-
bers of a racial or ethnic minority group, whereas
about 30 percent of purchasers of site-built homes
were minorities (data derived from table 6).35 33. As noted, the transition rules regarding the reporting of data
pose difﬁculties for evaluating the 2004 HMDA data for manufactured
homes. Consequently, applications governed by the transition rules
are excluded from tables 5 and 6. Despite the reporting exceptions
created by the rules, some lenders chose to report information on
manufactured-home status for applications submitted before Janu-
ary 1, 2004. However, it is not clear whether these lenders identiﬁed
all, or only some, of the pre-2004 applications for loans on manu-
factured homes, and so we exclude these additional data from the
analysis.
The 2004 data include information on applications or loans related
to manufactured homes from an additional 400 or so lenders—about
4,800 in all—which indicates that some institutions chose to identify
manufactured homes on applications taken during the transition period
(before January 1, 2004).
34. The income category of a purchaser is relative to the median
family income of the area (MSA or statewide non-MSA) in which the
property being purchased is located, and the income category of a
census tract is the median family income of the tract relative to that of
the area (MSA or statewide non-MSA) in which the tract is located:
‘‘Low’’ is less than 50 percent of the median; ‘‘moderate’’ is 50 per-
cent to 79 percent (in this article, ‘‘lower income’’ encompasses the
low and moderate categories); ‘‘middle’’ is 80 percent to 119 percent;
and ‘‘higher’’ is 120 percent or more.
35. For loans with two or more applicants, HMDA-covered lenders
report data on only two. Income for two applicants is reported jointly.
The HUD List of Specialists
in Manufactured-Home Lending
and the 2004 HMDA Data
Before 2004, HMDA reporters were not required to iden-
tify which of their applications and loans involved manu-
factured homes, and identifying all of the lenders offering
such credit was impossible. For 2003, HUD’s list of
manufactured-home loan specialists who are also HMDA
reporters identiﬁed 19 such lenders. Only 13 of the
19 lenders that reported 2003 HMDA data provided
2004 HMDA data under the same name and identiﬁca-
tion number. These 13 lenders accounted for 15 percent
of all the manufactured-home loans reported in the 2004
data. Among the 6 manufactured-home lenders on the
2003 HUD list that did not report in 2004 under the same
name or identiﬁcation number, 2 reported under differ-
ent names and identiﬁcation numbers. These 2 lenders
reported information on only about 950 loans related
to manufactured homes (about 0.4 percent of the total).
Of the 15 manufactured-home loan specialists on the
HUD list that reported data for 2004, only 11 were in fact
primarily involved in extending loans on manufactured
homes.
For 35 lenders that supplied 2004 data (including the
11 on the 2003 HUD list), lending for manufactured
homes constituted at least 80 percent of their reported
lending activity, and so they may reasonably warrant
consideration as specialists in manufactured-home lend-
ing. Among the rest of the approximately 4,400 reporting
lenders that had extended at least one manufactured-
home loan in 2004, about 500 indicated that the propor-
tion of their originations related to manufactured homes
was at least 20 percent but less than 80 percent, and the
remaining 3,900 indicated that the proportion was less
than 20 percent.
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The 2004 data for the ﬁrst time include information
on certain types of requests for pre-approval of home-
purchase loans. Since pre-approval programs pertain
only to requests for loans to purchase a home, the
HMDA data do not include pre-approval information
for applications involving a reﬁnancing or home-
improvement loan. Although all requests for pre-
approval that are turned down must be reported,
lenders have the option of reporting requests for
pre-approval that were approved but not acted on
by the consumer. Because many lenders apparently
chose not to report any optionally reportable requests
for pre-approval, the new data do not account com-
pletely for pre-approval activity. Nonetheless, the
new reporting scheme is sufﬁciently comprehensive
to identify which individuals were denied at the pre-
approval stage and which successful borrowers initi-
ated the borrowing process through a pre-approval
program.
Nearly half of all lenders reported some pre-
approval activity, although the volume of such activ-
ity varied greatly across lenders.36 The ﬁve lenders
that reported the greatest number of requests for
pre-approval accounted for one-third of all such
requests. Some differences in the propensity to
offer pre-approval programs were found by type of
institution; more than half of the reporting credit
unions, savings institutions, and mortgage companies
reported requests for pre-approval, but only about
one-third of the commercial banks reported such
information.
Although requests for pre-approval are far fewer in
number than home-purchase loan applications that
do not begin through this channel, they are not rare
events. The 2004 data include information about
1 million requests for pre-approval for ﬁrst-lien loans
to buy homes and about 100,000 for junior liens. Of
those institutions with pre-approval programs, 82 per-
cent did not report any pre-approval requests that
were approved but not acted on by the consumer, an
indication that these institutions chose not to report
all their requests for pre-approval.
DENIALS AND PRICING IN THE 2004 DATA
A central element of the 1989 revisions to HMDA
was the collection of loan-level data on the disposi-
tion of home-loan applications, and the 2002 revi-
sions to Regulation C expanded this concept to
include loan-level information on pricing. This
Although, as of 2004, applicants may choose more than one race as
well as one of two ethnicities, applications are placed for the purposes
of table 6 and tables 9 through 13 under only one category for race
and ethnicity, generally according to the race and ethnicity of the
person listed ﬁrst on the application. However, under race, the applica-
tion is designated as joint if one applicant reported the single designa-
tion of white and the other reported one or more minority races. If
the application is not joint but more than one race is reported, the
following designations are made: If at least two minority races are
reported, the application is designated as two or more minority races;
if the ﬁrst person listed on an application reports two races, and one is
white, the application is categorized under the minority race.
36. Pre-approvals were subject to the transition rules; conse-
quently, these numbers and the others in this section exclude applica-
tions submitted before 2004.
5. Distribution of loans on manufactured homes, by type of loan and type of home lender, 2004
Type of lender
Home purchase Reﬁnance Home improvement



























































Commercial bank ..... 28.1 5.2 18.8 * 22.5 1.2 ** 45.5 * 50.0 * 92.9 *
Savings institution .... 7.5 10.1 12.5 * 7.9 3.1 25.0 * 4.6 * 30.0 ** *
Creditunion .......... .1 .3 ** .2 .1 25.0 ** *20.0 * 3.6 *
Mortgage company
Independent .......... 45.6 11.2 59.4 * 55.3 3.9 50.0 * 18.2 ** * 3.6 *
Af ﬁliated ............. 18.8 18.0 9.4 * 14.1 3.8 ** 31.8 .1 ** **
All lenders .............. 100 8.6 100 * 100 2.5 100 * 100 * 100 * 100 *
Memo
Number of loans ........ 20,909 32 5,940 4 88 10 28
Note: Excludes transition-period loans (those for which the application was
submitted before 2004). For deﬁnition of manufactured home, see text note 9.
See also table 1, note 1.
1. Distribution sums vertically.
2. Distribution sums horizontally.
* Less than 0.05 percent.
360 Federal Reserve Bulletin Summer 2005section summarizes the aggregate outcomes on both
points. Because the transition rules regarding the
reporting of data create problems for assessing some
of the 2004 data regarding loan pricing, as they do for
manufactured homes and pre-approvals, the analysis
that follows excludes ‘‘transition’’ applications—
those submitted before January 1, 2004 (data on these
applications are shown as memo items in tables 7
and 8). Otherwise, information is given on all appli-
cations reported under HMDA. For presentation,
applications were grouped into twenty-ﬁve product
categories based on loan and property type, purpose
of the loan, and lien and owner-occupancy status.37
For each product category, information is provided
on the number of total and pre-approval applications,
application denials, originated loans, loans with
prices above the thresholds, loans covered by
HOEPA, and the mean and median spreads for loans
priced above certain thresholds.
Denial Rates
For the past ﬁfteen years or so, the HMDA data have
been the primary source of publicly available data on
the disposition of applications for home loans. The
expanded HMDA data for 2004 provide new opportu-
nities to assess patterns in the disposition of applica-
tions at different stages of the lending process and
across product lines and applicant groups.
Denial Rates across Products
The incidence of denials differs substantially across
loan products. Lenders deny only about 15 percent
of the applications for home-purchase loans on one-
to four-family site-built homes, whether the loans
are secured as a ﬁrst lien or a junior lien and whether
they are conventional or government backed
(table 7). In contrast, about 30 percent to 36 percent
of reﬁnancings and home-improvement loan appli-
cations involving ﬁrst liens are denied, as are about
50 percent of the applications for manufactured
homes. The main exception to this pattern is applica-
tions for government-backed ﬁrst-lien loans for reﬁ-
nancings, which have a denial rate similar to that of
home-purchase loans.
Of particular importance are the disposition pat-
terns for applications for manufactured homes. As
noted, past HMDA data did not distinguish appli-
cations for manufactured homes from those for
site-built properties. Analysis of the HUD list of
manufactured-home loan specialists suggested that
such lenders had very high denial rates, and that for
lenders offering both manufactured-home loans
and other home loans a distorted picture of their
propensity to deny credit could easily be drawn. The
2004 data conﬁrm the importance of distinguishing
applications for manufactured homes from those
for site-built properties. For example, adding the
applications for conventional home-purchase ﬁrst
liens for manufactured homes to those for one- to
four-family site-built homes would increase the
number of total lender actions on applications only
7 percent but the number of denials more than 25 per-
cent. The denial rate for the category ‘‘conventional
37. Applications in which the lender reported that the race, ethnic-
ity, and sex of the applicant or co-applicant were ‘‘not applicable’’
were assumed to have been made by businesses (including trusts)
rather than by individuals.
5.—Continued
Type of lender
































































Commercial bank ... 48.4 49.1 24.2 .6 45.8 31.6 41.9 1.1 61.6 4.8 63.9 2.6 89.7 3.7 112,385
Savings institution ... 6.9 50.9 3.4 .6 5.8 29.0 6.2 1.2 5.5 3.1 3.9 1.2 2.5 .8 15,391
Creditunion ........ 3.0 44.6 17.8 6.2 3.5 35.9 7.0 2.7 3.5 4.0 6.2 3.8 4.0 2.5 7,632
Mortgage company
Independent ......... 35.9 48.2 51.2 1.6 33.4 30.5 36.6 1.3 21.2 2.2 19.0 1.0 .3 * 84,940
Af ﬁliated ........... 5.8 30.2 3.4 .4 11.5 40.9 8.3 1.1 8.2 3.3 7.0 1.5 3.5 .8 21,849
All lenders ............ 100 47.1 100 1.1 100 32.0 100 1.2 100 3.6 100 1.9 100 1.9 242,197
Memo
Number of loans ...... 114,021 2,653 77,571 2,908 8,739 4,633 4,661 242,197
New Information Reported under HMDA and Its Application in Fair Lending Enforcement 361home-purchase ﬁrst liens’’ would increase from
14.9 percent to 17 percent (data derived from table).
Although this change might not appear large in the
aggregate, for some lenders it could create a major
distortion.
Denials of Requests for Pre-Approval
Denial rates for applications that begin with requests
for pre-approval can be computed in different ways,
especially since lenders need not report approved
6. Distribution of home-purchase loans for one- to four-family owner-occupied homes, by characteristic of borrower
and of census tract and by type of home, 2004
Characteristic
and status















Income ratio (percent of area median)
Less than 50 .................................... 4.7 93.3 12.2 6.8 4.9 100 205,771
50–79 .......................................... 18.9 95.8 29.1 4.2 19.2 100 798,602
80–119 ......................................... 29.4 97.2 30.1 2.8 29.5 100 1,227,091
120ormore .................................... 46.9 98.3 28.7 1.7 46.4 100 1,933,772
Total 4 ...................................... 100 97.3 100 2.8 100 100 4,165,236
Race
American Indian or Alaska Native ............... .8 96.1 1.2 3.9 .8 100 36,650
Asian ........................................... 4.9 99.7 .5 .3 4.7 100 206,716
BlackorAfricanAmerican ...................... 7.1 97.9 5.4 2.1 7.0 100 305,432
Native Hawaiian or other Paciﬁc Islander ......... .5 98.3 .3 1.7 .5 100 23,246
White........................................... 74.9 96.9 84.4 3.1 75.2 100 3,280,354
Two or more minority races ..................... .1 97.9 .1 2.1 .1 100 3,282
Joint ............................................ 1.4 98.0 1.0 2.0 1.4 100 59,524
Missing 5 ........................................ 10.4 98.1 7.2 1.9 10.3 100 447,970
T otal ....................................... 100 97.3 100 2.8 100 100 4,363,174
Ethnicity
Hispanic or Latino .............................. 11.2 98.2 7.4 1.8 11.1 100 483,253
Not Hispanic or Latino .......................... 76.4 97.1 82.1 2.9 76.6 100 3,341,979
Joint 6 ........................................... 1.3 97.9 1.0 2.1 1.3 100 55,914
Missing 5 ........................................ 11.1 97.7 9.5 2.4 11.1 100 482,028
T otal ....................................... 100 97.3 100 2.8 100 100 4,363,174
Minority status
Minority ........................................ 26.0 98.3 15.9 1.7 25.7 100 1,120,646
Non-Hispanic white ............................. 62.6 96.8 73.7 3.2 62.9 100 2,745,937
Missing 5 ........................................ 11.4 97.5 10.3 2.5 11.4 100 496,591
T otal ....................................... 100 97.3 100 2.8 100 100 4,363,174
Census Tract of Property
Income ratio (percent of area median)
Less than 50 .................................... 1.6 99.1 .5 .9 1.5 100 65,777
50–79 .......................................... 13.2 96.7 16.8 3.4 13.3 100 575,070
80–119 ......................................... 49.2 96.2 71.4 3.8 49.8 100 2,149,842
120ormore .................................... 36.0 99.1 11.4 .9 35.3 100 1,524,643
Total 4 ...................................... 100 97.3 100 2.7 100 100 4,315,332
Racial or ethnic composition
(minorities as percentage of population)
Less than 10 .................................... 32.5 96.5 43.4 3.5 32.8 100 1,417,201
10–19 .......................................... 22.9 97.6 21.1 2.5 22.9 100 988,062
20–49 .......................................... 27.7 97.5 25.7 2.5 27.7 100 1,193,394
50–79 .......................................... 10.2 98.0 7.6 2.0 10.2 100 438,175
80–100 ......................................... 6.6 99.1 2.2 0.9 6.5 100 279,509
Total 4 ...................................... 100 97.3 100 2.7 100 100 4,316,341
Location
Centralcity ..................................... 38.5 98.8 17.1 1.2 38.0 100 1,642,184
Noncentral city .................................. 52.7 97.6 47.3 2.4 52.5 100 2,272,738
Rural or only state known ....................... 8.8 90.0 35.6 10.0 9.5 100 411,822
Total 4 ...................................... 100 97.3 100 2.7 100 100 4,326,744
Note: Excludes transition-period loans (those for which the application was
submitted before 2004). For deﬁnition of income categories for borrower and
census tract, see text note 34. Census tract is for the property securing the loan.
Categories for race and ethnicity reﬂect the revised standards established in
1997 by the Ofﬁce of Management and Budget (OMB); for details, see text
discussion. The term minority means Hispanic or Latino ethnicity or any race
other than white. Census-tract data reﬂect the 2000 decennial census; they also
reﬂect deﬁnitions for metropolitan statistical areas established by the OMB in
June 2003 and used in HMDA for the ﬁrst time in the 2004 data (see note 2 in
main-text box ‘‘Distribution of HMDA Data and Pre-2004 Requirements of
Regulation C’’).
1. Distribution sums vertically.
2. Distribution sums horizontally.
3. For details on the identiﬁcation of borrower income, race, and ethnicity,
see text note 35.
4. Excludes loans for the information for the characteristic was missing on
the application.
5. Information for the characteristic was missing on the application.
6. On the applications for these loans, one applicant reported ‘‘Hispanic or
Latino,’’ and the other reported ‘‘not Hispanic or Latino.’’
362 Federal Reserve Bulletin Summer 2005requests for pre-approval not acted on by the borrow-
ers. One way to assess the disposition of applications
received through the pre-approval process is to com-
pute denial rates for requests for pre-approval sepa-
rately from the denial rates for subsequent applica-
tions related to a speciﬁc property. Another way of
assessing denial rates is to combine the two stages
(pre-approval requests and subsequent applications
for a speciﬁc property) and to treat a denial at either
stage as a denial.
The denial rates for pre-approval requests (col-
umn 3 of table 8) are similar to the denial rates for
all applications for home loans on speciﬁc prop-
erties (column 4 of table 7). Not surprisingly, the
denial rates on applications for a speciﬁc property
that began as requests for pre-approval (derived
from columns 5 and 6 of table 8) are lower than
the denial rates on pre-approval requests and on
applications for a speciﬁc property that did not
come through the pre-approval process. But although
they are relatively low, the denial rates for pre-
approved borrowers are not zero: More than
8 percent of pre-approved applicants for con-
ventional ﬁrst-lien home-purchase loans are turned
down when they apply for a loan on a speciﬁc
property.
If we view requests for pre-approval and appli-
cations for loans to purchase a speciﬁc property as
elements of a single process, the data suggest that
the overall denial rates for applicants for home loans
on speciﬁc properties who came through the pre-
approval process are about the same as for applicants
who did not ﬁrst request a pre-approval. Seventeen
percent of the applicants for conventional ﬁrst-lien
home-purchase loans who came through the pre-
approval process were denied versus 15 percent of
those who did not ﬁrst request a pre-approval (data
derived from tables 7 and 8).
However, origination rates for the two groups were
very different. Only 49 percent of the applicants for
conventional ﬁrst-lien home-purchase loans who
began the process with a request for a pre-approval
ended up with a loan, compared with 67 percent
of other applicants. This difference appears to stem
not from lender actions but from markedly different
rates of withdrawal from the process by applicants.
Thirty-four percent of applications for conventional
ﬁrst-lien home-purchase loans that started at the pre-
approval stage are withdrawn by the applicant at
some point (or not acted on by the lender). The
withdrawal rate for other applications is much lower
(19 percent).
Reported Reasons for Denial
The HMDA data include information from lenders on
why they turned down an application. Lenders gener-
ally provide the information voluntarily; however,
two federal bank supervisory agencies, the Ofﬁce of
Thrift Supervision and the Ofﬁce of the Comptroller
of the Currency, require the institutions they super-
vise to report this information.38
Institutions are allowed to cite up to three reasons
(from a list of nine) that an application was turned
down. Overall, one or more reasons for denial were
provided for about 81 percent of the denials across all
loan products and for about 75 percent of the denials
for home-purchase loans (data not shown in tables).
Poor or no credit history was the most frequently
cited reason for denying applications: Credit-related
issues were cited in about 26 percent of the denials
of applications for conventional ﬁrst-lien loans to
purchase one- to four-family site-built homes and
in about 52 percent of the denials of applications for
such loans to purchase manufactured homes. Other
reasons often cited for credit denials involved exces-
sive debt-to-income ratios, issues related to collat-
eral, and unveriﬁable or incomplete information on
applications; a catch-all category in the HMDA data
labeled ‘‘other’’ was also frequently cited.
Loan Pricing
Because of the transition rules, some unknown pro-
portion of higher-priced loans was reported in the
same way as loans that did not meet the threshold
requirements.39 The inability to identify higher-priced
loans that were originated in 2004 but had application
dates preceding that year means that users of the data
need to take special account of these applications
when conducting analyses.
Reasons for Loan-Price Variation
The HMDA data on loans in the higher-priced seg-
ment of the home-loan market do not include much
38. Reasons for denial are not provided for requests for pre-
approvals that are denied.
39. Analysis of the data is further complicated because loans not
subject to the Federal Reserve’s Regulation Z—that is, business
loans—are reported with the same code as loans with spreads below
the threshold. Some, perhaps most, of these loans are identiﬁable,
however, because, as explained in text note 37, an application can be
identiﬁed as being from a trust or other organization rather than from a
person.
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Acted upon by lender
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Loans with annual percentage rate (APR)















Firstlien ...................... 5,559,099 4,938,892 737,756 14.9 3,745,490 432,364 11.5 58.0 27.5
Junior lien .................... 1,072,726 964,662 164,750 17.1 701,078 270,688 38.6 . . . . . .
Government backed
Firstlien ...................... 652,281 583,299 79,253 13.6 479,498 6,298 1.3 58.3 24.4
Junior lien .................... 1,563 1,254 171 13.6 1,036 29 2.8 . . . . . .
Reﬁnance
Conventional
Firstlien ...................... 12,261,720 9,641,212 2,973,609 30.8 5,708,965 884,108 15.5 53.9 28.1
Junior lien .................... 954,842 785,067 270,594 34.5 439,495 120,500 27.4 . . . . . .
Government backed
Firstlien ...................... 427,105 347,785 51,661 14.9 269,349 4,084 1.5 69.5 19.8
Junior lien .................... 766 451 172 38.1 268 12 4.5 . . . . . .
Home improvement
Conventional
Firstlien ...................... 706,594 619,012 224,727 36.3 339,836 74,584 21.9 49.0 25.9
Junior lien .................... 915,901 784,857 332,508 42.4 376,785 65,185 17.3 . . . . . .
Government backed
Firstlien ...................... 3,876 3,361 820 24.4 2,350 90 3.8 48.9 21.1
Junior lien .................... 5,505 4,899 2,372 48.4 2,142 1,133 52.9 . . . . . .
Conventional or government-
backed, unsecured ........... 364,947 348,629 182,505 52.3 143,856 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Manufactured
Conventional, ﬁrst lien
Home purchase .................. 359,129 347,524 186,618 53.7 98,864 56,498 57.1 22.9 21.8
Reﬁnance ........................ 239,999 201,876 104,276 51.7 71,508 34,171 47.8 32.9 27.3
Other .............................. 99,144 88,765 33,661 37.9 48,565 9,807 20.2 24.3 13.4
Nonowner occupied 5
Conventional, ﬁrst lien
Home purchase .................. 1,112,330 1,003,071 156,925 15.6 760,796 92,715 12.2 59.0 26.8
Reﬁnance ........................ 937,424 808,515 193,158 23.9 539,758 75,537 14.0 53.4 27.4
Other .............................. 234,450 208,729 70,590 33.8 122,321 36,442 29.8 10.7 5.9
Business related 4
Conventional, ﬁrst lien
Home purchase .................. 54,944 50,213 3,062 6.1 45,339 4,244 9.4 49.9 24.7
Reﬁnance ........................ 55,051 47,590 5,952 12.5 38,922 3,997 10.3 45.7 29.0
Other .............................. 29,115 26,444 3,638 13.8 21,427 1,952 9.1 6.3 4.7
MULTIFAMILY 6
Conventional, ﬁrst lien
Home purchase .................. 24,593 22,599 2,372 10.5 19,294 861 4.5 60.2 23.2
Reﬁnance ........................ 23,424 21,619 2,306 10.7 18,468 886 4.8 58.8 23.5
Other .............................. 5,662 5,067 954 18.8 3,942 279 7.1 14.0 10.8
Total .............................. 26,102,190 21,855,392 5,784,410 26.5 13,999,352 2,176,464 15.5 41.4 21.3
Note: Excludes transition-period applications (those submitted before 2004)
and transition-period loans (those for which the application was submitted
before 2004).
1. APR spread is the difference between the APR on the loan and the yield
on a comparable-maturity Treasury security. The threshold for ﬁrst-lien loans is
a spread of 3 percentage points; for junior-lien loans, it is a spread of 5 percent-
age points.
2. Loans covered by the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of
1994, which does not apply to home-purchase loans (for details, see text).
3. Number denied divided by number (not shown) acted upon.
4. Business-related applications and loans are those for which the lender
reported that the race, ethnicity, and sex of the applicant or co-applicant are ‘‘not
applicable’’; all other applications and loans are nonbusiness related.
5. Includes applications and loans for which occupancy status was missing.
6. Includes business-related and nonbusiness-related applications and loans
for owner-occupied and nonowner-occupied properties.
. . . Not applicable.
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Loans originated
Memo
Transition-period applications (those submitted before 2004) Loans with annual percentage rate (APR)

























13.2 1.2 .2 4.1 3.8 . . . 490,846 41,115 9.9 303,881 5.1 . . .
76.2 21.7 2.1 6.4 6.2 . . . 47,351 5,230 13.4 26,475 23.1 . . .
12.7 4.3 .3 4.2 3.9 . . . 85,896 8,172 11.5 56,693 .7 . . .
69.0 17.2 13.8 7.1 6.0 . . . 226 16 9.8 134 2.2 . . .
15.7 2.2 .2 4.2 3.9 7,249 813,761 106,316 18.5 333,550 10.7 322
58.3 28.9 12.9 7.3 6.7 3,987 36,965 6,184 21.6 16,479 23.7 177
9.4 1.0 .3 3.9 3.6 496 49,849 6,008 15.9 23,485 .8 106
58.3 41.7 0 6.7 6.6 2 63 6 21.4 19 0 . . .
19.4 4.5 1.1 4.4 4.0 1,965 13,773 1,733 14.6 7,912 14.6 63
41.5 27.9 30.7 8.0 7.6 5,046 21,962 4,342 24.0 10,646 13.0 158
21.1 7.8 1.1 4.7 4.0 4 391 74 25.0 189 3.7 . . .
23.1 29.3 47.6 9.2 8.9 1,002 273 67 30.9 88 43.2 17
... ... ... ... ... ... 4 , 8 8 1 1 , 2 0 9 2 7 . 1 2 , 1 3 2 ... ...
32.4 16.8 6.0 5.7 5.2 . . . 9,595 1,177 13.8 5,003 22.2 . . .
28.9 8.2 2.8 5.0 4.6 1,830 12,252 2,370 25.0 4,590 21.2 41
30.5 16.4 15.4 6.4 5.5 904 6,679 722 12.5 4,308 4.9 24
11.6 1.8 .8 4.1 3.8 . . . 84,952 7,864 10.8 53,019 7.8 . . .
16.4 2.4 .5 4.2 3.9 612 82,569 11,682 17.3 42,145 9.1 34
50.9 25.6 6.8 6.4 6.1 218 8,684 1,120 15.7 4,739 24.9 6
20.7 3.5 1.2 4.4 4.0 . . . 87,425 11,520 14.9 50,885 5.7 . . .
21.6 3.2 .5 4.4 4.1 104 117,852 25,941 25.4 54,936 10.5 36
64.3 20.9 3.8 6.2 6.1 29 42,414 7,973 22.0 21,444 9.8 121
13.9 2.1 .6 4.1 3.7 . . . 3,607 169 5.2 2,838 3.1 . . .
16.0 1.4 .3 4.1 3.8 29 3,920 262 7.3 3,060 3.0 3
57.7 15.1 2.5 5.9 5.8 7 689 35 5.6 548 2.7 2
27.2 7.7 2.5 4.8 4.3 23,484 2,026,875 251,307 15.7 1,029,198 8.4 1,110
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prices of reported loans. Among the factors reﬂected
in loan pricing are the cost of the funds to be lent,
credit risk, prepayment risk, overhead expenses, loan-
servicing costs, the negotiating abilities and inclina-
tions of the creditor and borrower, the possibility of
discriminatory pricing, and variations in the channels
through which a loan application at a given lender
may be processed (see box ‘‘Reasons for Loan Price
Variation’’).
Issues Raised by Expanding the Disclosure
of Pricing-Related Items
Although disclosures that are more comprehensive
could improve the understanding of loan pricing, it
would impose new costs on lenders to collect and
report the additional data, raise difﬁcult reporting
issues, and might pose privacy concerns for consum-
ers and reveal otherwise nonpublic information about
lenders’ business strategies. Adding new data ele-
ments to mandated disclosures would require institu-
tions to train staff, modify data collection and report-
ing software, and expand controls to ensure the
reporting of correct data.
Further, the fact that lenders differ in the factors
they consider in setting loan prices makes it difﬁcult
to select additional data elements that would allow
a complete understanding of the determinants of a
particular lender’s pricing method. Also, some loan-
pricing items that might be added to the HMDA data
raise technical issues about what, precisely, to report.
For example, if lenders were required to report credit
scores, getting consistent data across lenders would
be difﬁcult because institutions rely on different types
of credit scores in underwriting—for example, some
lenders rely on generic FICO credit history scores
(see text note 31), whereas others use proprietary
credit scores developed from information on their
own experience with lending.
8. Home-purchase lending that began with a request for pre-approval: Disposition and pricing, by type of home, 2004
Type of home
Requests for pre-approval Applications preceded by
requests for pre-approval1
Loan originations whose applications were









Acted upon by lender
Number
Loans with annual percentage
rate (APR) spread








Firstlien ........................ 684,306 153,773 22.5 448,771 396,998 34,665 332,804 27,340 8.2
Juniorlien ....................... 88,793 15,423 17.4 67,757 61,771 4,728 52,671 14,865 28.2
Government backed
Firstlien ........................ 100,118 26,682 26.7 71,632 64,214 7,218 53,527 662 1.2
Juniorlien ....................... 147 35 23.8 118 99 13 83 7 8.4
Manufactured
Conventional, ﬁrst lien ............. 39,791 23,838 59.9 37,592 35,700 22,039 7,430 4,735 63.7
Other .............................. 3,714 935 25.2 2,912 2,351 419 1,787 94 5.3
Nonowner occupied
Conventional, ﬁrst lien ............. 84,763 15,252 18.0 58,101 51,548 5,457 41,564 3,478 8.4
Other .............................. 7,003 1,067 15.2 5,953 5,040 487 4,000 1,307 32.7
Business related
Conventional, ﬁrst lien ............. 3,667 350 9.5 3,317 2,791 244 2,417 364 15.1
Other .............................. 1,540 117 7.6 1,419 1,208 90 1,079 149 13.8
MULTIFAMILY
Conventional, ﬁrst lien ............. 226 29 12.8 207 186 14 167 19 11.4
Other .............................. 16 4 25.0 14 13 2 11 6 54.5
Total .............................. 1,014,084 237,505 23.4 697,793 621,919 75,376 497,540 53,026 10.7
Note: Excludes transition-period requests for pre-approval (those submit-
ted before 2004). See also notes 4, 5, and 6 of table 7 for details on business-
related, nonowner-occupied, and multifamily properties and general note to
table 2.
1. These applications are included in the total of 26,102,190 reported in
table 7.
2. Number denied divided by number (not shown) acted upon.
3. See table 7, note 1.
. . . Not applicable.
366 Federal Reserve Bulletin Summer 2005The potential for compromising consumer privacy
is also a consideration. More than 90 percent of
the loan records in a given year’s HMDA data are
unique—that is, an individual lender reported only
one loan in a given census tract for a speciﬁc loan
amount. These unique loan records can be matched
with other publicly available information, such as
property deed records, to determine the identities
of individual borrowers. With such a match, any data
item in the HMDA database, such as loan pricing,
becomes publicly known. During the Board’s review
of Regulation C, some commenters cited this circum-
stance as a reason not to require the reporting of price
information. Expanding HMDA to include data items
such as credit scores that may be considered highly
personal would likely also raise privacy concerns.
Finally, requiring lenders to disclose additional
information about their lending activities may result
in the disclosure of otherwise nonpublic information
about lenders’ business strategies. HMDA now
requires disclosure of information about lending
patterns—for example, pricing patterns—that other-
wise would not be public. In general, such disclosure
is pro-competitive because it helps possible entrants
to the market identify business opportunities and
lowers the information advantage of market incum-
bents. An argument could be made that disclosing
detailed information about lenders’ business strate-
gies through HMDA might discourage lenders from
testing new products or entering new markets by
creating a risk that, because of such disclosure, a
lender would lose its competitive advantage before
it had recouped the ﬁxed costs of entry. The likeli-
hood of such discouragement would depend critically
on whether potential competitors could discern the
essential elements of a lender’s business strategy
(a discernment that would depend, in part, on which
data items had to be disclosed) and, further, distin-
guish successful business strategies from unsuccess-
ful ones (a distinction that could not be made on the
basis of HMDA data alone). Ultimately, any decision
to add data items to the reporting requirements of
HMDA should be based on a careful weighing of the
costs and beneﬁts of such additional reporting.
8.—Continued
Loan originations whose applications were
preceded by requests for pre-approval Memo
Applications with transition-period requests for pre-approval
(request submitted before 2004) Loans with annual percentage rate (APR) spread above the threshold 3
Percent distribution,














49.2 28.4 20.0 2.0 .5 4.3 4.0 20,444 731 4.3 13,382 3.8
. . . . . . 81.3 16.7 2.0 6.2 6.0 1,269 37 3.4 919 9.6
34.1 7.4 29.5 28.5 .5 5.6 6.3 5,866 351 7.2 3,770 1.4
. . . . . . 71.4 14.3 14.3 6.4 5.3 11 1 10.0 9 0
19.6 23.4 33.5 15.2 8.3 5.8 5.3 172 23 18.4 91 22.0
20.2 0 77.7 2.1 0 5.0 5.3 508 26 6.5 335 0
48.0 21.8 17.0 7.7 5.4 4.8 4.0 2,406 107 5.4 1,493 4.8
0 0 53.8 38.5 7.7 7.0 6.8 184 8 5.8 81 18.5
36.8 19.8 31.0 8.2 4.1 5.1 4.6 1,800 75 4.6 1,393 3.2
.7 0 82.6 11.4 5.4 6.4 6.3 570 21 4.2 450 4.7
47.4 31.6 10.5 0 10.5 5.1 4.1 16 0 0 15 6.7
0 0 50.0 50.0 0 6.8 6.9 1 0 0 1 0
31.0 18.4 39.5 9.0 2.1 5.1 5.0 33,247 1,380 5.0 21,939 3.8
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As in credit underwriting, loan pricing reﬂects a wide
variety of factors.
Cost of funds. The cost of funds is the largest element in the
overall cost of extending prime-market home loans and a
signiﬁcant factor for loans in the higher-priced segment of
the market. Funding costs vary with the expected duration
of the debt and the creditworthiness of the borrower. Also,
many creditors originate loans for subsequent sale in
the secondary market; consequently, the prices offered by
secondary-market participants for home loans bear heavily
on the pricing decisions for such loans.
Credit risk. Credit risk is the probability that a loan will go
into default. Loans that involve greater credit risk carry
higher prices. On average, loans in the prime market entail
substantially lower credit risk than do those in the subprime
market.1 Interest rates on loans increase with the rate of
serious delinquency, even for subprime loans, an indication
that loans that pose greater credit risk carry higher rates of
interest (chart A).
Credit risk is a function of the creditworthiness of the
borrower, the equity in the home securing the loan, and the
likelihood that proceeds of a foreclosure sale of the home
will satisfy the obligation if default occurs. In general, the
1. See Amy Crews Cutts and Robert Van Order (2004), ‘‘On the Econom-
ics of Subprime Lending,’’ Freddie Mac Working Paper 04-01 (Washington:
Freddie Mac, January), www.freddiemac.com/corporate/reports.
creditworthiness of borrowers is related to their income and
employment prospects; available assets if ﬁnancial prob-
lems arise; claims on their income from servicing other
debts; and credit history, which, in part, reﬂects their will-
ingness and ability to repay credit. As noted, in underwrit-
ing loans, credit history is often summarized and measured
by a credit history score. Equity in a home is measured at
the time of loan origination by a loan-to-value ratio (LTV).
The importance of credit history in loan pricing is illus-
trated by the fact that interest rates are higher for loans with
lower credit history scores (chart B). For the most part,
borrowers in the prime segment of the market have credit
history scores that indicate they pose relatively little credit
risk. Borrowers in the higher-priced segment of the market
typically have weaker credit history proﬁles for one or
more of several reasons: previous failures to make loan
payments as scheduled, collection agency actions, bank-
ruptcy or adverse court judgments, or little or no previous
experience with credit.
Prepayment risk. Prepayment risk measures the possibility
that a loan will be repaid before the end of the loan term.
Most early payoffs of home loans are attributable either to
the sale of the home or the reﬁnancing of the loan, typically
when rates have fallen sufﬁciently from the rate on the
existing loan. Because a prepayment results in payment of
the principal ahead of schedule, the lender (or secondary-
market investor) must reinvest the funds at the new market
rate, which may be lower than the old rate, particularly in





















Interest rate on loan
A. Percentage of selected subprime loans delinquent 
ninety days or more or in foreclosure, by interest rate 
on loan, May 2005  
NOTE: The loans, which consist of 1.5 million home loans from among
twenty-five active subprime lenders, are first- and second-lien home-
purchase and home-refinancing loans originated in the second quarter of
2001. Performance is as of May 2005. 





620–639 640–659 660–679 680–699 700–759 760–850
Range of credit history scores
B. Interest rates offered on thirty-year fixed-rate 
mortgages, by credit history score of borrower, 
July 2005  
NOTE: Based on a nationwide tabulation of lenders; loan amount is
$150,000. 
SOURCE: Fair Isaac Corporation (www.myfico.com, accessed on July 18,
2005). 
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Although the possibility of prepayment is well under-
stood, estimating when it will happen is quite difﬁcult. For
this reason, lenders compensate for the risk either by includ-
ing prepayment penalties in their loan contracts or by pric-
ing the risk in their calculation of the interest rate on the
loan. The ﬁrst of these options, the prepayment penalty, is
rare in the prime segment of the market but is more com-
mon in the subprime segment.
Borrowers in the higher-priced segment of the home-loan
market have higher prepayment rates than others because
many of them improve their credit proﬁles over time as they
make regular payments, and this improvement in turn
allows them to qualify for a lower-rate loan. Our review of
depersonalized credit record information from one of the
three national credit-reporting agencies indicates that, as of
June 30, 2003, almost one-fourth of those with outstanding
home-loan debt and with credit history scores between 580
and 620 (a credit score range associated with individuals
with subprime credit quality) increased their credit scores
40 points or more over the ensuing eighteen-month period.
A change in credit score of this magnitude would typically
be sufﬁcient to move their credit risk proﬁles into the
near-prime or prime segment of the market.2
The effect of even a small improvement in the credit
history score is much larger for borrowers in the higher-
priced segment of the home-loan market than for those
in the prime segment. For a higher-priced loan, a small
improvement in the borrower’s credit history score may
translate into a substantial reduction in interest rates and
may encourage prepayment (chart B).3 Because pricing in
the prime segment varies little by credit score, borrowers in
the prime market are less likely to obtain a lower-priced
loan if their credit scores improve.
Another factor that may result in elevated rates of prepay-
ment in the higher-priced portion of the market is the
practice referred to as ‘‘loan ﬂipping.’’ Flipping is inducing
a borrower to reﬁnance a loan repeatedly—even though
the reﬁnancing may not be in the borrower’s interest—and
charging high fees with each reﬁnancing.
Overhead expenses. Overhead expenses represent a fairly
small component of the cost of lending for most home
loans. However, borrowers who have experienced payment
problems in the past, or who have little or no credit history,
or who are unable or unwilling to document their employ-
ment histories or income are likely to require more time to
underwrite. The higher cost of underwriting may be passed
on to such borrowers and can result in prices that place their
loans in the higher-priced segment of the market. Marketing
2. The three national credit-reporting agencies are Equifax
(www.equifax.com), Experian (www.experian.com), and Trans Union Cor-
poration (www.transunion.com).
3. Of course, prepayment penalties may deter prepayment among some
borrowers in the higher-priced segment of the market even when their credit
scores improve.
and other expenses incurred to identify market opportuni-
ties and solicit customers may also differ across segments of
the home-loan market.
Servicing costs. Servicing costs are expenses incurred to
process and distribute loan payments, monitor accounts,
and deal with borrowers who fall behind in their payments.
Servicing costs can be particularly high if the loan involves
a foreclosure—that is, a forced sale. Because the higher-
priced segment of the market has high rates of serious
delinquency, servicing costs are higher than in the prime
market. And because higher-priced loans tend to be smaller
than prime loans, the costs of servicing and the costs of
extra underwriting efforts (noted earlier) must be spread
over a smaller dollar volume of loans. Borrowing a rela-
tively small amount increases the possibility that elevated
costs will lead to a higher-priced loan because any given
amount of ﬁxed costs passed on to the borrower increases
the APR more on a smaller loan than on a larger loan.
Hence, these costs have a larger effect on loan prices in the
higher-priced segment of the market than in the prime
segment.
In general, the cost and risk-related factors noted earlier
may be measured in an objective way and are demonstrably
related to the costs, and hence the prices established, for
credit. Two additional, and related, pricing factors are not
necessarily objective and, moreover, are more likely than
others to raise fair lending concerns: discretionary pricing
by loan ofﬁcers and price negotiations between creditor and
applicant.
Discretionary pricing. Many creditors provide their loan
ofﬁcers and agents working on their behalf (for example,
mortgage brokers) with rate sheets that indicate the credi-
tors’ minimum prices by product (for example, for con-
ventional loans of various types or with various types of
government backing), loan characteristics (for example,
term to maturity and LTV ratio), and borrower creditworthi-
ness (for example, credit history score and debt-to-income
ratio). In some cases, loan ofﬁcers and brokers are allowed
to deviate from these prices as market conditions warrant
or allow. A loan ofﬁcer may quote a prospective borrower
a price above the rate sheet (sometimes referred to as an
‘‘overage’’), and if the consumer accepts the price without
demanding cash back to offset loan fees or other closing
costs, the contract interest rate or loan fees on such ‘‘over-
aged loans’’ will be higher than they might otherwise have
been.
Discretionary pricing can be a legitimate business prac-
tice and can help ensure that markets allocate resources
in the most efﬁcient way. However, when loan ofﬁcers are
permitted latitude in establishing prices, the lender runs the
risk that differential treatment on a basis prohibited by law
may arise. Obtaining overages more often, or in higher
New Information Reported under HMDA and Its Application in Fair Lending Enforcement 369The Interest Rate Situation in 2004
The interest rates prevailing in a given year can
signiﬁcantly affect the proportion of loans that exceed
the thresholds established by the Federal Reserve for
determining whether a loan is ‘‘higher-priced.’’ For
2004, the rate on Treasury securities used to calculate
the spread for home loans with thirty-year terms
varied from 4.67 percent to 5.54 percent. This varia-
tion implies that the threshold for reporting a ﬁrst-
lien loan as higher-priced ranged from 7.67 percent
to 8.54 percent over the year. For junior liens, which
typically have a shorter term to maturity than do
ﬁrst liens, the reporting threshold ranged from about
8.78 percent to 9.79 percent for a ﬁfteen-year loan
(different terms to maturity would yield somewhat
different ranges).
Data derived by Freddie Mac from its Primary
Mortgage Market Survey show that the spread for
average interest rates for ﬁrst-lien conforming mort-
gages extended in 2004 imply a typical gap between
the thirty-year Treasury rate and an estimated APR
for prime-rate loans of between 1 percent and
1.25 percent.40 This gap implies that a thirty-year
ﬁrst-lien home loan would have to have been priced
between 1.75 percentage points and 2 percentage
points above a prime-rate home loan to exceed the
HMDA price-reporting threshold. Such a price spread
was around the upper end of the near-prime market,
but it was probably still below the levels associated
with most subprime loans. In future years, the thresh-
olds may cover a greater proportion of the near-prime
segment of the market.
Results: The Incidence of Higher-Priced Lending
Several patterns are revealed in the 2004 HMDA
pricing data (table 7). First, in almost all cases,
government-backed loan products show lower inci-
dences of higher-priced lending than do comparable
conventional loan products. For example, among
ﬁrst-lien home-purchase loans for site-built homes,
11.5 percent of conventional loans have APRs above
40. See www.freddiemac.com.
Reasons for Loan Price Variation—Continued
amounts, from minority borrowers or targeting only minori-
ties for overaging may constitute a fair lending violation
unless some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason exists for
the result.
Price negotiations. Price variation can also arise because
less sophisticated or less knowledgeable borrowers are not
as likely to shop for credit or to realize that they may
negotiate with the lender over the interest rate and fees.
Moreover, lower-income borrowers may be disproportion-
ately represented in the category of less sophisticated bor-
rowers. Given that minority borrowers have disproportion-
ately lower incomes, there is some likelihood that they will
be overrepresented among borrowers with overaged loans.
Such results may be interpreted by some as demonstrating
unlawful discriminatory pricing by lenders.
Differences in the extent to which borrowers negotiate or
shop for the best deal may result in a pattern of overage
loans that is not illegal but that nonetheless may be difﬁcult
for a lender to document and explain. Moreover, instances
of different negotiating strengths among borrowers can be
difﬁcult to distinguish from illegal discriminatory treatment
in which loan ofﬁcers quote loan rates or provide informa-
tion or assistance that varies according to the race, ethnicity,
sex, or other prohibited characteristic of the borrower.
Variations in loan-processing channels. The delivery chan-
nels through which borrowers obtain loans vary widely
across lenders. On the one hand, underwriting and pricing
may be centrally controlled even though the application
may begin on the Internet or with a mailed solicitation or
at a bank branch. On the other hand, in complex ﬁnancial
organizations with bank branches, multiple afﬁliates, decen-
tralized loan production ofﬁces, indirect brokerage opera-
tions, and nonbank subsidiaries, each application may
be subject to a different underwriting and pricing regime
depending on its point of initiation. The 2004 HMDA
pricing data suggest that the delivery channel through
which a borrower obtains a loan may matter. As dis-
cussed elsewhere in this article (see section ‘‘Incidence
of Higher-Priced Lending for Selected Subgroups’’), the
incidence of higher-priced lending is higher for borrowers
who live outside the assessment areas of lenders covered by
the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA) than for
those who live inside these areas.4 This difference may be
due to a reliance on different delivery channels for loans
within and outside these lenders’ assessment areas.
4. The assessment areas of lenders covered by the CRA include princi-
pally the locales in which a lender has its main or branch ofﬁces and its
deposit-taking automated teller machines. For a more complete deﬁnition
of CRA assessment areas, see the Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation BB,
section 228.41. See also Robert B. Avery, Glenn B. Canner, Shannon C.
Mok, and Dan S. Sokolov (2005), ‘‘Community Banks and Rural Develop-
ment: Research Relating to Proposals to Revise the Regulations That Imple-
ment the Community Reinvestment Act,’’ Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 91
(Spring), pp. 202–35.
370 Federal Reserve Bulletin Summer 2005the pricing threshold versus only 1.3 percent of
government-backed loans. Second, with few excep-
tions, ﬁrst-lien loans have a substantially lower inci-
dence of higher-priced lending than do junior-lien
loans for the same purposes. For example, nationally
the incidence of higher-priced lending for conven-
tional ﬁrst-lien reﬁnance loans was 15.5 percent
whereas for comparable junior-lien loans it was
27.4 percent. Third, manufactured-home loans exhibit
the greatest incidence of higher pricing across all
loan products, a result consistent with the elevated
credit risk associated with such lending. For example,
57.1 percent of conventional ﬁrst-lien loans used to
purchase manufactured homes were higher priced, in
sharp contrast to the 11.5 percent rate for comparable
loans for site-built homes. Finally, the lower inci-
dence of higher-priced lending (shown in the memo
item in table 7) for loans initiated in the transition
period reinforces the decision to exclude such loans
from the pricing analysis.
Rate spreads for higher-priced loans. Variation in
mean and median spreads across products for loans
with rates above the threshold is much smaller than
variation in the incidence of higher-priced lending.
Because the threshold for reporting is set higher for
junior liens than for ﬁrst liens, higher-priced junior-
lien products have higher mean and median spreads.
Once again, manufactured-home loans stand out in
that they have the highest average spreads among all
the loan products with comparable lien status.
Except for loans backed by manufactured homes,
the vast majority of higher-priced loans have prices
within 1 or 2 percentage points of the pricing thresh-
olds. Only a very small proportion of higher-priced
ﬁrst-lien loans have spreads that exceed 7 percentage
points. Similarly, only a small proportion of junior-
lien loans have spreads of 9 percentage points or
more: But home-improvement loans provide two
exceptions—30.7 percent of conventional junior-
lien home-improvement loans and 47.6 percent of
government-backed junior-lien home-improvement
loans have spreads of 9 percentage points or more.
Reﬂecting these distributions, the mean and median
spreads for most loan products fall within 2 percent-
age points of the reporting thresholds. The exceptions
include loans backed by manufactured homes and
junior-lien home-improvement loans, for which the
distribution of prices is more even.
Lenders of higher-priced loans. Most lenders covered
by HMDA reported extending few if any higher-
priced loans for 2004 (data not shown in tables).
Nearly 3,300 lenders reported making no such loans,
and an additional 2,300 reported making between one
and nine such loans. Nearly 500 lenders reported
making more than 100 higher-priced loans; these
more-active lenders accounted for 96 percent of all
reported higher-priced lending of this type. More-
over, the 10 lenders with the largest volume extended
38 percent of all higher-priced loans.
Variation across metropolitan areas. The analysis of
separate geographic markets shows that higher-
priced lending varies considerably across MSAs.41
For this exercise, the focus is on the incidence of
higher-priced lending among conventional ﬁrst-lien
home-purchase loans for site-built, owner-occupied
homes. The MSA with the lowest incidence of
higher-priced lending for this product is the San Fran-
cisco–San Mateo–Redwood City area in California,
at 2 percent; the MSA with the highest incidence
is the McAllen–Edinburg–Pharr area in Texas, at
42 percent.42 A review of the full list of MSAs
indicates that most of the areas with the highest
incidence are in the southern region of the country,
whereas those with the lowest incidence are much
more dispersed.
Although a comprehensive analysis of the reasons
for such wide variation in the incidence of higher-
priced lending is beyond the scope of this article, a
review of data from one of the three national credit-
reporting agencies ﬁnds a close association between
the proportion of individuals in an MSA county with
a low credit score and the incidence of higher-priced
lending in that area.
Loans Covered by HOEPA
The 2004 HMDA data indicate whether a loan is
subject to the Home Ownership and Equity Protec-
tion Act of 1994. Before 2004, little information was
publicly available about the extent of such lending
or the number or type of institutions involved in
such activities. However, HMDA data do not capture
all HOEPA-related lending. Some HOEPA loans are
extended by institutions not covered by HMDA, and
some HOEPA loans that are made by HMDA-covered
institutions are not reported under the Federal
41. Reporting institutions are required to report all their lending in
MSAs as well as in the nonmetropolitan portions of states. However,
because institutions operating exclusively in nonmetropolitan areas
are not covered by HMDA, loans in nonmetropolitan areas are under-
represented in the data. For this reason, the geographic analysis here is
focused on MSAs.
42. In November 2004, the OMB redesignated this Texas MSA as
McAllen–Edinburg–Mission (see www.whitehouse.gov/omb/bulletins/
fy05/b05-02_attachment.pdf).
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HMDA. In particular, if the proceeds of a home-
secured loan are not used to reﬁnance an existing
home loan or to ﬁnance home improvement, then the
loan may be covered by HOEPA but is not reportable
under Regulation C.43
Incidence of HOEPA-Related Lending
For 2004, 1,948 lenders reported extending 24,594
loans covered by HOEPA (table 7). The HOEPA
loans accounted for only 0.003 percent of all the
originations of home-secured reﬁnance or home-
improvement loans reported for 2004 (derived from
the table).44
HOEPA lending is relatively concentrated: The ten
lenders that reported the largest number of HOEPA
originations accounted for 37 percent of all reported
HOEPA loans (data not shown in tables). At the other
extreme, 801 institutions reported only one HOEPA
loan, and 327 reported only two such loans. Most
HOEPA loans were extended by banks (50 percent of
the total) or by bank subsidiaries or afﬁliates of bank
holding companies (14 percent of the total); indepen-
dent mortgage companies extended the rest.
Characteristics of HOEPA-Related Lending
As noted, HOEPA applies only to closed-end home
loans (whether for reﬁnancing or home improve-
ment) and not to home-purchase loans or home equity
lines of credit. The vast majority of HOEPA loans
reported in the 2004 data involved conventional prod-
ucts: Only 7 percent of reported HOEPA loans were
government backed (derived from table 7). About
50 percent of the reported HOEPA loans involved
ﬁrst-lien conventional loans (more than 80 percent
of these were for reﬁnancings, and the rest were for
home improvement), and about 40 percent involved
junior-lien conventional loans (more than half of
these were for home improvement).
On average, reported HOEPA loans are not large
(data not shown in tables). For example, for con-
ventional reﬁnancing loans covered by HOEPA, the
average size of a ﬁrst-lien loan was $98,650, and
the average size of a junior-lien loan was $31,705. In
contrast, the average sizes of such loans not covered
by HOEPA were $173,125 for a ﬁrst-lien loan and
$54,581 for a junior-lien loan.
Reported HOEPA lending varies among borrowers
sorted by borrower income, race, and ethnicity and
among census tracts sorted by census tract income,
population, and location. However, the data do not
indicate that HMDA-reportable HOEPA lending is
focused primarily on lower-income or minority indi-
viduals or on those residing in lower-income neigh-
borhoods or neighborhoods with high concentrations
of minority individuals. For example, although
reported HOEPA loans were extended to borrowers
in all income groups, about three-fourths were
extended to middle- and higher-income borrowers
(data not shown in tables). Similarly, most reported
HOEPA loans were extended to non-Hispanic white
borrowers. Most of the homes secured by reported
HOEPA loans were in middle- or higher-income areas
and in areas with a minority population that was less
than 20 percent of the total population.
LENDING OUTCOMES BY RACE,E THNICITY,
AND SEX
One of the primary purposes of the HMDA data is
to allow comparison of the outcomes of the lending
process for applicants and borrowers grouped along
many dimensions, including by race, ethnicity, and
sex. Outcomes reported in the HMDA data include
the disposition of applications (denial rates) and, as
of 2004, the pricing of loans. Gross outcomes for
different groups of borrowers can be compared, but
HMDA data include information on a number of
items whose presence or absence for borrowers can
be made consistent (‘‘controlled for’’) in conducting
the comparisons. Clearly the HMDA data do not
include all the factors that are involved in credit
underwriting and pricing. However, by controlling
for variations so as to make borrowers as similar as
possible on the dimensions of the data that are avail-
able, one can account for some of the factors that
may explain differences in the outcomes of the lend-
ing process among groups.
The HMDA data allow individuals to be matched
by loan type and purpose, type of property securing
the loan, lien status, owner-occupancy status, prop-
erty location (for example, same MSA or even same
census tract), income relied on for underwriting, loan
amount, and time of year when the loan was made as
well as by whether the loan involved a co-applicant.
43. For example, if a homeowner takes out a HOEPA-covered loan
to pay off outstanding credit card debt or some other type of consumer
credit, and the loan does not involve the reﬁnancing of an existing
home loan or home improvement, then the loan is not covered by
Regulation C and is thus not required to be part of an institution’s
HMDA reporting.
44. The HMDA data also include information on loans purchased
by covered institutions during 2004: Among purchased loans, about
2,700 were designated as HOEPA loans.
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ethnic groups, one can match for the sex of the
applicant and co-applicant, and in comparing out-
comes by sex, one can match for race and ethnicity.
Comparisons in outcomes across groups can be
conducted at the level of an individual institution,
groups of institutions (for example, manufactured-
home lending specialists), geographic market, or
populations as a whole. Further, a variety of statis-
tical methodologies can be used to control for the
effects of the credit-related or other factors in HMDA
noted above. The full range of these comparisons is
beyond the scope of this article. However, to gain an
understanding of the differences that are likely to be
important, we analyzed the 2004 data using statistical
matching criteria similar to those used in the Federal
Reserve’s statistical analysis program (described in
the section ‘‘Using the Expanded HMDA Data as a
Screening Tool for Fair Lending Enforcement’’).
We restrict the analysis to denial rates, the inci-
dence of higher-priced lending, and the mean spreads
paid by borrowers with higher-priced loans, and we
compare these outcomes across eleven groups—nine
racial or ethnic groups and the two sexes. We conduct
the analysis for thirteen of the twenty-ﬁve loan prod-
ucts covered in table 7.45
We present the comparisons at three levels, one
unadjusted and two adjusted. The ﬁrst level for each
group is the raw, or unadjusted, average outcome.
The second level is the average outcome as adjusted
for the borrower-related factors reported in the
HMDA data—income, loan amount, location (MSA)
of the property, presence of a co-applicant, and (in
the comparisons by race and ethnicity) sex or (in the
comparisons by sex) race and ethnicity; applying this
adjustment is hereafter termed ‘‘adjusting (or control-
ling or accounting) for borrower-related factors.’’ The
third level is the average outcome as adjusted for all
the items in the second level (the borrower-related
factors) plus the lending institution—applying this
adjustment is hereafter termed ‘‘adjusting (or control-
ling, or accounting) for borrower-related factors plus
lender.’’
Applications subject to the transition rules were
excluded from the pricing comparisons; however,
they were included for the denial-rate comparisons.46
Also excluded from the sample are applicants resid-
ing outside the ﬁfty states and the District of Colum-
bia, applications deemed to be business-related, and
requests for pre-approval that were denied by the
lender or that were granted by the lender but not
acted upon by the borrower. Otherwise, the sample
includes all 2004 HMDA applications acted upon by
the lender in the thirteen product areas.
Unadjusted and adjusted comparisons for lending
outcomes across groups are discussed in the sections
below. For purposes of presentation, the adjusted
outcomes shown in the tables are normalized so that,
for the base comparison group (non-Hispanic whites
in the case of comparison by race and ethnicity, and
males in the case of comparison by sex), the adjusted
mean at each adjustment level is the same as the
unadjusted mean. Consequently, the adjusted out-
comes for any other group represent the expected
average outcome if the members of that group had
the same distribution of control factors as that of the
base comparison group.
Denial Rates across Groups
Unadjusted mean denial rates vary across loan cate-
gories for all groups of borrowers (table 9). For
example, the mean unadjusted denial rate for Asians
is lowest for government-backed ﬁrst-lien home-
purchase loans (12.4 percent) and highest for con-
ventional junior liens for home improvements
(46.1 percent).
For every loan category, American Indians, blacks,
Hispanic whites, and the group for which race was
missing have higher unadjusted mean denial rates
than non-Hispanic whites, with the highest rates gen-
erally for blacks and the rates for Hispanic whites
lying about halfway between those for blacks and
those for non-Hispanic whites. The denial rates for
each of the other minority groups vary in their rela-
tionship with the rates for non-Hispanic whites.
With few exceptions, controlling for borrower-
related factors reduces the differences among racial
and ethnic groups. (Although the effect of controlling
for borrower-related factors can widen the racial and
ethnic differences in denial rates.) Accounting for
45. The analysis was not conducted for unsecured loans because
pricing data were not collected for these loans. Eleven other product
areas were not used because they accounted for so few loans that
matching was difﬁcult.
46. The action date on an application is used to determine the
reporting year for HMDA data. The gap between the application date
and the action date is generally shorter for denied applications than for
originated loans. For example, applications received and acted upon in
December (and therefore reported in HMDA for that year) are more
likely to be denials than acceptances. Similarly, applications acted
upon in January but received in the previous year are more likely to be
acceptances. In analyzing denial rates for 2004, excluding applica-
tions covered by the transition period (that is, applications received
before 2004) is therefore likely to disproportionately exclude accep-
tances. This can be seen in the memo item in table 7, where the denial
rates are lower for applications ﬁled during the transition period. For
this reason, transition-period applications are included in the denial-
rate analysis in tables 9 and 14.
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A. Home purchase, owner-occupied site-built home




Government backed, ﬁrst lien













































Alaska Native ... 42,460 21.1 20.4 15.7 11,211 22.7 22.6 18.3 6,425 15.5 14.4 14.7
Asian ................ 288,060 13.5 12.7 12.9 48,970 18.6 17.4 16.3 7,645 12.4 12.2 13.2
Black or African
American ....... 402,090 24.7 22.3 18.2 96,741 21.9 21.2 18.8 85,845 17.2 16.9 16.0
Native Hawaiian or
other Paciﬁc
Islander ......... 30,866 17.5 15.3 15.4 9,312 18.3 17.2 15.6 3,629 13.8 12.9 11.7
Two or more
minority races ... 3,768 13.8 12.3 15.7 975 12.5 11.8 15.5 534 15.4 15.8 12.1
Joint ................. 64,744 12.0 15.0 12.4 12,224 13.1 15.3 13.8 12,807 9.6 12.5 11.8
Race missing ......... 696,276 21.8 20.1 15.1 156,504 20.4 19.6 17.7 63,179 20.0 17.0 16.6
Hispanic white ....... 423,395 18.4 15.8 14.8 124,483 20.0 18.0 16.0 59,172 15.6 13.8 13.5
Non-Hispanic white .. 3,309,353 10.9 10.9 10.9 532,260 13.7 13.7 13.7 396,856 10.4 10.4 10.4
Sex
Onemale ............ 1,636,413 16.8 16.8 16.8 344,552 18.7 18.7 18.7 195,671 14.0 14.0 14.0
One female .......... 1,217,287 16.0 15.3 15.8 235,350 18.3 18.2 18.4 133,456 14.4 13.2 13.5
Twomales ........... 55,264 15.6 15.6 15.6 11,311 18.3 18.3 18.3 13,409 11.2 11.2 11.2
Two females ......... 45,100 15.2 14.0 14.4 8,591 17.5 16.4 16.1 9,121 12.1 10.9 11.8
Note: Includes transition-period applications (those submitted before 2004);
for explanation, see text note 46. For explanation of adjustment factors, see text.
For method of allocation into racial and ethnic categories and deﬁnitions
of categories, see general note to table 6 and text note 35. Applications made
jointly by a male and female are not tabulated here because they would not be
directly comparable with applications made by one applicant or by two appli-
cants of the same sex.
9.—Continued
B. Reﬁnance, owner-occupied site-built home




Government backed, ﬁrst lien













































Alaska Native ... 93,068 38.2 40.1 32.3 6,529 40.8 38.6 34.9 3,222 15.7 13.8 13.3
Asian ................ 321,978 18.7 25.7 27.3 20,194 33.1 36.1 35.2 3,698 15.0 15.4 16.1
Black or African
American ....... 897,836 41.9 39.8 32.4 54,132 44.5 42.2 37.3 69,607 17.6 18.5 17.2
Native Hawaiian or
other Paciﬁc
Islander ......... 55,859 29.7 33.5 31.2 4,518 36.3 36.3 37.3 2,204 12.2 12.0 14.1
Two or more
minority races ... 8,340 28.2 32.9 31.3 704 31.5 37.3 39.8 442 13.6 13.6 14.3
Joint ................. 108,225 25.7 33.0 27.3 9,382 28.9 33.9 31.7 7,857 11.0 13.8 14.0
Race missing ......... 2,084,368 43.9 47.3 32.3 193,182 43.8 41.1 35.2 55,907 21.4 17.8 17.1
Hispanic white ....... 639,075 29.6 31.3 28.6 38,892 37.9 37.0 33.8 29,182 15.8 15.1 16.2
Non-Hispanic white .. 5,916,294 24.3 24.3 24.3 475,471 28.4 28.4 28.4 206,851 12.4 12.4 12.4
Sex
Onemale ............ 2,683,328 35.1 35.1 35.1 179,812 37.4 37.4 37.4 91,609 16.1 16.1 16.1
One female .......... 2,161,057 32.2 31.0 32.8 131,172 37.9 35.5 36.0 71,666 16.1 15.2 16.3
Twomales ........... 69,113 26.9 26.9 26.9 5,471 32.7 32.7 32.7 4,995 17.4 17.4 17.4
Two females ......... 78,731 30.1 27.0 26.1 5,370 34.4 32.8 34.2 4,740 15.5 14.6 14.7
Note: See note to table 9.A.
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C. Home improvement, conventional loan, owner-occupied site-built home
Percent except as noted
Race and ethnicity
and sex



























American Indian or Alaska Native .. 8,843 47.1 47.1 40.3 7,712 54.7 48.2 47.3
Asian .............................. 15,204 27.8 34.8 33.4 16,276 46.1 45.7 44.3
BlackorAfricanAmerican ......... 67,098 49.1 47.2 41.7 62,045 60.1 55.6 52.0
Native Hawaiian or other
Paciﬁc Islander ................ 4,402 38.3 42.7 38.9 4,538 50.1 46.4 43.8
Two or more minority races ........ 677 41.5 43.0 40.7 656 62.0 57.0 48.8
Joint ............................... 6,832 32.6 40.2 34.1 10,842 40.6 47.1 42.2
Race missing ....................... 102,716 53.0 56.0 39.5 159,984 49.6 48.4 42.1
Hispanic white ..................... 54,319 37.5 37.7 36.2 39,529 51.4 46.4 45.1
Non-Hispanic white ................ 360,959 28.6 28.6 28.6 494,636 36.3 36.3 36.3
Sex
Onemale .......................... 159,817 43.4 43.4 43.4 189,244 51.1 51.1 51.1
One female ........................ 143,959 38.4 37.0 39.9 143,026 50.0 47.3 49.4
Twomales ......................... 5,024 39.1 39.1 39.1 5,588 46.3 46.3 46.3
Two females ....................... 5,788 38.4 37.5 34.6 6,261 44.3 42.9 44.9
Note: See note to table 9.A.
9.—Continued
D. Manufactured housing, conventional loan, ﬁrst lien, owner-occupied home






























American Indian or Alaska Native .. 4,785 57.3 55.9 52.7 1,670 58.0 57.9 51.5
Asian .............................. 1,736 44.4 44.1 40.2 641 49.5 48.4 51.6
BlackorAfricanAmerican ......... 28,363 64.2 62.4 57.7 9,535 63.9 61.6 53.8
Native Hawaiian or other
Paciﬁc Islander ................ 1,351 57.3 55.2 50.2 346 59.8 60.3 56.5
Two or more minority races ........ 121 68.6 63.5 74.7 73 56.2 68.4 50.2
Joint ............................... 3,398 53.5 58.3 57.5 1,549 50.7 50.4 47.9
Race missing ....................... 33,385 60.9 58.4 54.7 39,237 64.2 68.5 52.7
Hispanic white ..................... 20,820 55.1 55.9 52.5 6,760 51.0 51.3 49.3
Non-Hispanic white ................ 238,698 48.0 48.0 48.0 149,366 46.2 46.2 46.2
Sex
Onemale .......................... 101,964 52.7 52.7 52.7 54,294 52.8 52.8 52.8
One female ........................ 82,536 54.9 52.3 52.1 39,726 52.7 52.1 52.9
Twomales ......................... 4,483 50.3 50.3 50.3 1,271 43.2 43.2 43.2
Two females ....................... 5,766 56.7 53.4 49.9 1,792 50.0 51.4 43.3
Note: See note to table 9.A.
New Information Reported under HMDA and Its Application in Fair Lending Enforcement 375lender almost always reduces differences further,
although statistically signiﬁcant differences remain
between non-Hispanic whites and most of the other
racial and ethnic groups.
For example, for conventional ﬁrst-lien home-
purchase loans, the unadjusted mean denial rate for
blacks was 24.7 percent and for non-Hispanic whites
10.9 percent, a difference of 13.8 percentage points.
Accounting for income, loan amount, and other
borrower-related factors in the HMDA data reduces
the difference 2.4 percentage points. Controlling for
borrower-related factors plus lender signiﬁcantly
reduces the gap further, to 7.3 percentage points.
The reduction for conventional ﬁrst-lien reﬁnanc-
ing is even more dramatic. The unadjusted difference
between black and non-Hispanic white denial rates is
17.6 percentage points, a difference cut by more than
half, to 8.1 percentage points, when adjusted for
borrower-related factors plus lender.
Differences in denial rates exhibit no consistent
pattern with regard to the sex of the applicant. For
some products, males have higher denial rates, and
for others, females do; but in general, the size of the
difference by sex is small. Furthermore, controlling
for borrower-related factors plus lender has an incon-
sistent (but generally small) effect. In fact, in some
cases adjustment reverses the sign of the difference—
that is, for example, some denial rates that were
higher for females than for males before adjustment
become higher for males than for females after
adjustment.
Incidence of Higher-Priced Lending across
Racial and Ethnic Groups
Although most borrowers do not have higher-priced
loans, the incidence of higher-priced lending varies
substantially across racial and ethnic groups
(table 10). Moreover, both the overall incidence of
higher-priced lending and the differences across
groups varies substantially across loan product cate-
gories. For government-backed loan products, small
proportions of borrowers have higher-priced loans,
and no meaningful differences appear across racial
and ethnic groups. At the other extreme, the majority
of borrowers for manufactured homes have higher-
priced loans; and for this product, signiﬁcant dif-
ferences appear across racial and ethnic groups
(although these differences are smaller than for some
other products).
Differences in the incidence of higher-priced lend-
ing across loan products make it difﬁcult to identify
9. Unadjusted and adjusted denial rates on applications for loans on one- to four-family homes,
by type of loan and by race and ethnicity and sex of applicant, 2004—Continued
E. Nonowner-occupied site-built home


















































Alaska Native ... 6,881 37.5 28.5 16.2 5,674 30.5 30.5 27.0 2,183 49.7 44.5 38.9
Asian ................ 48,246 15.0 13.3 12.9 30,317 20.4 22.3 22.2 6,716 30.0 32.1 28.4
Black or African
American ....... 80,051 24.1 19.6 17.1 87,234 30.6 28.6 25.4 26,017 44.8 38.4 34.1
Native Hawaiian or
other Paciﬁc
Islander ......... 5,127 18.2 15.6 13.3 4,401 24.8 25.2 26.4 1,611 40.5 33.7 32.4
Two or more
minority races ... 600 14.8 13.1 10.8 661 24.4 28.3 30.6 214 42.1 33.5 46.2
Joint ................. 11,839 11.1 13.4 12.6 7,957 18.1 23.0 20.1 2,293 24.7 31.9 27.5
Race missing ......... 123,905 18.2 17.2 14.2 132,928 32.5 30.9 26.2 31,499 40.3 37.6 31.5
Hispanic white ....... 56,912 18.7 14.9 14.2 44,640 26.8 24.4 22.7 14,508 37.9 34.9 31.8
Non-Hispanic white .. 659,022 11.0 11.0 11.0 484,333 17.8 17.8 17.8 133,098 25.5 25.5 25.5
Sex
Onemale ............ 318,461 17.2 17.2 17.2 264,494 24.5 24.5 24.5 74,353 33.6 33.6 33.6
One female .......... 164,107 17.5 16.3 16.3 143,972 25.5 24.0 23.8 43,267 39.3 34.6 33.6
Twomales ........... 25,564 10.7 10.7 10.7 13,387 16.2 16.2 16.2 4,006 24.0 24.0 24.0
Two females ......... 8,813 12.2 9.6 10.8 5,283 21.5 17.6 14.9 1,881 35.3 29.5 24.6
Note: See note to table 9.A. 1. ‘‘Other’’ consists of government-backed loans of all types, junior liens,
home-improvement loans, and unsecured loans.
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A. Home purchase, owner-occupied site-built home




Government backed, ﬁrst lien










































Alaska Native ... 28,107 18.1 17.2 11.8 7,618 50.2 47.5 33.6 4,751 4.9 4.1 1.1
Asian ................ 199,359 5.9 7.4 8.1 32,444 34.4 30.8 29.9 5,402 2.5 1.7 .8
Black or African
American ....... 232,688 32.4 26.7 15.7 62,434 61.9 58.3 37.1 59,275 1.5 1.3 1.1
Native Hawaiian or
other Paciﬁc
Islander ......... 20,293 15.7 16.3 11.1 6,195 49.6 44.9 33.5 2,373 2.3 1.6 1.4
Two or more
minority races ... 2,613 22.9 22.2 12.2 699 43.2 44.3 26.6 400 20.5 17.0 1.2
Joint ................. 47,299 6.9 10.8 9.4 9,090 29.3 36.7 31.3 10,035 1.1 1.1 1.4
Race missing ......... 390,136 13.4 16.8 11.1 96,140 40.7 43.5 33.2 35,547 1.4 1.3 .9
Hispanic white ....... 301,915 20.3 16.6 11.6 87,612 58.0 49.9 35.1 47,055 2.1 1.1 1.1
Non-Hispanic white .. 2,476,255 8.7 8.7 8.7 394,357 30.4 30.4 30.4 304,809 1.1 1.1 1.1
Sex
Onemale ............ 1,129,781 15.3 15.3 15.3 237,097 46.1 46.1 46.1 145,275 1.3 1.3 1.3
One female .......... 850,213 15.3 14.4 15.0 162,680 47.8 46.9 46.7 98,428 1.6 1.5 1.3
Twomales ........... 38,170 9.5 9.5 9.5 7,879 34.4 34.4 34.4 10,094 1.2 1.2 1.2
Two females ......... 31,083 10.4 9.0 9.8 6,064 37.3 34.5 35.2 6,716 1.2 1.3 1.1
Note: Excludes transition-period loans (those for which the application was
submitted before 2004). For deﬁnition of higher-priced lending and explana-
tion of adjustment factors, see text. For method of allocation into racial and
ethnic categories and deﬁnitions of categories, see general note to table 6
and text note 35. Loans taken out jointly by a male and female are not tabulated
here because they would not be directly comparable with loans taken out by one
borrower or by two borrowers of the same sex.
10.—Continued
B. Reﬁnance, owner-occupied site-built home




Government backed, ﬁrst lien










































Alaska Native ... 44,503 20.2 21.0 14.7 2,981 26.8 24.4 26.1 2,216 4.4 4.2 1.0
Asian ................ 207,114 5.9 9.7 12.1 10,519 25.4 24.9 24.3 2,348 3.9 2.0 1.0
Black or African
American ....... 391,524 34.6 29.5 17.6 24,292 45.2 41.3 26.4 46,603 1.0 1.2 1.5
Native Hawaiian or
other Paciﬁc
Islander ......... 31,381 16.4 18.6 14.5 2,267 35.8 33.2 24.6 1,547 6.1 4.1 1.4
Two or more
minority races ... 5,089 21.1 22.4 15.0 394 19.3 25.4 24.7 347 18.7 19.6 2.3
Joint ................. 67,199 10.4 14.7 13.5 5,609 23.3 26.5 24.8 6,100 .9 1.1 1.2
Race missing ......... 827,590 19.3 25.4 15.3 82,329 32.7 42.1 24.8 30,603 2.0 2.0 1.3
Hispanic white ....... 378,826 19.3 18.5 14.3 20,687 35.1 28.7 25.2 21,804 1.9 1.2 1.4
Non-Hispanic white .. 3,698,309 12.9 12.9 12.9 285,505 23.9 23.9 23.9 152,619 1.3 1.3 1.3
Sex
Onemale ............ 1,360,350 18.6 18.6 18.6 90,991 34.0 34.0 34.0 63,536 1.4 1.4 1.4
One female .......... 1,173,835 19.8 18.5 18.7 67,266 32.6 32.6 33.9 49,282 1.7 1.6 1.4
Twomales ........... 40,012 12.1 12.1 12.1 3,024 23.6 23.6 23.6 3,103 2.2 2.2 2.2
Two females ......... 43,208 17.3 14.5 13.4 2,887 31.7 26.6 22.6 3,053 1.8 1.5 1.6
Note: See note to table 10.A.
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C. Home improvement, conventional loan, owner-occupied site-built home
Percent except as noted
Race and ethnicity
and sex

























American Indian or Alaska Native .. 3,775 23.4 25.8 22.5 2,628 18.8 17.4 17.5
Asian .............................. 8,907 8.4 16.3 18.8 6,467 13.5 15.1 16.6
BlackorAfricanAmerican ......... 27,677 42.5 39.2 24.6 19,520 37.9 31.3 18.0
Native Hawaiian or other
Paciﬁc Islander ................ 2,237 17.7 22.4 21.9 1,749 26.5 22.6 16.9
Two or more minority races ........ 341 22.3 22.6 18.6 193 16.6 15.1 14.1
Joint ............................... 3,894 15.5 20.7 19.2 5,280 15.2 18.3 16.3
Race missing ....................... 36,877 21.5 32.2 21.4 61,005 17.4 23.1 15.9
Hispanic white ..................... 28,395 26.7 27.6 21.0 15,464 21.0 20.0 16.5
Non-Hispanic white ................ 221,213 19.5 19.5 19.5 259,771 15.6 15.6 15.6
Sex
Onemale .......................... 74,062 26.1 26.1 26.1 71,519 24.4 24.4 24.4
One female ........................ 74,479 27.0 25.8 26.5 57,771 22.3 21.4 23.6
Twomales ......................... 2,545 17.2 17.2 17.2 2,390 19.1 19.1 19.1
Two females ....................... 3,053 23.9 18.5 21.2 2,807 19.0 18.1 19.2
Note: See note to table 10.A.
10.—Continued
D. Manufactured housing, conventional loan, ﬁrst lien, owner-occupied home




























American Indian or Alaska Native .. 1,168 68.2 58.3 54.8 513 51.9 53.5 50.6
Asian .............................. 537 62.8 62.6 61.9 210 42.9 47.8 56.0
BlackorAfricanAmerican ......... 5,175 78.5 64.8 60.0 2,316 67.7 56.1 50.1
Native Hawaiian or other
Paciﬁc Islander ................ 315 70.8 69.2 65.3 102 48.0 44.5 45.5
Two or more minority races ........ 21 47.6 51.2 57.0 26 42.3 54.3 −9.8
Joint ............................... 918 58.3 56.8 60.3 568 41.2 49.3 48.7
Race missing ....................... 6,535 57.2 56.6 55.4 7,420 59.0 51.6 46.3
Hispanic white ..................... 5,598 67.5 65.2 60.7 2,274 46.2 56.7 50.0
Non-Hispanic white ................ 76,324 54.7 54.7 54.7 56,713 46.0 46.0 46.0
Sex
Onemale .......................... 28,100 61.0 61.0 61.0 17,181 48.6 48.6 48.6
One female ........................ 22,177 60.5 60.2 59.8 12,772 49.8 49.0 49.2
Twomales ......................... 1,566 65.1 65.1 65.1 560 56.3 56.3 56.3
Two females ....................... 1,547 65.0 64.6 65.1 622 47.3 50.8 53.6
Note: See note to table 10.A.
378 Federal Reserve Bulletin Summer 2005consistent patterns across all types of lending. Con-
ventional home-purchase lending and conventional
reﬁnance lending include most of the borrowers cov-
ered by the HMDA data, and consequently those loan
types are the main focus of the discussion of higher-
priced lending that follows. In general, unadjusted
differences in the incidence of higher-priced lend-
ing between non-Hispanic whites, on the one hand,
and blacks, on the other, are large, but these differ-
ences are substantially reduced after controlling for
borrower-related factors plus lender.
Most of the reduction in the difference in the
incidence of higher-priced lending across groups
comes from adding the control for lender to the
control for borrower-related factors. For conventional
ﬁrst-lien home-purchase loans, the mean unadjusted
incidence of higher-priced lending was 32.4 percent
for blacks and 8.7 percent for non-Hispanic whites,
a difference of 23.7 percentage points. Borrower-
related factors account for about one-fourth of the
difference. Adding to this adjustment the control for
lender reduces the remaining gap markedly, to 7 per-
centage points. For conventional ﬁrst-lien reﬁnanc-
ings, the unadjusted difference between blacks and
non-Hispanic whites is 21.7 percentage points; this
difference is reduced to 4.7 percentage points after
controlling borrower-related factors plus lender, and
about two-thirds of that reduction comes from the
addition of the control for lender. Similar patterns for
differences between black and non-Hispanic white
borrowers are found for the junior-lien products.
The picture for Asians differs greatly from that for
blacks. Asians have a lower unadjusted mean inci-
dence of higher-priced lending for ﬁrst-lien conven-
tional home-purchase and reﬁnance loans than do
non-Hispanic whites. The gap is narrowed by control-
ling for borrower-related factors plus lender, although
the incidence of higher-priced lending remains lower
for Asians than for non-Hispanic whites. Hispanic
whites show a pattern similar to that of blacks, but
with smaller differences relative to non-Hispanic
whites. For ﬁrst-lien conventional loan products, the
adjusted differences for Hispanic whites are less than
one-half those for blacks; for conventional home-
purchase junior liens, the differences for Hispanic
whites are close to those for blacks.
The foregoing analysis indicates that the informa-
tion in the HMDA data—that is, adjusting the HMDA
data for borrower-related factors plus lender—is
insufﬁcient to account fully for racial or ethnic differ-
ences in the incidence of higher-priced lending; sig-
niﬁcant differences remain unexplained. Explaining
10. Unadjusted and adjusted incidence of higher-priced lending for loans on one- to four-family homes,
by type of loan and by race and ethnicity and sex of borrower, 2004—Continued
E. Nonowner-occupied site-built home















































Alaska Native ... 3,576 16.9 15.6 11.1 3,166 19.7 21.5 14.1 828 34.8 25.2 31.2
Asian ................ 33,592 7.4 8.5 8.6 18,809 7.0 10.9 11.3 3,785 37.5 32.1 30.4
Black or African
American ....... 46,260 38.6 24.2 14.7 46,900 33.5 27.7 16.7 11,099 46.8 43.2 33.6
Native Hawaiian or
other Paciﬁc
Islander ......... 3,407 15.8 14.6 11.2 2,666 14.6 17.3 13.0 731 40.8 33.5 29.5
Two or more
minority races ... 424 25.7 23.5 11.4 424 24.8 27.5 15.9 97 38.1 19.9 55.4
Joint ................. 8,971 7.1 11.0 9.9 5,421 8.2 13.5 11.3 1,466 27.2 31.8 28.6
Race missing ......... 76,434 11.5 14.1 10.6 64,341 15.5 22.2 13.5 13,877 41.1 40.0 32.0
Hispanic white ....... 40,643 16.8 15.4 10.9 28,011 17.9 18.1 13.3 7,522 49.4 40.1 34.5
Non-Hispanic white .. 502,030 9.4 9.4 9.4 330,979 10.9 10.9 10.9 81,408 30.2 30.2 30.2
Sex
Onemale ............ 219,700 17.7 17.7 17.7 161,011 17.9 17.9 17.9 39,283 42.5 42.5 42.5
One female .......... 111,338 17.4 16.9 16.9 85,278 19.8 19.8 18.4 20,416 43.0 42.5 43.1
Twomales ........... 19,437 8.3 8.3 8.3 9,083 7.9 7.9 7.9 2,526 27.2 27.2 27.2
Two females ......... 6,428 7.6 6.8 7.9 3,307 12.0 9.3 10.2 984 35.6 33.5 32.0
Note: See note to table 10.A. 1. ‘‘Other’’ consists of government-backed loans of all types, junior liens,
home-improvement loans, and unsecured loans.
New Information Reported under HMDA and Its Application in Fair Lending Enforcement 379the remaining differences is likely to require more
details about such factors as the speciﬁc credit cir-
cumstances of each borrower, the speciﬁc loan prod-
ucts they seek, and the business practices of the
institutions they approach for credit.
Understanding the patterns within the HMDA data
is also likely to require more information. Two some-
what offsetting patterns are shown in the data. On
the one hand, minority borrowers (except for Asians)
tend to disproportionately use government-backed
products, which show a much lower incidence of
higher-priced loans. The implication is that the dif-
ference in the incidence of higher-priced lending
between minorities and non-Hispanic whites is lower
for the combined loan product, conventional and
government-backed loans, than for each product
separately. On the other hand, for a given loan type,
whether government-backed or conventional, non-
Asian minorities tend to disproportionately borrow
from lenders that have higher incidences of higher-
priced loans, a tendency on the part of minority
borrowers that accounts for much of the aggregate
difference in outcomes between them and non-
Hispanic white borrowers.
The disproportionate borrowing by non-Asian
minorities from higher-priced lenders could occur
because of often benign factors such as a ‘‘seg-
mented’’ marketplace in which different lenders offer
different products and borrower groups self-select the
product-lender combination that best matches their
credit or other circumstances. Such a marketplace
does not necessarily raise public-policy concerns
regarding fair lending: For example, compared with
non-Hispanic whites, minority groups on average
11. Unadjusted and adjusted incidence of higher-priced lending for conventional, ﬁrst-lien loans on site-built,
owner-occupied, one- to four-family homes, by selected race and ethnicity for selected characteristics
of borrower, property, and lender, 2004
Percent except as noted
Selected characteristic,



























BlackorAfricanAmerican ......... 87,841 39.2 35.2 21.7 161,762 42.1 39.6 25.9
Hispanic white ..................... 83,642 23.6 21.2 16.3 120,253 22.5 24.2 20.4
Non-Hispanic white ................ 637,019 12.9 12.9 12.9 961,571 19.3 19.3 19.3
Middle
BlackorAfricanAmerican ......... 66,997 33.9 31.1 18.1 112,007 34.8 33.8 20.1
Hispanic white ..................... 84,988 22.1 19.5 13.3 118,699 20.8 21.5 16.6
Non-Hispanic white ................ 648,853 9.9 9.9 9.9 989,420 14.9 14.9 14.9
Higher
BlackorAfricanAmerican ......... 70,247 23.9 19.8 10.9 104,662 26.0 22.8 12.7
Hispanic white ..................... 118,728 17.4 12.5 7.8 123,101 16.9 14.6 10.4
Non-Hispanic white ................ 1,099,544 5.8 5.8 5.8 1,539,336 9.0 9.0 9.0
Income of Census Tract
Lower
BlackorAfricanAmerican ......... 69,713 40.9 34.7 22.7 141,851 42.5 37.5 27.4
Hispanic white ..................... 85,791 26.0 25.0 18.8 126,577 23.3 25.6 22.9
Non-Hispanic white ................ 254,231 15.0 15.0 15.0 383,904 21.7 21.7 21.7
Middle
BlackorAfricanAmerican ......... 107,177 32.0 29.0 17.8 175,784 33.4 31.2 19.5
Hispanic white ..................... 137,291 20.5 17.7 13.0 167,456 19.2 19.6 16.0
Non-Hispanic white ................ 1,229,899 10.3 10.3 10.3 1,936,163 15.0 15.0 15.0
Higher
BlackorAfricanAmerican ......... 55,401 22.7 18.2 9.8 73,571 22.2 18.1 10.2
Hispanic white ..................... 78,431 13.6 10.5 7.0 84,151 13.6 11.2 8.2
Non-Hispanic white ................ 984,982 5.2 5.2 5.2 1,370,653 7.4 7.4 7.4
CRA Assessment Area
Property not in assessment area
BlackorAfricanAmerican ......... 78,331 31.9 25.5 17.7 121,253 28.3 23.3 14.8
Hispanic white ..................... 100,290 16.7 14.3 11.1 105,634 13.6 12.6 10.3
Non-Hispanic white ................ 1,010,824 7.4 7.4 7.4 1,419,662 8.8 8.8 8.8
Property in assessment area
BlackorAfricanAmerican ......... 43,680 12.7 9.9 6.6 79,403 13.3 10.9 6.4
Hispanic white ..................... 68,101 9.6 5.6 4.0 113,714 7.7 5.3 4.6
Non-Hispanic white ................ 620,870 2.8 2.8 2.8 964,166 3.9 3.9 3.9
Notes appear at end of table.
380 Federal Reserve Bulletin Summer 2005may seek loans with higher loan-to-value ratios (per-
haps because on average they may have less savings
to meet down-payment and closing cost require-
ments), which are typically higher priced and which
are the specialty of certain lenders. This explanation
could account for differences in lender choice, but
demonstrating it requires loan-speciﬁc information—
such as loan-to-value ratios—as well as other infor-
mation that is not in the HMDA data.
However, a situation that might suggest an inad-
equately functioning marketplace—and that could
trigger fair lending concerns—would occur if minor-
ity borrowers are incurring prices on their loans that
are higher than is warranted by their credit charac-
teristics. Such a problem could arise in one or both of
the following circumstances: (1) neighborhoods with
high proportions of minority residents may be less
well served by lenders offering prime products, a
circumstance that would make obtaining lower-priced
loans more difﬁcult for well-qualiﬁed minorities, or
(2) some minority borrowers may be steered to lend-
ers who typically charge higher prices than the credit
characteristics of these borrowers warrant. The data
reported under HMDA are insufﬁcient to tell us
whether either explanation (or any other) is correct,
nor do they tell us why minorities disproportionately
use government-backed products.
Incidence of Higher-Priced Lending for
Selected Subgroups
Although, for reasons discussed above, we cannot
deﬁnitively explain the racial and ethnic pricing
differences that remain after adjusting for borrower-
related factors plus lender or the reasons that minori-
ties may disproportionately obtain credit from higher-
priced lenders, some additional insights may be
gained by analyzing subgroups of lenders and bor-
rowers (table 11). We present data only for blacks
11.—Continued
Percent except as noted
Selected characteristic,



























BlackorAfricanAmerican ......... 43,683 9.0 6.7 5.2 71,439 1.1 1.0 .7
Hispanic white ..................... 67,768 3.9 3.2 2.9 87,929 .4 .4 .4
Non-Hispanic white ................ 808,454 1.6 1.6 1.6 1,200,878 .4 .4 .4
Sold to others
BlackorAfricanAmerican ......... 137,679 40.5 33.3 20.6 196,055 43.6 36.7 25.9
Hispanic white ..................... 160,188 26.3 24.0 17.5 179,549 27.3 27.9 22.1
Non-Hispanic white ................ 1,065,255 13.8 13.8 13.8 1,427,539 20.0 20.0 20.0
Retained
BlackorAfricanAmerican ......... 51,326 30.7 25.6 13.2 124,030 39.6 34.3 21.0
Hispanic white ..................... 73,959 22.2 17.5 10.5 111,348 21.4 21.7 18.5





That Are Higher Priced
Less than 10
BlackorAfricanAmerican ......... 121,500 10.6 8.5 8.4 171,423 6.6 5.1 4.3
Hispanic white ..................... 182,503 5.7 4.8 4.5 212,021 2.6 2.5 2.3
Non-Hispanic white ................ 1,993,900 2.3 2.3 2.3 2,589,887 1.8 1.8 1.8
10–49
BlackorAfricanAmerican ......... 69,894 44.3 40.9 35.9 139,090 46.1 42.2 36.9
Hispanic white ..................... 78,695 31.0 33.0 31.2 111,898 32.1 32.9 30.6
Non-Hispanic white ................ 366,709 25.3 25.3 25.3 763,119 27.3 27.3 27.3
50 or more
BlackorAfricanAmerican ......... 41,189 76.6 75.6 74.8 80,743 74.4 71.8 71.7
Hispanic white ..................... 40,393 65.4 70.7 71.6 54,639 58.2 65.8 67.1
Non-Hispanic white ................ 115,646 66.5 66.5 66.5 345,303 64.2 64.2 64.2
Note: For discussion of CRA assessment areas and the identiﬁcation of
higher-priced lenders, see text note 47. See also general note to table 10.A.
1. Government-sponsored enterprise; virtually all were to Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac.
New Information Reported under HMDA and Its Application in Fair Lending Enforcement 381and Hispanic whites because they are the two minor-
ity groups whose outcomes differ most from those of
non-Hispanic whites in the incidence of higher-priced
lending. We also restrict the comparison to the two
loan-products that account for the largest number of
loans—conventional home-purchase loans and reﬁ-
nancings. We analyze these two minority groups and
the two loan products with regard to ﬁve factors:
(1) the borrower’s relative income; (2) the relative
income of the census tract in which the property
related to the loan is located; (3) the location of the
property relative to the lender’s assessment area as
deﬁned under the Community Reinvestment Act of
1977 (CRA); (4) the disposition of the loan—that is,
whether the loan was retained or sold and, if it was
sold, to whom; and (5) the proportion of the lender’s
loans that are higher priced (less than 10 percent,
10–49 percent, or 50 percent or more—the last pro-
portion being taken to indicate that the lender special-
izes in higher-priced lending).47
Results for borrowers grouped by their relative
income and their census tract income classiﬁcation
offer little evidence that unexplained racial differ-
ences in pricing or lender choice vary by income.
Although the incidence of higher-priced loans is
higher for lower-income borrowers and those who
live in lower-income census tracts, the same is
true for all three racial groups. Thus, although unex-
plained price differences are somewhat lower for
higher-income borrowers, price patterns are generally
similar to those of the overall decompositions.
The decompositions for CRA assessment area and
loan sales provide evidence on whether the channel
through which a loan was obtained and the subse-
quent disposition of the loan affect racial or ethnic
groups differently. Although the overall incidence of
higher-priced loans reported in the 2004 HMDA data
is much lower for loans sold to the GSEs, the data
offer scant evidence that the disposition (sold or
retained) is related to unexplained racial differences.
However, whether the loan was originated by an
institution in its CRA assessment area does matter.
Differences across groups for lending within an
assessment area are about one-third of those for lend-
ing outside the assessment area. Moreover, for all
racial and ethnic groups, lending within an assess-
ment area exhibits a much lower incidence of higher-
priced lending.
One possible explanation for the assessment-area
effect may be that the channel through which loans
are originated matters. Loans extended to borrowers
outside an institution’s assessment area may be more
likely to have come through mortgage brokers, who
may price differently or who operate in areas with
different market conditions than do institutions that
originate loans directly. Although this pattern may
suggest that brokers charge higher prices, particularly
to minorities, it is not necessarily evidence of unfair
treatment or that the existence of the broker channel
adversely affects minorities. It may indicate that
brokers serve markets or individuals who are more
costly to serve, or whose credit proﬁles are weaker,
and price accordingly. If so, then were it not for
broker activity, some of these borrowers might not be
served at all or might pay higher prices. Determining
whether brokers treat minority borrowers fairly is
a complex undertaking and requires information
unavailable in the HMDA data. The same can be said
about lenders that originate loans through different
channels.
Finally, although the aggregate lending patterns of
specialists in higher-priced lending exhibit unex-
plained racial or ethnic differences, so do the aggre-
gate patterns of other lenders to approximately the
same degree. And for the higher-priced specialists
with the highest incidence of higher-priced lending,
differences across racial and ethnic groups are, in
some instances, lower than for other lenders. Regard-
ing the racial and ethnic differences in the lending
patterns that do exist among higher-priced lending
specialists, the analysis shows that income, loan
amount, and other HMDA factors appear to explain
little of those differences.
Differences in Mean Price Spreads across
Racial and Ethnic Groups
Patterns across racial and ethnic groups for the mean
spreads paid by those with higher-priced loans are
quite different from patterns across such groups for
the incidence of higher-priced lending (table 12). For
the loan products with the largest numbers of borrow-
ers, the unadjusted mean spreads are lower for all
minority groups except blacks than they are for non-
Hispanic whites. Typically, Asian borrowers have the
47. Larger depository institutions covered by the CRA (generally
those with assets of $250 million or more) are required to identify the
census tracts in their CRA assessment areas as of the end of each
calendar year. That information was used to determine which loans in
the HMDA data were for properties within the lenders’ CRA assess-
ment areas. When lenders were part of a bank holding company, the
combined assessment areas of all banks in the holding company were
used for the analysis. For a deﬁnition of ‘‘assessment area,’’ see note 4
to box ‘‘Reasons for Loan Price Variation.’’
The identiﬁcation of specialists in high-priced lending was based
solely on the incidence of higher-priced loans for non-Hispanic whites.
This restriction prevented the identiﬁcation from being affected by
differences between the pricing outcomes of blacks and Hispanics, on
the one hand, and those of non-Hispanic whites, on the other.
382 Federal Reserve Bulletin Summer 200512. Unadjusted and adjusted mean APR spreads for higher-priced loans on one- to four-family homes,
by type of loan and by race and ethnicity and sex of borrower, 2004
A. Home purchase, owner-occupied site-built home




Government backed, ﬁrst lien

















































Alaska Native ... 5,101 4.0 4.1 4.1 3,828 6.3 6.4 6.4 235 4.2 4.0 4.1
Asian ................ 11,771 3.8 4.0 4.0 11,164 6.2 6.4 6.4 137 4.3 4.2 4.2
Black or African
American ....... 75,427 4.2 4.2 4.2 38,657 6.6 6.5 6.5 911 4.1 4.0 4.2
Native Hawaiian or
other Paciﬁc
Islander ......... 3,186 4.0 4.1 4.1 3,070 6.3 6.5 6.5 55 4.3 4.3 4.5
Two or more
minority races ... 598 4.1 4.3 4.1 302 6.4 6.5 6.5 82 3.9 3.6 4.1
Joint ................. 3,242 4.0 4.1 4.1 2,662 6.4 6.5 6.5 114 4.2 4.1 4.2
Race missing ......... 52,094 4.1 4.1 4.1 39,130 6.4 6.5 6.5 515 4.2 4.2 4.1
Hispanic white ....... 61,248 3.9 4.0 4.1 50,817 6.3 6.4 6.4 973 4.7 4.2 4.2
Non-Hispanic white .. 216,409 4.1 4.1 4.1 119,879 6.4 6.4 6.4 3,214 4.1 4.1 4.1
Sex
Onemale ............ 173,166 4.0 4.0 4.0 109,257 6.4 6.4 6.4 1,924 4.2 4.2 4.2
One female .......... 130,250 4.1 4.0 4.0 77,785 6.4 6.4 6.4 1,555 4.2 4.3 4.3
Twomales ........... 3,632 4.1 4.1 4.1 2,711 6.3 6.3 6.3 126 4.1 4.1 4.1
Two females ......... 3,246 4.1 4.0 4.1 2,261 6.4 6.3 6.3 83 4.0 3.8 3.9
Note: For deﬁnition of APR spread, see table 7, note 1. See also note to table 10.A.
12.—Continued
B. Reﬁnance, owner-occupied site-built home
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Alaska Native ... 8,977 4.1 4.2 4.1 800 7.2 6.8 7.1 98 4.1 4.0 3.8
Asian ................ 12,250 3.9 4.1 4.1 2,675 6.5 6.9 7.1 91 4.4 3.7 3.8
Black or African
American ....... 135,467 4.3 4.3 4.3 10,974 7.5 7.2 7.2 456 3.7 3.8 3.8
Native Hawaiian or
other Paciﬁc
Islander ......... 5,153 4.1 4.2 4.2 811 6.8 7.1 7.1 94 5.1 3.7 3.6
Two or more
minority races ... 1,072 4.0 4.1 4.1 76 6.8 7.0 7.3 65 3.9 3.9 3.9
Joint ................. 6,973 4.1 4.2 4.2 1,308 7.0 7.1 7.1 56 3.9 3.8 3.6
Race missing ......... 159,741 4.2 4.2 4.2 26,915 7.6 7.3 7.2 603 3.8 3.9 3.9
Hispanic white ....... 73,181 4.0 4.1 4.2 7,255 6.9 7.0 7.1 408 4.4 4.0 3.9
Non-Hispanic white .. 476,034 4.2 4.2 4.2 68,211 7.1 7.1 7.1 2,002 3.8 3.8 3.8
Sex
Onemale ............ 252,618 4.1 4.1 4.1 30,905 7.1 7.1 7.1 895 3.9 3.9 3.9
One female .......... 232,583 4.2 4.2 4.1 21,919 7.1 7.1 7.1 823 3.9 3.9 3.8
Twomales ........... 4,833 4.2 4.2 4.2 714 7.0 7.0 7.0 68 4.1 4.1 4.1
Two females ......... 7,479 4.3 4.2 4.2 914 7.2 6.9 7.0 55 3.9 4.0 4.3
Note: See note to table 12.A.
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ferences in loan amounts, incomes, and other HMDA
factors plus lender either does little to the average
spreads or changes them in different directions for
different groups. One consistent difference that per-
sists after adjustment is the difference between blacks
and non-Hispanic whites. After adjustment, the gap
in the mean spreads between these groups for the
most common loan products is between 0.10 and
0.15 percentage points.
Differences in Pricing by Sex of Borrower
As with denial rates, there is little evidence of sys-
tematic differences in pricing when borrowers are
12. Unadjusted and adjusted mean APR spreads for higher-priced loans on one- to four-family homes,
by type of loan and by race and ethnicity and sex of borrower, 2004—Continued
C. Home improvement, conventional loan, owner-occupied site-built home
Percent except as noted
Race and ethnicity
and sex































American Indian or Alaska Native .. 883 4.5 4.6 4.4 493 7.7 7.6 7.8
Asian .............................. 752 3.9 4.3 4.4 875 7.5 7.8 7.9
BlackorAfricanAmerican ......... 11,770 4.6 4.6 4.5 7,389 8.4 8.3 8.1
Native Hawaiian or other
Paciﬁc Islander ................ 397 4.2 4.4 4.5 463 7.9 8.0 7.7
Two or more minority races ........ 76 4.4 4.3 4.3 32 7.7 7.9 6.6
Joint ............................... 605 4.4 4.5 4.4 800 7.8 8.1 8.2
Race missing ....................... 7,920 4.5 4.6 4.5 10,633 7.9 8.2 8.0
Hispanic white ..................... 7,572 4.3 4.3 4.4 3,255 7.7 8.1 8.0
Non-Hispanic white ................ 43,209 4.4 4.4 4.4 40,410 7.9 7.9 7.9
Sex
Onemale .......................... 19,340 4.4 4.4 4.4 17,425 8.2 8.2 8.2
One female ........................ 20,104 4.4 4.4 4.4 12,873 8.1 8.1 8.1
Twomales ......................... 438 4.3 4.3 4.3 457 7.9 7.9 7.9
Two females ....................... 729 4.6 4.4 4.1 532 8.0 8.0 7.9
Note: See note to table 12.A.
12.—Continued
D. Manufactured housing, conventional loan, ﬁrst lien, owner-occupied home


































American Indian or Alaska Native .. 796 6.0 6.0 5.9 266 5.4 5.3 4.9
Asian .............................. 337 5.4 5.5 5.5 90 4.9 5.7 5.7
BlackorAfricanAmerican ......... 4,060 6.0 5.9 5.9 1,567 5.4 5.3 5.3
Native Hawaiian or other
Paciﬁc Islander ................ 223 5.8 6.1 6.6 49 4.8 5.0 5.1
Two or more minority races ........ 10 5.6 6.8 5.3 11 3.9 4.0 3.2
Joint ............................... 535 5.6 5.8 5.7 234 4.9 5.1 5.1
Race missing ....................... 3,738 5.9 5.9 5.7 4,379 4.8 4.7 4.9
Hispanic white ..................... 3,777 6.0 6.1 6.0 1,051 5.0 5.0 5.1
Non-Hispanic white ................ 41,725 5.6 5.6 5.6 26,104 5.0 5.0 5.0
Sex
Onemale .......................... 17,145 5.8 5.8 5.8 8,350 5.0 5.0 5.0
One female ........................ 13,413 5.7 5.7 5.7 6,363 5.1 5.0 5.0
Twomales ......................... 1,019 5.9 5.9 5.9 315 5.4 5.4 5.4
Two females ....................... 1,005 5.7 5.6 6.0 294 5.4 5.3 5.7
Note: See note to table 12.A.
384 Federal Reserve Bulletin Summer 2005distinguished by sex (table 10). The differences in the
unadjusted incidence of higher-priced lending are
almost always small across loan products and gen-
erally narrow when HMDA factors plus lender are
taken into account. Of the nineteen loan product
comparisons with evidence of some pricing differ-
ence by sex, males have a higher incidence of higher-
priced loans in nine cases, while females do in ten
cases. Nearly identical patterns are exhibited for
mean spreads, and there is no evidence that one sex
consistently pays more than the other (table 12).
The Role of Factors Not Included in HMDA
An important limitation of the decompositions
reported earlier is that controls were possible only for
borrower-related factors included in the HMDA data
plus lender when assessing differences in loan pricing
among racial, ethnic, or other groups. As noted, many
factors relevant to underwriting and pricing are not
included in the HMDA data and thus cannot be
accounted for in analyses that rely exclusively on
the data. To provide some insight into how impor-
tant controlling for these other factors might be in
accounting for pricing differences across borrower
groups, we collaborated with Georgetown Univer-
sity’s Credit Research Center (CRC) to perform addi-
tional analyses using a CRC database. The CRC data
consist of both HMDA data and a wide range of other
loan-level factors not in the HMDA data that may
relate to credit underwriting and pricing.
The CRC data, which were provided by eight
lenders that specialize in subprime lending, are
equivalent to the 2004 HMDA ﬁlings of those lenders
(for the loans they originated) plus non-HMDA infor-
mation on many other characteristics of the loans and
borrowers.48 The non-HMDA information consists of
credit history scores (in this instance, FICO scores),
loan-to-value ratios for ﬁrst-lien loans, the appraised
value of property, and information on whether the
interest rate on the loan was adjustable or ﬁxed,
whether underwriting for the loan waived certain
certiﬁcations by the borrower (that is, whether the
loan was a ‘‘low documentation’’ product), whether
the loan carried a prepayment penalty, and whether
the loan was originated through a broker. Unlike the
HMDA data, the CRC data are not disaggregated
48. The eight subprime mortgage lenders are subsidiaries of large
ﬁnancial institutions. The 2004 data from these lenders consist of
about 626,000 loans that they originated; more than 60 percent of the
loans in that group are higher-priced. The data from these subprime
lenders have been used in various research initiatives and public
policy deliberations.
12. Unadjusted and adjusted mean APR spreads for higher-priced loans on one- to four-family homes,
by type of loan and by race and ethnicity and sex of borrower, 2004—Continued
E. Nonowner-occupied site-built home






















































Alaska Native ... 603 3.9 4.1 4.1 623 4.1 4.3 4.3 288 6.5 6.2 6.3
Asian ................ 2,476 3.9 3.9 4.0 1,319 3.9 4.0 4.1 1,419 6.5 6.2 6.1
Black or African
American ....... 17,841 4.2 4.1 4.1 15,731 4.3 4.3 4.3 5,197 6.5 6.3 6.2
Native Hawaiian or
other Paciﬁc
Islander ......... 539 4.0 4.0 3.9 388 4.2 4.4 4.8 298 6.7 6.3 6.2
Two or more
minority races ... 109 4.1 4.4 4.1 105 3.9 3.9 3.7 37 6.7 6.2 6.7
Joint ................. 637 4.0 4.0 3.9 444 4.2 4.2 4.0 399 6.5 6.4 6.0
Race missing ......... 8,816 4.1 4.1 4.1 9,995 4.2 4.3 4.2 5,698 6.7 6.3 6.3
Hispanic white ....... 6,831 3.9 4.0 4.0 5,002 4.1 4.2 4.2 3,718 6.3 6.2 6.1
Non-Hispanic white .. 47,211 4.0 4.0 4.0 35,920 4.1 4.1 4.1 24,622 6.1 6.1 6.1
Sex
Onemale ............ 38,917 4.0 4.0 4.0 28,824 4.2 4.2 4.2 16,711 6.4 6.4 6.4
One female .......... 19,349 4.0 4.0 4.0 16,904 4.2 4.2 4.2 8,774 6.3 6.3 6.4
Twomales ........... 1,605 4.1 4.1 4.1 718 4.1 4.1 4.1 688 6.3 6.3 6.3
Two females ......... 489 4.1 4.2 5.4 396 4.4 4.1 4.0 350 6.5 6.2 6.4
Note: See note to table 12.A. 1. See table 10.E., note 1.
New Information Reported under HMDA and Its Application in Fair Lending Enforcement 385by individual lender; consequently, the analysis of
the data could not control for lender. Together, the
eight lenders accounted for about 22 percent of the
higher-priced conventional ﬁrst- or junior-lien home-
purchase or reﬁnance loans related to owner-occupied
properties reported by HMDA ﬁlers for 2004.
The CRC analyzed pricing differences among the
combined ﬁlings of the eight lenders in a manner
identical to that used to prepare table 10—that is,
using only data reported in HMDA—and then it
extended the adjustment of differences by using the
non-HMDA items in its database.49 The number of
loans in the CRC database was sufﬁcient to allow
meaningful analysis of conventional home-purchase
and reﬁnance loans on one- to four-family, site-built,
owner-occupied homes for two minority groups—
blacks and Hispanic whites—and for non-Hispanic
whites.
For pricing outcomes for conventional ﬁrst-lien
home-purchase loans from the eight lenders, as
adjusted for borrower-related factors (that is, using
only the HMDA data), the incidence of higher-priced
lending differs between black and non-Hispanic white
borrowers by 1.5 percentage points and between His-
panic white and non-Hispanic white borrowers by
0.3 percentage point (table 13). When additional fac-
tors available only in the CRC data are taken into
account, the differences between black and non-
Hispanic white borrowers and between Hispanic
white and non-Hispanic white borrowers falls about
one-third. For reﬁnance loans, the 1.2 percentage
point gap between black and non-Hispanic white
borrowers that remains after controlling for HMDA
data items is removed when additional factors in the
CRC database are controlled for. With respect to
mean APR spreads for these loan products, gross
49. Only loans with complete information on all relevent factors
were used in the analysis. Loans with missing information for any
factor had a somewhat lower incidence of higher-priced lending than
did the loans used in the analysis.
13. Loan pricing by eight subprime specialists, conventional ﬁrst-lien loans on owner-occupied
one- to four-family homes, by type of loan and by selected race and ethnicity of borrower, 2004
A. Unadjusted and adjusted incidence of higher-priced lending































BlackorAfricanAmerican ......... 6,369 85.8 84.4 83.9 37,354 82.9 81.9 80.7
Hispanic white ..................... 6,110 72.6 83.2 83.1 12,800 71.7 78.8 80.9
Non-Hispanic white ................ 30,224 82.9 82.9 82.9 135,667 80.7 80.7 80.7
Note: Includes transition-period loans (those for which the application was
submitted before 2004). For details on higher-priced lending, the subprime lend-
ers, and the adjustment factors, see text and text note 49. For method of alloca-
tion into racial and ethnic categories and deﬁnitions of categories, see general
note to table 6 and text note 35.
Source: Credit Research Center, Georgetown University.
13.—Continued
B. Unadjusted and adjusted mean APR spreads for higher-priced loans





































BlackorAfricanAmerican ......... 5,463 5.1 5.1 5.0 30,959 5.1 5.1 5.0
Hispanic white ..................... 4,437 4.7 4.9 4.9 9,183 4.7 4.8 4.9
Non-Hispanic white ................ 25,053 4.9 4.9 4.9 109,524 5.0 5.0 5.0
Note: For deﬁnition of APR spread, see table 7, note 1. See also notes to
table 13.A.
386 Federal Reserve Bulletin Summer 2005differences across racial or ethnic groups (that is,
differences that exist in the raw, or unadjusted, data)
are de minimus, a fact little changed by adding more
controls from either the HMDA or the CRC data.
These results suggest that an analysis employing
comprehensive information on speciﬁc loan products
(for example, different types of adjustable-rate loans)
from speciﬁc lenders—information unavailable in the
HMDA or CRC data—would be required to draw
ﬁrm conclusions about racial or ethnic differences in
pricing.
USING THE EXPANDED HMDA DATA AS A
SCREENING TOOL FOR FAIR LENDING
ENFORCEMENT
Ensuring compliance with the nation’s fair lending
laws is one of the responsibilities of the federal and
state agencies that regulate ﬁnancial institutions. For
some time, the Federal Reserve has been using a
statistical analysis system that relies on the HMDA
data to help assess fair lending compliance by high-
volume mortgage lenders. The system identiﬁes
which supervised institutions and which loan prod-
ucts and geographic markets show meaningful differ-
ences in the denial rates of loan applications by the
race, ethnicity, or sex of the borrower and thus war-
rant greater supervisory attention. The statistical
analysis system measures differences in denial rates
by comparing applications for a speciﬁc loan product
ﬁled by applicants who differ by race, ethnicity, or
sex but who are matched on the basis of the limited
set of items in the HMDA data. For example, the
analysis can focus on denial rates of whites, Hispanic
whites, and blacks by comparing the denials of appli-
cants from each of those groups who sought the same
loan product for about the same loan amount, are
from the same metropolitan area, and have similar
incomes, dates of application, and number of appli-
cants in the transaction. The statistical analysis sys-
tem also provides compliance examiners with a spe-
ciﬁc list of matched application ﬁles to review during
the on-site part of an examination.
The expanded data provide opportunities to
improve the statistical analysis system in two ways.
First, some of the new data items can be used to
reﬁne the existing system of analyzing denial rates
of loan applications by allowing more precise dif-
ferentiation among loan products. Lien status and
manufactured-home designation are prominent
examples because both typically have signiﬁcant
roles in loan underwriting. Second, the new loan-
pricing information provides opportunities to expand
the statistical analysis beyond the disposition of
applications to differences in loan pricing. The data
can be reviewed for differences across groups in the
incidence of higher-priced lending and in average
spreads paid by borrowers with loans priced above
the thresholds. The pricing data can also be reviewed
for broader patterns that may indicate fair lending
issues. For example, an institution’s overall lending
activity can be reviewed to identify geographic varia-
tions in pricing that may be associated with neighbor-
hood racial or ethnic population characteristics. Each
of these approaches will improve the fair lending
analyses conducted by examiners.
Screening Using the 2004 HMDA Data
As of this writing, the Federal Reserve has modiﬁed
its statistical analysis system for fair lending exami-
nations to incorporate the new information available
in the expanded HMDA data. To examine the poten-
tial utility of the enhanced system, we used a stream-
lined version of the system to conduct a review of the
lending activity of the 8,853 institutions reporting
2004 HMDA data. The approach here and in the
earlier sections of this article are related, but unlike
the earlier sections, which involved an analysis of
aggregate patterns that included a control for lender,
this exercise uses the data to identify patterns in the
lending of individual institutions.
The streamlined analysis starts by evaluating the
statistical signiﬁcance of differences across racial or
ethnic lines in the unadjusted (or gross) incidence of
denial rates, incidence of higher-priced lending, and
average spreads paid by those with higher-priced
loans for each lender separately. This procedure pro-
duces a series of lender–product combinations. For
each lender–product combination, further analysis
matches each minority applicant (or borrower) with
nonminority applicants (or borrowers) on the basis
of a variety of factors available in the HMDA data,
including loan product, borrower income and loan
amount, geographic market (for example, speciﬁc
MSA), and number of applicants (one or more than
one).
Adjusted differences are computed by comparing
the denial rates, incidence of higher-priced lending,
and average APR spreads of minorities with those of
the nonminorities matched to them. This procedure is
designed to remove the effects of these other factors
from the calculations of the differences. The adjusted
differences are an estimate of the expected differ-
ences in outcomes if a minority and a nonminority
with the same income, loan amount, and number of
New Information Reported under HMDA and Its Application in Fair Lending Enforcement 387applicants applied for the same loan product, at the
same institution, in the same market.
The streamlined analysis used for purposes of this
article relies on publicly available data as well as data
ﬁled under HMDA that are not subject to public
disclosure (the dates an application was ﬁled and
acted on). A picture of the outcomes of the statistical
analysis system with regard to the analysis of denial
rates or pricing can be conveyed by reviewing the
number of loan products for which the system indi-
cates a statistically signiﬁcant difference between
blacks and Hispanics (as a group) and non-Hispanic
whites in denial rates, in the incidence of higher-
priced lending, or in the mean differences in pricing
for those with higher-priced loans.50 The focus of the
streamlined analysis is on the eight owner-occupied
product areas that account for the vast majority of
owner-occupied loans in the 2004 HMDA data.51
In total, there are 13,260 lender–product combina-
tions for the 8,853 HMDA reporting institutions that
have at least one black or Hispanic borrower who can
be matched (for comparison) to at least one non-
Hispanic white borrower. Of the 13,260 lender–
product combinations, 2,418 have at least ﬁfty black
or Hispanic borrowers and at least ﬁfty non-Hispanic
white borrowers, numbers that provide a more mean-
ingful basis for comparison.
For the black and Hispanic group and the non-
Hispanic white group, we have calculated, for the
13,260 lender–product combinations, the distribution
across the categories of the statistical signiﬁcance
of three indicators—the difference in denial rates
(table 14), in the incidence of higher-priced lending
(table 15), and in the mean spreads for loans above
the threshold (table 16). We differentiate between
situations in which the black and Hispanic group has
an indicator (denial rate, incidence of higher-priced
loans, or mean spread) that is greater than that for the
non-Hispanic white group and situations in which an
indicator is lower for the black and Hispanic group
than for the non-Hispanic white group. Differences
are presented in two ways: (1) as the distribution of
the statistical signiﬁcance of the unadjusted rate or
incidence and (2) for each unadjusted category, as the
distribution of the statistical signiﬁcance that remains
after the statistical analysis system has been applied.
The categories of statistical signiﬁcance are, from
highest to lowest level of signiﬁcance, 1 percent,
5 percent, 10 percent, and not statistically signiﬁcant.
Denial Rates
Of the 13,260 lender–product combinations, 3,075,
or 23 percent, are those in which the minority group
has an unadjusted denial rate that is different from
that of the non-Hispanic white group by a statistically
signiﬁcant amount. In almost all of these cases, the
black and Hispanic denial rate is higher, although the
reverse holds in 4 percent of the cases. Eleven per-
cent of the lender–product combinations show a sta-
tistically signiﬁcant difference in denial rates after
the matching procedure is employed (6 percent at
the 1 percent signiﬁcance level), and only 2 percent
of the 11 percent show a lower denial rate for blacks
and Hispanics.
Incidence of Higher-Priced Loans
Of the 13,260 lender–product combinations, 1,148, or
9 percent, have a statistically signiﬁcant difference
between the minority and nonminority groups in the
unadjusted incidence of higher-priced lending. Most
of the signiﬁcant differences show a higher incidence
for the black and Hispanic group, although about
8 percent show a lower incidence. Employing the
matching process to control for differences in income,
loan amount, and other HMDA factors reduces the
number of statistically signiﬁcant differences by more
than one-half. Of the lender–product combinations
that are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level
when unadjusted differences are evaluated, fewer
than one-half (2 percent of the total number of
lender–product combinations) are statistically signiﬁ-
cant at the 1 percent level after adjustment. A similar
reduction occurs in the number of lenders with at
least one loan product with a statistically signiﬁ-
cant minority–nonminority difference—the matching
procedure reduces the number of lenders almost
50 percent (data not shown in tables).
50. Black and Hispanic borrowers were selected for this review
because these groups generally showed the greatest differences from
non-Hispanic whites. The groups were combined to have sufﬁcient
numbers for a meaningful statistical comparison. The ‘‘Hispanic’’
category used here includes all borrowers designated as Hispanic
regardless of their race. This deﬁnition differs from that used in the
previous section, which restricted the category of ‘‘Hispanics’’ to
white Hispanics.
51. The eight products are virtually the same as those portrayed in
table 9 with the modiﬁcations of (1) adding reﬁnance and home-
improvement ﬁrst liens to the manufactured-housing product area and
(2) combining the home-improvement and junior-lien reﬁnancing
products and expanding the category to include government-backed
loans. Combining products for this exercise was done purely for the
purpose of paralleling the way products are grouped in the Federal
Reserve’s statistical analysis system. The key product areas are identi-
cal to those used for tables 7 and 8. The product groupings do not
affect the actual matching procedure because minority borrowers are
always matched with non-Hispanic white borrowers with exactly the
same product as deﬁned using all the information available in HMDA.
Transition-period applications were used in the denial-rate compari-
son but not in the comparisons for pricing.
388 Federal Reserve Bulletin Summer 2005The effect of employing the statistical procedures
is particularly dramatic for those products for which
the black and Hispanic group shows an unadjusted
incidence that is lower by a statistically signiﬁcant
amount. Only 7 percent of such cases remain statisti-
cally signiﬁcant after the matching procedures are
employed—and none are at the 1 percent signiﬁcance
level.
The reduction in the number of statistically signiﬁ-
cant differences results primarily from a reduction in
the magnitude of the differences. For example, on
average, the minority–nonminority difference in the
incidence of higher-priced loans for those lender–
product combinations in which the unadjusted differ-
ence is positive and statistically signiﬁcant falls
4.5 percent, or about one-fourth, after matching.
Mean Pricing Spreads
The matching procedure yields a similar reduction in
the number of lender–product combinations showing
a statistically signiﬁcant difference in the mean
spreads for blacks and Hispanics versus those for
non-Hispanic whites. Of the 13,260 lender–product
combinations, 5 percent show a statistically signiﬁ-
cant minority–nonminority difference in the mean
spread; about one-third of these show a lower spread
for blacks and Hispanics. The number of statistically
signiﬁcant differences for lender–product combina-
tions is reduced 60 percent after the matching proce-
dure is employed, and about one-sixth of those show
a lower spread for blacks and Hispanics. The number
of lenders with a statistically signiﬁcant difference in
mean spread for at least one product also falls about
60 percent when adjustments are made.
Overall Patterns
A high degree of overlap exists among lenders with
statistically signiﬁcant adjusted differences between
the minority and nonminority groups in denial rates,
the incidence of higher-priced lending, and mean
spreads. For example, 60 percent of the lenders with
a difference in the adjusted mean spread that is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level also have a
statistically signiﬁcant difference in the incidence of
higher-priced lending for at least one product. Almost
80 percent of the lenders with an adjusted difference
in the incidence of higher-priced lending that is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level also have a
statistically signiﬁcant difference in the denial rates
for at least one product. However, the presence of
statistically signiﬁcant differences in multiple out-
come measures does not necessarily imply a more
serious fair lending concern; it may simply reﬂect
differences in the distribution of credit characteristics
of the minority and nonminority populations served
by the lender.
We emphasize that the Federal Reserve’s statistical
analysis system is only a screening tool. The HMDA
14. Distribution of the difference between denial rates on applications by black and Hispanic applicants as a group
and such denial rates for non-Hispanic white applicants, by lender–product combination, 2004
Percent except as noted






Distribution of percentage of lender–product combinations after adjustment
Black and Hispanic denial rate is higher
and difference is statistically signiﬁcant,











at least at the
10 percent level
Total
1 percent 5 percent 10 percent
Black and Hispanic denial rate is
higher and difference is statistically
signiﬁcant, by degree of signiﬁcance
1 percent ........................ 1,642 43.8 16.4 8.6 31.1 0 100
5 percent ........................ 758 4.1 12.4 9.5 74.0 0 100
10 percent ....................... 557 .7 5.7 8.8 84.7 0 100
Difference is not statistically
signiﬁcant ..................... 10,185 .3 48.0 1.0 98.1 .4 100
Non-Hispanic white denial rate is
higher and difference is statistically
signiﬁcant, by degree of signiﬁcance
1 percent ........................ 48 2.1 2.1 0 45.8 50.0 100
5 percent ........................ 34 0 0 0 94.1 5.9 100
10 percent ....................... 36 0 0 0 80.6 19.4 100
Note: Includes transition-period applications (those submitted before 2004);
for explanation, see text note 46. The adjustment factors and the racial and
ethnic categories differ from those in tables 9 through 13. For explanation of
adjustment factors and for method of allocation into racial and ethnic cate-
gories and deﬁnitions of categories, see text and text notes 50 and 51.
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lated, cannot be used to conclude whether a particular
applicant was treated adversely on the basis of a
prohibited factor regarding either the disposition of
the application or the pricing of the loan. The data
reveal little about an individual’s ﬁnancial circum-
stances and nothing about the condition or value of
the property offered as collateral. Furthermore, the
data reveal nothing about the underwriting standards
used by a lender to assess the creditworthiness of an
individual or to set loan price. Moreover, the data do
not reveal how a lender’s credit decisions relate to its
overall business strategy. For example, the data do
not account for the possibility that an institution’s
outreach efforts may attract a larger proportion of
applicants with weaker credit proﬁles than do other
institutions. Consequently, the data do not provide a
ﬁnal basis on which to draw conclusions regarding
either the existence or the absence of fair lending
violations.
The Use of Screening in the
Enforcement Process
As implemented in the Federal Reserve’s bank super-
visory process, the statistical analysis system is used
as a screening procedure to identify those institutions
and their speciﬁc products that warrant closer review
for fair lending concerns. Examiners familiar with
the procedures and products of a given institution
conduct the analysis and tailor it to the speciﬁc
circumstances relevant to the institution in ways that
reﬂect the institution’s product offerings, its com-
pliance risk-management systems, and the Federal
Reserve’s overall supervisory experience with the
institution. Thus, the system used as a screening tool
to analyze fair lending compliance for a particular
institution is more complex than the streamlined
analysis used in this article.
If an institution is targeted for more-intensive
review, follow-up procedures can take one or more
forms, including soliciting more information from the
institution regarding its lending and underwriting pro-
cedures; gathering additional loan-level data, such as
credit scores and loan-to-value ratios; performing
detailed reviews of loan-ﬁle data; and conducting
interviews with current or past bank personnel or
borrowers. The follow-up can be integrated into the
normal consumer examination cycle or can become a
special review of fair lending compliance. The Fed-
eral Reserve has already applied the expanded sta-
tistical management system that includes the 2004
HMDA data to many of the institutions it supervises
and has contacted those that exhibited relatively large
pricing differences by race, ethnicity, or sex to learn
more about their lending practices and to improve
compliance oversight.
In addition, a review of the 2004 data by other
agencies is under way. The Federal Reserve is shar-
ing the screening procedures with other agencies so
that, if they wish, they may integrate them into their
15. Distribution of the difference between incidence of higher-priced loans for black and Hispanic borrowers as a group
and the incidence for non-Hispanic white borrowers, by lender–product combination, 2004
Percent except as noted






Distribution of percentage of lender–product combinations after adjustment
Black and Hispanic incidence is higher
and difference is statistically signiﬁcant,











at least at the
10 percent level
Total
1 percent 5 percent 10 percent
Black and Hispanic incidence is
higher and difference is statistically
signiﬁcant, by degree of signiﬁcance
1 percent ........................ 532 43.0 15.4 7.5 34.0 0 100
5 percent ........................ 285 4.9 11.9 8.4 74.7 0 100
10 percent ....................... 241 1.2 4.6 9.1 85.1 0 100
Difference is not statistically
signiﬁcant ..................... 12,112 .1 .3 .4 99.0 .2 100
Non-Hispanic white incidence is
higher and difference is statistically
signiﬁcant, by degree of signiﬁcance
1 percent ........................ 33 0 0 0 93.9 6.1 100
5 percent ........................ 26 0 0 0 96.2 3.8 100
10 percent ....................... 31 0 0 0 90.3 9.7 100.
Note: Excludes transition-period loans (those for which the application was
submitted before 2004). The adjustment factors and the racial and ethnic cate-
gories differ from those in tables 9 through 13. For explanation of adjustment
factors and for method of allocation into racial and ethnic categories and deﬁni-
tions of categories, see text and text notes 50 and 51.
390 Federal Reserve Bulletin Summer 2005supervisory programs. It is also responding to agency
requests for additional, more detailed analysis of
individual institutions that may be of concern to the
agencies.
Follow-Up Procedures When Unexplained
Differences Are Found
Experience with fair lending reviews indicates that
widely used and largely noncontroversial, objective
underwriting factors, such as credit scores and loan-
to-value ratios, can often account for some or perhaps
all of the pricing differences by race, ethnicity, and
sex that are not explained by the HMDA data. Thus,
generally the ﬁrst step in a compliance examination
in which pricing differences are at issue is to gather
additional information on the factors that are used in
underwriting and pricing but that are not included in
the HMDA data. These factors can vary from institu-
tion to institution and from product to product. This
step is generally taken after consultation with the
lending institution and after a review of its underwrit-
ing policies and procedures. If accounting for these
objective factors explains all racial or ethnic pricing
differences remaining after controlling for HMDA-
related factors, the examination will typically be
closed unless other pricing issues remain. If, how-
ever, not all differences can be explained by control-
ling for these factors, further steps will typically be
taken.
Ordinarily examiners will ask the institution to
provide any evidence it has for the remaining differ-
ences. Supervisory experience shows that these dif-
ferences frequently arise in institutions that employ
discretionary pricing programs. Lenders who indicate
to examiners that pricing differences are the result of
either (1) the use of discretionary pricing to adjust for
varied market factors, such as a competitor’s pricing
or individualized credit-risk or pricing-related factors
not encompassed in a rate sheet, or (2) differences in
the extent to which borrowers negotiate for the best
available pricing on their loans should expect to be
asked to provide credible evidence to support such
explanations. Such evidence could include contem-
poraneous documentation from loan ﬁles, credible
statements by participating loan personnel, and non-
discriminatory underwriting policies and procedures,
such as internal audits of discretionary pricing pat-
terns or training that focuses on a loan ofﬁcer’s
responsibility to avoid setting pricing overages
according to the perceived susceptibility of a given
group to such pricing.
A particularly complex arena in which evidence of
pricing differences may arise involves institutions
having multiple loan origination channels, particu-
larly channels that involve indirect loans (for exam-
ple, those supplied by brokers or wholesalers). These
channels can include multiple origination sources
within a particular institution, including the institu-
tion’s own loan ofﬁcers along with those of its afﬁli-
ates or subsidiaries, as well as indirect lending in
which an institution originates loans referred to it by
brokers or loan correspondents or purchases loans or
pools of loans from unafﬁliated, third-party origina-
16. Distribution of the difference between mean APR spread of prices for loans above the threshold for black and Hispanic
borrowers as a group and the mean spread for non-Hispanic white borrowers, by lender–product combination, 2004
Percent except as noted






Distribution of percentage of lender–product combinations after adjustment
Black and Hispanic mean spread is higher
and difference is statistically signiﬁcant,











at least at the
10 percent level
Total
1 percent 5 percent 10 percent
Black and Hispanic mean spread is
higher and difference is statistically
signiﬁcant, by degree of signiﬁcance
1 percent ........................ 172 28.5 18.6 6.4 40.7 0 100
5 percent ........................ 145 5.5 8.3 9.0 77.2 0 100
10 percent ....................... 127 4.7 6.3 7.1 81.9 0 100
Difference is not statistically
signiﬁcant ..................... 12,611 .1 .2 .3 99.3 .2 100
Non-Hispanic white mean spread is
higher and difference is statistically
signiﬁcant, by degree of signiﬁcance
1 percent ........................ 75 1.3 1.3 0 84.0 13.3 100
5 percent ........................ 57 1.8 1.8 0 91.2 5.3 100
10 percent ....................... 73 0 0 1.4 97.3 1.4 100
Note: For deﬁnition of APR spread, see table 7, note 1. See also note to table 15.
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in the nature of the relationships between a given
lender and the afﬁliates, brokers, or third-party origi-
nators that deliver loans to the lender. Indeed, such
relationships may range across a spectrum from a
prime-rate lender that also operates a subprime busi-
ness in the same geographic market through a direct
subsidiary to a regional bank in one section of the
country that makes fully ‘‘arm’s length’’ purchases of
closed loans from an unafﬁliated mortgage company
operating solely in a different area.
From a fair lending perspective, a lender whose
different channels of lending serve either borrowers
or geographic areas that differ by race, ethnicity, or
other prohibited characteristic is likely to be further
reviewed. That will certainly be the case if these
different channels produce loan pricing that also dif-
fers by race, ethnicity, or other prohibited character-
istic.52 A full review of fair lending compliance in
multiple-channel situations will turn on complex fac-
tual analyses that are beyond the scope of this article.
It is sufﬁcient to note here that such analyses will
cover the type and degree of pricing differences, the
nature of the various channels, the lender’s legal and
business relationships with other entities (for exam-
ple, afﬁliates, brokers, correspondents, or whole-
salers), the lender’s business or economic basis for
operating through those channels, and the lender’s
explanation for the pricing differences.
The process of examining an institution for which
pricing differences based on race, ethnicity, or sex are
statistically signiﬁcant and for which purely objective
pricing factors, such as credit scores or loan-to-value
ratios, cannot explain the differences, will include a
review of loan ﬁles; discussions with management or
loan personnel about possible reasons for the differ-
ences; a review of evidence put forth to support their
explanations; interviews with customers, where nec-
essary, regarding their experiences with the lender;
and a careful vetting of an institution’s policies and
procedures and actual practices. If, after conducting
an examination, there is no credible nondiscrimina-
tory explanation for such differences, examiners will
consider what supervisory action will be appropriate
to address the issue. Moreover, a lender that cannot
account for differences in pricing across groups may
also be exposed to private rights of action under
applicable fair lending laws and may face adverse
effects on its reputation.
HOEPA Enforcement
For the agencies that evaluate compliance with
HOEPA, the expanded HMDA data provide the ﬁrst
opportunity to readily identify which lenders extend
home loans subject to that law and to measure the
extent of their involvement in such lending. The new
information also provides examiners with the data
needed to efﬁciently select samples of loan ﬁles for
review. The data can also be used to examine patterns
of HOEPA-related lending across borrowers and
neighborhoods, arrayed by their racial and ethnic
proﬁles. Such analysis may reveal possible fair lend-
ing issues and may indicate communities where credit
counseling activities could be targeted.
The Federal Reserve’s statistical analysis system
has been augmented to include several screens to aid
HOEPA-related enforcement. These screens include
the identiﬁcation of HOEPA loans that are potentially
unaffordable given a comparison of the applicant’s
income and the estimated monthly loan payments,
the identiﬁcation of loans with APR spreads that
would appear to have triggered HOEPA coverage but
were not reported as such, and the calculation of
differences across racial and ethnic groups in the
incidence of HOEPA lending.53
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In 2002 the Federal Reserve Board amended its
Regulation C to expand the types of information that
lenders covered by HMDA must disclose to the pub-
lic about their home-lending activities. The amend-
ments are intended to improve the quality, consis-
tency, and utility of the reported data and to keep the
regulation in step with recent developments in home-
loan markets. Data reported for 2004 are the ﬁrst to
reﬂect the changes in the reporting rules.
As anticipated, the expanded data provide new
opportunities to assess home-lending activity. Newly
available information on lien status and on whether a
loan is for a site-built or manufactured home, as well
as more uniformity in the information on home-
improvement and reﬁnancing loans, allows analyses
that are more relevant to the current state of the
52. The expanded HMDA data can be used to roughly differentiate
the pricing of an institution’s retail lending operations from the
pricing of loans obtained from other channels by comparing the
locations of borrowers with the locations of an institution’s assess-
ment areas. Loans outside an institution’s assessment areas are more
likely to have been initiated by third-party brokers or through other
indirect channels.
53. The estimated monthly loan payment is derived from HMDA
data using the reported loan amount and an estimated APR that
assumes a ﬁxed-rate thirty-year loan.
392 Federal Reserve Bulletin Summer 2005market. Most prominently, the new information pro-
vides the ﬁrst publicly available loan-level informa-
tion on loan pricing in the higher-priced segment of
the home-loan market, a segment that was virtually
nonexistent a decade or so ago but is now an impor-
tant part of the overall home-loan market.
This article presents an analysis of the 2004
HMDA data. The analysis is conducted with the
national HMDA database and is designed to provide
an understanding of the overall patterns in the data
rather than patterns that pertain to any individual
market or lender. Much of the presentation focuses
on the new items in the data. On balance, the analysis
suggests that the information on lien status, manufac-
tured homes, requests for pre-approval, and reﬁned
product deﬁnitions provides a much improved basis
for describing lending activity and the disposition of
applications for credit. Much of the initial public
review of the data will, however, undoubtedly focus
on loan pricing and particularly on the incidence of
higher-priced lending and the comparison of prices
paid by borrowers grouped by race, ethnicity, and
sex.
The most likely initial public focus will be on the
incidence of higher-priced lending among minorities
(particularly blacks) and among non-Hispanic whites.
In the raw data, the differences between these two
groups in the incidence of higher-priced lending are
generally more than 20 percentage points for various
loan products. Our analysis shows, however, that
more than two-thirds of the aggregate difference in
the incidence of higher-priced lending between black
and non-Hispanic white borrowers can be explained
by differences in the groups’ distributions of income,
loan amounts, other borrower-related characteristics
included in the HMDA data, and the choice of lender.
Further, analysis at the level of individual lenders
suggests that about 2 percent of the 8,853 lenders
covered by HMDA exhibited a statistically signiﬁ-
cant difference in the incidence of higher-priced loans
between black and Hispanic borrowers, on the one
hand, and non-Hispanic white borrowers, on the
other, after accounting for factors included in the
HMDA data.
Thus, we see a sizable narrowing, at both the
aggregate and institution levels, in the unexplained
differences in the the incidence of higher-priced lend-
ing between minority and nonminority groups. This
narrowing suggests that controlling for credit-related
factors not found in the HMDA data, such as credit
history scores and loan-to-value ratios, might further
reduce unexplained racial or ethnic differences.
Whether controlling for such additional factors will
completely account for all remaining differences is
unclear. In that regard, our collaborative study with
the Credit Research Center on the lending activities
of eight large subprime lenders, reported here, sug-
gests that controlling for credit-related factors not
included in the data can make a difference. Our
analysis demonstrated that for some products the
racial or ethnic differences were fully accounted for,
whereas for other products, unexplained differences
remained. Clearly, reaching convincing conclusions
about whether institutions treat individuals differ-
ently on a prohibited basis requires institution-
speciﬁc analysis.
Hence, our analysis strongly indicates that the raw
data alone can lead to inaccurate conclusions, which
in turn may be unfair to particular institutions and
may lead to unnecessary restrictions on the availabil-
ity of loans to less-creditworthy applicants. Risk-
based pricing has greatly expanded the availability of
home loans to borrowers who, because of weaknesses
in their credit proﬁles, had previously been unable
to qualify. It would be unfortunate if unwarranted
accusations of illegal bias, stemming from improp-
erly analyzed pricing differences, discouraged
lenders from participating in this segment of the
market.
The primary responsibility for ensuring compli-
ance with fair lending laws falls on lenders. HMDA
data may help lenders analyze and monitor their
lending patterns. In addition, the regulatory agen-
cies use the data for screening purposes to identify
individual lenders that warrant heightened scrutiny
regarding their loan-pricing activities. Where war-
ranted, such reviews include gaining a fuller under-
standing of the institution’s loan-pricing practices,
analyzing loan-level data, and interviewing appropri-
ate personnel to determine whether pricing differ-
ences identiﬁed through the HMDA screening pro-
cess are explained by controlling for these additional
data or by other objective factors.
To improve its fair lending examination capa-
bilities, the Federal Reserve has modiﬁed its sta-
tistical analysis tool to use the new data to screen
institutions for signiﬁcant differences in lending out-
comes across borrowers grouped by race, ethnicity,
or sex. The Federal Reserve has already applied this
expanded statistical management system to many
of the institutions it supervises. It has also contacted
those institutions that exhibit relatively large pricing
differences to learn more about their lending prac-
tices and to improve its compliance oversight. More-
over, a review of the 2004 data by other agencies
is under way, and the Federal Reserve is sharing the
screening procedures with other agencies to facilitate
their efforts.
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sible with the HMDA data alone, are essential to
determining whether loan-pricing differences in fact
reﬂect discriminatory treatment of minority groups.
However, the aggregate data can nonetheless provide
valuable, broader insights into the experience of such
groups in the home-loan market. For example, black
and Hispanic borrowers taken together are much
more likely than non-Hispanic white borrowers to
obtain credit from institutions that report a higher
incidence of higher-priced loans. On the one hand,
this pattern may be benign and reﬂect a sorting of
individuals into different market segments by their
credit characteristics. On the other hand, it may be
symptomatic of a more serious issue. Lenders that
report a lower incidence of higher-priced products
may be either less willing or less able to serve minor-
ity neighborhoods. More troubling, these patterns
may stem, at least in part, from borrowers being
steered to lenders or to loans that offer higher prices
than the credit characteristics of these borrowers war-
rant. Reaching accurate determinations among these
alternative possible outcomes is one goal of the
supervision system. Moreover, we hope that future
research using the new HMDA data will provide
insights that will facilitate this process.
APPENDIX:E NHANCED DATA ON PRIVATE
MORTGAGE INSURANCE
Historically, mortgage lenders have required prospec-
tive borrowers to make a down payment of at least
20 percent of a home’s value before they will extend
a home-purchase loan. Such down payments are
required because experience has shown that home-
owners with little equity are substantially more likely
to default on their mortgage. Private mortgage insur-
ance (PMI) emerged as a response to both creditors’
concerns about the elevated credit risk of lending
backed by little equity in a home and the difﬁcul-
ties that some consumers encounter in accumulating
sufﬁcient savings to meet required down-payment
and closing costs.
PMI protects a lender if a borrower defaults on a
loan: It reduces a lender’s credit risk by insuring
against losses associated with default up to a contrac-
tually established percentage of the claim amount.
The costs of the insurance are typically paid by the
borrower through a somewhat higher interest rate on
the loan.
In 1993 the Mortgage Insurance Companies of
America (MICA) asked the Federal Financial Institu-
tions Examination Council (FFIEC) to process data
from PMI companies on applications for mortgage
insurance and to produce disclosure statements for
the public based on the data.54 The PMI data largely
mirror the types of information submitted by lend-
ers covered by HMDA. However, because the PMI
companies do not receive all the information about a
prospective loan from the lenders seeking insurance
coverage, some HMDA items are not included in the
PMI data. In particular, loan-pricing information,
requests for pre-approval, and HOEPA status are
unavailable in the PMI data.
For 2004 the seven PMI companies that were writ-
ing private mortgage insurance submitted data to
the FFIEC through MICA. In total, these companies
acted on nearly 2 million applications for insur-
ance: 1.3 million to insure mortgages for purchas-
ing homes and about 650,000 to insure mortgages
for reﬁnancing existing mortgages. PMI companies
approved more than 90 percent of the applications
they received. Approval rates are high because lend-
ers are familiar with the underwriting standards used
by PMI companies and generally submit applications
for insurance only if the applications are likely to be
approved.
54. Founded in 1973, MICA is the trade association for the PMI
industry. The FFIEC prepares disclosure statements for each of the
PMI companies. The statements are available at the corporate head-
quarters of each company and at a central depository in each MSA in
which HMDA data are held. The central depository also holds aggre-
gate data for all the PMI companies active in that MSA. In addition,
the PMI data are available from the Federal Reserve Board through its
HMDA Assistance Line (202-452-2016).
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